F70 

P3S8K3 


ARGUMENT 

FOR 

DISTRICT  ATTORNEY 

JOSEPH  C.  PELLETIER 

(Respondent) 

BY 

JAMES  A.  REED 

(U.  S.  Senator)  7 

AND 

LOUIS  G.  BOYLE 

(Ex.  Atty.-G  en  1 of  Kansas) 

BOSTON  COLLEGE  LIBRAUl 
OHESTNHT  HILL, 

242  DOVER  STREET 


StASHINCTON  PRESS 


AN  ANSWER 


For  more  than  a decade,  the  man  on  whom  executive  officers,  supreme 
directors,  and  national  and  state  officers  have  depended  for  judgment,  j 
initiative  and  guidance  in  the  successive  steps  which  have  given  the  Knights 
of  Columbus  the  largest  membership  in  the  United  States  of  any  order  , 
based  on  Christian  principles,  whose  objects,  ritual  and  accomplishmenth  ! 
have  been  open  to  public  scrutiny,  whose  primacy  as  an  auxiliary  in  ! 
all  war  work  and  a subsequent  program  of  educational,' civic,  patriotic  and  ] 
rehabilitational  endeavor  is  ideal,  has  been  Supreme  Advocate  Joseph  C.  \ 
Pelletier  of  Boston.  t : 

That  this  record  of  continuous  success  in  diverse  fields  of  leadership 
might  bring  envy  and  hatred  could  be  expected;  but  the  actuality,  osten- 
tatiously planned  against  this  man,  but  really  leveled  against  the  forces  and 
agencies  he  represents,  passes  comprehension.  , 

As  District  Attorney  of  a great  American  metropolis,  elected  and  re- 
elected again  and  again,  during  the  last  twelve  years  he  has  been  officially 
responsible  for  passing  on  eighty  thousand  cases,  having  considered  at  least  \ 
200,000  more.  From  this  multitude  thirty-one  were  originally  selected  by  ''{ 
the  politicans  representing  the  organized  effort  to  discredit  him,  each  and  ( j 
every  one  being  sworn  to  as  sufficient  to  warrant  his  removal.  At  the 
last  moment,  without  explanation  or  excuse,  more  than  one-third  of  these 
cases  were  withdrawn. 

Those  who  know  Mr.  Pelletier  will  appreciate  that  in  every  capacity  of 
life,  but  especially  as  the  peopWs  lawyer  of  one  of  the  great  jurisdictions  t 
of  the  country,  it  has  been  always  his  policy  to  have  a human  interest  in  r 
each  individual  case;  to  consider  not  only  the  justice  which  the  wrong-  \ i 
doer  deserves,  but  even  more — the  mercy  which  the  Divine  Fountain  Head  ii 
of  law,  government  and  justice,  decrees  that  every  human  being  receive.  \ 

Joseph  Pelletier  is  of  the  7?iasses  and  for  the  77iasses;  none  dares  speak  I 
slightiTigly  of  his  friend  in  his  hearing;  to  love  his  friends  and  to  be  loved  ’ 
by  them  is  his  happiness.  His  is  not  the  kind  of  brotherhood  which  is  r 
isolated,  fugitive,  unexerdsed,  but  of  that  sturdiness  which  fights  when  '^ 
and  where  the  need  7i\ay  be.  With  such  a record  Joseph  C.  Pelletier  ^ 
approaches  the  tribunal  of  earthly  justice  as  he  will  that  of  the  last  judg- 
meTit,  comforUd  with  the  knowledge  that  this  judg7nent  will  be  based  on  I 
his  record.  ® 

JAMES  A.  FLAHERTY , Supreme  Knight  | 


Supreme  f ubmal  Court  for  tfje 
Commonhjealtfi. 


Rugg,  C.  J.,  Braley,  DeCourcy,  Carroll,  Tenney  TT 
No.  4145. 

J.  WESTON  ALLEN,  Attorney  General,  Petitioner, 

(by  information) 


vs. 

JOSEPH  C.  PELLETIER,  District  Attorney,  Respondent. 
VOLUME  XX. 

^ . Boston,  January  23,  1922. 

The  Court  came  in  at  9:30  o’clock. 


ARGUMENTS  FOR  THE  RESPONDENT. 

, „ J-  convenience  of  counsel  in  the  arguments  the 

/Court  wiU  announce  that  at  quarter  past  eleven  this  morning  an  inter- 
• I mission  of  fifteen  minutes  will  be  taken  until  half  past  eleven. 

MR,  BOYLE: 

to  your  Honor  please,  it  now  devolves  upon  counsel 

to  assist  the  court  in  analyzing  the  facts  of  this  case.  We  are  not 
now  so  much  concerned  about  the  law  as  we  are  with  a right  understand- 

inf  thk^^e  ^ t”  possessed  of  sufficient  candor,  know- 

oofo^-f  ^ I be  of  some  help  to  the  court;  it  is  my  pur- 

pose, if  your  Honors  please,  to  analyze  certain  of  these  specifications 

H J tv,”  helpful  in  the  interest  of  truth  and 

tice,  then  I will  have  served  you  in  your  task.  ^ 

Before  undertaking  the  items  themselves,  may  I suggest  to  vour 

th?s”mante  hfs°offi^^  of  visualizing  this  case  from  the  standpoint  of 
r y®  cannot  take  these  facts  and  analyze  them 
»t^v  calm,  judicial  atmosphere  of  this  court  and 

P®^®Pcctjve.  We  must  take  these  facts  and  place  them 
atmosphere  of  this  busy  throbbing  office  where  a vast 
nultitude  of  men  and  incidents  are  daily  passing.  This  is  a huTan 
vroblern,  I do  not  know  whether  any  of  you  gentlemen  have  ever 
iccupied  the  position  of  District  Attorney.  I know  that  Senator 
leed  has.  and  I know  that  I have,  and  I know,  if  your  Hoi^rs  p™ 


that  when  you  come  to  consider  the  facts  that  come  before  a District 
Attorney,  especially  in  a great  city  like  this,  where  instant  decisions 
are  frequently  necessary  and  where  error  of  judgment  is,  of  course, 
possible,  we  must  be  very  careful  when  we  search  out  the  moral  ele- 
ments of  conduct. 

I first  want  to  call  your  attention  to  a group  of  cases  wherein 
assistant  District  Attorneys  are  involved.  There  are  four  of  them: 
The  Soracco,  Nee,  Stone  and  Mancovitz  cases.  Let  me  briefly  call 
your  attention  to  these  items. 

The  Soracco  case:  This  case  is  brought  under  four  paragraphs 
of  the  complaint.  Paragraphs^  30^  and  32  need  give  us  no  concern. 
Those  paragraphs  involve  the  District  Attorney  himself;  that  is  to  say, 
that  he  directed  of  his  own  motion  certain  things.  There  is  not  even 
a suggestion  in  the  record  that  the  District  Attorney  himself  had  aught 
to  do  with  the  disposition  of  the  Soracco  case,  or  that  the  matter  was 
called  to  his  attention  prior  to  the  action  taken  by  Assistant  District 
Attorney  Mancovitz.  Paragraphs  34  and  35  charge  that  discovering 
that  the  deputies  did  certain  things  he  did  not  discharge  them,  and  that  is 
the  phase  of  the  charge  in  the  Soracco  case  to  which  I now  address  my 
attention.  In  fact  the  only  phase  that  could  be  involved  under  the 
proof.  The  charge  was  that  Soracco,  a young  man  of  twenty-two  or 
twenty-four  years  of  age  was  running  a liquor  nuisance.  The  matter 
came  up  before  Assistant  District  Attorney,  Mancovitz.  This  was  one 
of  the  late  cases,  1921.  There  was  one  witness  on  the  witness  list,  to 
wit : Officer  Campbell.  When  the  matter  came  up  for  consideration  the 
attorney  for  young  Soracco  was  present.  It  is  in  evidence  from  Officer 
McTieman  that  this  attorney  made  some  statement;  it  is  in  evidence 
before  your  Honors  that  the  father  of  this  young  man  owned  the  place, 
although  the  young  man’s  name  was  on  the  license;  it  is  in  evidence 
that  the  place  changed  hands  immediately  after  this  incident  in  the 
District  Attorney’s  office.  There  is  no  evidence  as  to  just  what  state- 
ments were  made  to  Mancovitz.  It  is  sufficiently  in  evidence  that  the 
young  man  did  not  own  it.  Now,  what  were  the  considerations  that 
prompted  Mancovitz?  I don’t  know.  But  insofar  as  this  record  is 
concerned,  the  presumptions  are  in  his  favor,  that  he  was  actuated  by 
perfectly  proper  motives  under  all  the  facts  that  were  submitted  to 
him.  Now,  Pelletier  had  nothing  whatever  to  do  with  the  case  up  to 
this  stage.  Later  on,  some  time  after  that — some  two  months — 
Commissioner  Curtis,  I think  the  name  is — ^when  I make  an  error  I 
would  be  glad  to  be  corrected,  because  I can  only  help  you  if  I keep 
within  the  four  comers  of  this  record — Commissioner  Curtis  wrote  to 
Mr.  Pelletier  and  said  that  there  had  been  a complaint  made  about 
this  very  place,  and  calling  his  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  case  had 
been  disposed  of  without  trial.  Now  what  was  done  by  Pelletier  in 
response  to  that  letter  doesn’t  appear  in  this  record.  But  if  Pelletier 
had  not  taken  proper  steps  to  correct  any  misconduct,  or  error,  in  his 
office,  you  can  rest  assured  that  the  diligent  Attorney  General  would 
have  presented  evidence  in  reference  thereto.  Here  is  the  sole  and 
only  case  involving  a liquor  charge  that  is  before  this  Court,  and  the 
presumptions  are  in  favor  of  Mr.  Pelletier  taking  proper  steps,  if  any 

4 


mistake  had  been  made.  And  this  is  the  only  incident  in  the  himdreds 
of  cases  that  Mancovitz  must  have  handled. 

Here,  then  is  the  fact:  Mancovitz  recommended  to  the  trial  court 
that  the  Soracco  case  be  disposed  of  without  trial.  No  improper 
motive  on  the  part  of  Mancovitz  is  even  suggested.  It  must  be  pre- 
sumed that  he  was  actuated  by  a proper  motive.  True  it  is,  he  may 
have  acted  unwisely.  Now,  Pelletier’s  fault,  if  any,  lies  in  the  sole 
circumstance  that  he  did  not  discharge  Mancovitz  after  he  learned  that 
this  case  had  been  disposed  of  in  the  manner  stated.  What  Pelletier 
did  in  reference  to  the  matter  is  not  indicated.  Every  presumption 
is  to  the  effect  that  he  took  such  action  as  was  proper  in  the  premises. 
We  do  know  this:  This  is  the  sole  incident  in  which  David  Mancovitz 
is  involved  touching  official  conduct.  Of  the  many  hundred  cases 
disposed  of  by  this  faithful  assistant  but  one  has  been  found  wherein 
it  is  claimed  he  committed  error — no  wrong  or  immoral  conduct  is 
imputed  to  him.  The  worst  that  can  be  said  is  that  he  made  a mis- 
take. For  failure  to  discharge  him,  Joe  Pelletier  is  to  be  ousted  from 
his  high  office — this  in  face  of  the  further  fact  that  the  Soracco  case,  out 
of  literally  hundreds  of  liquor  cases,  is  the  only  liquor  case  that  it  is 
even  suggested  was  improperly  dealt  with.  As  already  indicated  there 
is  no  suggestion  of  immoral  conduct,  no  political  pull,  no  favoritism — 
nothing  but  the  naked  fact  that  the  case  was  disposed  of  without  trial. 

In  reviewing  this  case,  your  Honors,  please  remember  that  it 
was  shown  to  Mancovitz,  the  Assistant  District  Attorney,  that  the 
accused  was  a boy  twenty-two  years  old ; he  had  no  interest  in  the  place ; 
the  place  changed  hands  within  a few  days  after  the  case  was  dis- 
posed of ; there  was  but  one  witness  shown  on  witness  slip.  These  and 
other  matters  furnish  the  background  of  suggestion  as  to  possible  rea- 
sons for  the  action  taken.  Of  one  thing  we  are  very  sure — there  is  no 
suggestion  of  unworthy  motive. 

That  is  all  there  is  to  the  Mancovitz  case.^ 

Here  is  the  Nee  case,  in  which  young  Fred  Sheenan  is  concerned. 
He  refused  to  prosecute.  Some  men  were  out  in  a field,  ‘seeing  an  offi- 
cer coming  they  ran  down  an  open  cellar  way.  This  is  the  case  where 
they  were  charged  with  breaking  in  No.  18  cellar  way  and  ran  into  the 
adjoining  cellar  way  which  was  No.  20.  You  will  remember  the  witness, 
we  can  all  remember  thart  name  because  it  is  the  name  of  a man  some- 
what familiar  to  our  younger  days — ^John  L.  SuUivan — an  officer  who 
had  been  in  the  service  of  this  great  city  for  years,  and  is  stiU  in  its 
service — he  was  the  complaining  officer.  Mr.  Pelletier’s  name  is  not 
touched  in  this  case  only  in  that  he  did  not  discharge  Sheenan  after 
he  learned  the  fact  that  the  case  was  dismissed.  The  truth  is  there 
is  not  a word  of  testimony  that  the  matter  was  ever  called  to  his  atten- 
tion. This  case  comes  under  one  of  those  phases  of  the  complaint 
wherein  it  is  charged  that  an  assistant  district  attorney  did  something 
wrong  and  he,  Pelletier,  did  not  discharge  him.  Now  what  are  the 
facts?  You  must  here  visualize  in  your  mind  this  yoimg  man  with  a 
multitude  of  cases,  getting  them  ready  to  send  to  trial — it  is  in  volume 
13,  if  your  Honors  please,  if  you  are  looking  for  the  case.  A lawyer  by 
the  name  of  McDonald  represented  Nee  and  these  other  men.  He 

5 


made  a statement  in  the  presence  of  the  arresting  officer.  This  officer 
Sullivan,  testifies  here  before  your  Honors  to  the  effect  that  the  things 
that  Mr.  McDonald  stated  to  Sheenan  as  a reason  why  this  case  should 
not  be  prosecuted  were  true,  andj^he  further  added  that  the  principal 
witness  in  the  case  was  dead.  You  are  not  here  to  try  the  case  itself. 
You  are  here  to  pass  judgment  upon  the  conduct  of  the  official.  He  may 
have  made  a^mistake.  That  is  not  your  concern.  It  is  the  motive  that 
prompted  the  conduct  that  concerns  you. 

For  the  moment,  however,  let  us  touch  the  facts  of  the  case. 
Sullivan  says  that  there  were  two  boards  off  of  this  cellar  way,  not 
sufficient  for  a man  to  pass  through.  When  they  were  taken  off  he 
does  not  know.  Sullivan  says  there  were  Moxie  boxes  piled  up  on 
the  inside  of  cellar  18  where  these  boards  were  taken  off  so  that  an 
entry  could  not  be  made.  The  day  clerk  says  that  the  Moxie  boxes 
were  not  there..  I know  nothing  about  that.  I am  telling  you,  how- 
ever, what  Sullivan  told  this  man  Sheenan,  and  that  is  the  thing  that 
controls  here.  What  were  the  facts  he  presented  to  Sheenan?  Officer 
Sullivan  says  that  he  told  him  these  facts  and  that  the  case  ought  not 
to  be  prosecuted. 

Now,  the  young  man  nolled  the  case.  The  only  place  on  earth 
where  it  can  be  claimed  that  Mr.  Pelletier  came  in  contact  with  that 
case  is  that  one  of  the  officers  of  the  parole  board,  wrote  Mr.  Pelletier 
and  said  if  this  man.  Nee,  plead  guilty  or  was  convicted,  they  would 
revoke  his  parole.  That  letter  it  will  be  charged,  I assume,  is  the 
notice  which  Pelletier  had  of  the  pendency  of  this  case.  And  yet,  as 
practical  men,  must  we  not  know  that,  in  the  multitude  of  things, 
this  could  not  be  a matter  which  would  remain  in  his  mind  ? Therefore 
when  you  come  to  this  case  the  only  incident  there  is  in  reference  to 
it  is  that  Mr.  Pelletier  did  not  discharge  Fred  Sheenan  because  he  took 
the  action  indicated.  To  urge  Pelletier’s  ouster  due  to  this  item  is  to 
confess  the  desperate  length  to  which  these  gentlemen  are  willing  to 
go  to  gain  their  point.  Not  a suggestion  in  the  record  that  even  squints 
at  improper  motive,  directly  or  indirectly,  that  touches  Mr.  Pelletier. 
Is  it  not  clear  to  your  Honors  that  Mr.  Allen  is  driven  hard  for  facts, 
when  he  will  seize  upon  a circumstance  of  this  character?  Bear  in 
mind  that  this  case  is  plucked  out  of  thousands,  and  is  here  urged  as 
ground  for  ouster.  Those  of  you  on  this  Bench  who  in  your  younger 
years  may  have  filled  the  office  of  District  Attorney,  harken  back  to 
your  own  experience  and  answer  to  your  conscience  if  you  could  have 
escaped  the  harsh  penalty  of  ouster  if  the  facts  in  the  Nee  case  are  to 
be  taken  as  demonstrating  official  malfeasance  or  misfeasance  in 
office. 

We  pass  to  the  Stone  case.  Your  Honors  will  remember  that  this 
is  a case  brought  under  Paragraph  3: — “permitted  assistant  district 
attorneys  to  nol  pross  cases  which  should  have  been  prosecuted.” 
What  are  the  facts?  Mrs.  Stone  testified.  Also  a witness  by  the 
name  of  Officer  Harvey  testified.  It  was  shown  that  an  attorney  by 
the  name  of  Green  represented  the  defendant.  A divorce  suit  was 
pending.  Some  time  in  June  the  divorce  was  granted — at  least,  it  was 
so  represented  to  Sheenan.  In  other  words,  if  you  recall,  a divorce  had 

6 


been  brought  on  the  ground  of  adultery  with  the  name  of  the  woman  in 
the  case  unkno\\Ti.  When  the  case  came  on  to  be  tried  at  nisi  it  de- 
veloped that  the  name  of  the  woman  was  known.  The  tryer  of  the 
fact  said,  “You  will  have  to  amend  your  pleading  and  insert  the  name.” 
Afterwards,  the  case  came  on,  thirty  or  sixty  days  later,  and  was  dis- 
posed of.  In  Jime,  at  the  first  trial,  when  ever^^hing  was  disposed  of 
to  aU  practical  intents  and  purposes,  the  attorney  representing  the 
defendant  came  and  discussed  this  matter  with  Mr.  Sheehan,  told  him 
that  the  case  was  disposed  of,  and  that  the  parties  in  interest  had  no 
further  concern  in  the  criminal  prosecution. 

This  case  would  not  be  here  but  that  Nathan  Tufts’  name  appears 
in  the  papers — Shaving  no  more  to  do  with  Joe  Pelletier  in  the  way  of 
improper  conduct  than  I had.  Tufts  had  written  a letter  saying  that 
before  an3rthing  was  done  with  this  case  he  would  like  to  be  heard;  he 
represented  Mrs.  Stone,  Tufts  wrote — and  said  that  he  would  like  to  be 
heard  before  anything  was  done  with  the  criminal  case.  There  was 
no  secrecy,  no  subterfuge  about  it.  When  the  Attorney  Green  talked 
to  Mr.  Sheenan  and  Mr.  Sheenan  found  Mr.  Tufts’  name  in  the  papers, 
Mr.  Sheenan  wrote  Mr.  Tiifts,  or  called  him  on  the  phone,  and  Tufts 
wrote  a letter  saying  that  he  had  no.  further  interest  in  the  case. 

If  your  Honors  please,  there  is  no  suggestion  of  sinister  or  im- 
moral conduct  on  the  part  of  Fred  Sheenan  in  this  matter.  Of  course, 
Mr.  Pelletier  had  nothing  whatever  to  do  wdth  the  case,  and  the  case, 
as  I say,  would  not  be  here  except  that  Nathan  Tufts’  name  is  found 
in  these  papers,  because  there  are  himdreds  of  cases  which  have  been 
dismissed  involving  divorce  suits  wherein  adultery  had  been  charged, 
or  something  of  that  kind,  and  no,  question  could  be  made  of  the  pro- 
priety of  nol  prossing  the  case.  But  it  is  a different  thing,  if  you  can 
touch  Joe  Pelletier  with  the  name  of  Nathan  Tufts.  Here  again,  I chal- 
lenge attention  to  the  labored  effort  to  involve  Pelletier  with  something 
that  might  indicate  unworthiness.  It  is  known  of  all  men  that  Tufts 
has  been  found  imworthy.  If  his  name  can  be  coupled  with  Pelletier, 
the  circumstance  may  serve  a desperate  cause.  Mark  you,  Pelletier 
had  nothing  to  do  with  the  matter  one  way  or  the  other.  It  is  a demon- 
stration that  Fred  Sheenan  did  nothing  improper.  The  magic  word 
Tufts,  in  the  opinion  of  these  gentlemen,  is  sufficient  to  supply  all 
links  in  evidence.  Tairff  the  air  wdth  a name  and  thereby  destroy 
Pelletier!  However,  we  are  here  in  a Court  of  Justice  not  a school  of 
scandal  and  suspicion.  Facts  must  be  presented  before  a man’s  good 
name  can  be  besmirched.  Mr.  Allen  cannot  make  out  his  case  in  a 
Court  of  Justice  by  the  constant  reiteration  of  the  names — Tufts  and 
Corcoran.  These  flaming  names  of  scandal  and  reproach  may  serve  to 
create  suspicion  in  the  shallow  mind,  but  never  will  they  suffice  to  bridge 
the  gap  in  a Court  of  Justice. 

The  fourth  and  last  case  wherein  deputies  are  concerned  is  the 
Mancovitz  case.  This  happened,  unfortunately,  to  be  a brother  of 
David  Mancovitz,  who  was  an  assistant.  Dave  Mancovitz  never 
had  a thing  to  do  with  his  brother’s  case  in  the  district  Attorney’s 
office,  and  there  can  be  no  question  about  that,  because  there  is  no 
word  of  evidence  in  reference  to  it,  and  I say  that  it  is  one  of  God’s 

7 


providences  that  we  are  here  before  a jury  of  lawyers  who  will  not  sub- 
stitute suspicion  for  fact. 

What  are  the  facts  about  this  case?  The  charge  is  that  he,  Pelle- 
tier, did  not  discharge  Gallagher  because  of  Gallagher’s  misconduct  in 
.the  presentation  of  the  Mancovitz  case  to  the  grand  jury.  Fortunately, 
testimony  in  the  Mancovitz  case  before  the  Grand  Jury  was  taken  in 
shorthand  and  transcribed.  Gallagher  recommended  that  this  man 
be  indicted  for  the  possession  of  stolen  goods  and  not  for  breaking  and 
entering.  Now,  I have  read  the  testimony.  I assume  that  the  Attor- 
ney General  has  also  read  it.  I do  not  know  what  his  experience  has 
been  as  a public  prosecutor.  I have  had  that  experience.  Some  of  you 
gentlemen  may  have  had  it.  Any  man  who  has  had  experience  as  a 
public  prosecutor  and  who  reads  that  record,  will  know  why  Gallagher 
did  not  indict  this  man  for  breaking  and  entering.  It  is  a demonstra- 
tion, and  you  have  the  evidence  preserved  for  you,  and  I am  not  going 
to  take  time  to  analyze  it,  because,  if  Gallagher  had  done  otherwise, 
if  he  had  indicted  this  man  for  breaking  and  entering,  Mr.  Attorney 
General,  there  would  have  been  left  open  a debatable  fact,  whereas 
having  indicted  him  in  eight  coimts,  for  which  he  could  have  been  sent 
to  the  penitentiary  for  forty  years,  he  indicted  him  on  the  only  evi- 
dence which  W'ould  have  made  it  an  absolute  certainty  that  there  was 
no  escape  for  the  man. 

Now,  it  is  said,  by  subtle  innuendo  that  GaUagher  stated  to  some 
of  the  Grand  Jurors  that  this  was  Dave  Mancovitz’s  brother.  It  de- 
veloped in  the  trial  of  the  case  before  the  Grand  Jury  that  Mancovitz’s 
name  was  mentioned.  Now,  whether  some  juror  said,  “who  is  this 
Mancovitz’’? — or  whether  Gallagher  voluntarily  made  the  offer  or  sug- 
gestion, I know  not ; but  I say  to  your  Honors  that  no  bit  of  testimony 
in  this  case  so  demonstrates  the  strained  effort  to  make  innuendo  fur- 
nish the  Hnk  which  is  essential  in  this  case  than  that  evidence  which 
was  introduced  out  of  the  lips  of  Grand  Jurors.  “How  did  GaUagher 
present  his  evidence?’’  “He  pounded  the  table  and  he  spoke  in  a loud 
voice’’ — so  the  witness  said.  “Did  he  teU  you  that  he  was  Dave  Man- 
covitz’s brother?’’  “Yes.’’  AU  of  which  indicates  so  the  hint  is  sug- 
gested that  they  were  trying  to  favor  this  brother  of  Mancovitz ; when, 
of  course,  if  corruption  was  in  the  saddle,  if  devUtry  was  afoot,  there  was 
a practical  way  to  do  it,  and  that  was  not  to  present  the  case  at  aU  to 
the  Grand  Jury. 

You  read  the  evidence  of  the  man  Evans,  to  whom  Mr.  GaUagher 
spoke  in  a loud  tone  and  was  emphatic  and  get  your  own  reaction. 
Every  witness  was  subpoenaed  that  was  asked  for.  One  witness, 
Levine,  was  not  subpoenaed.  But  was  his  name  submitted  to  GaUagher  ? 
No.  But  Campbell,  the  complaining  officer,  said  he  told  all  that 
Levine  could  have  testified  to.  Do  you  remember  that  testimony? 
Campbell  stated,  “I  testified  for  thirteen  pages.  I covered  every  fact 
of  my  evidence,  ever3rthing  was  developed  that  I had.’’  And  yet  it  is 
said  that  Gallagher,  a lawyer  untouched  and  unscathed  in  this  good 
court  excepting  by  inneundo  and  suspicion — ^was  guUty  of  error,  never- 
theless we  find  that  this  lawyer  presented  every  fact  presented  to  him. 
The  only  other  thing  charged  is  that  the  case  was  not  tried  as  quickly 

8 


as,  in  the  judgment  of  these  gentlemen,  it  should  have  been.  He  was 
indicted  here  March,  1920,  and  was  afterwards  indicted  in  New  York 
March,  1921,  and  sent  to  the  penitentiary  from  that  State.  But  in  the 
interim  of  time  it  is  urged  that  there  was  time  to  have  tried  him  here, 
and  therefore  Joe  Pelletier  must  be  ousted  from  office  for  not  trying 
him.  How  many  times  the  case  was  listed  for  trial,  what  the  occa- 
sion was  for  the  continuances,  is  not  shown;  but  your  Honors  are 
to  translate  every  presumption  in  favor  of  guilt.  Fortunately,  that  is 
not  the  law. 

It  is  said  that  this  man  Mancovitz,  the  brother  of  the  accused, 
was  destroying  evidence.  What  happened?  A man  by  the  name  of 
Evans  went  to  Mancovitz y>ne  day.  He  had  lost  a Masonic  charm,  and 
he  said  to  Mancovitz,  “My  wife  feels  badly  about  it,  and  I would 
like  to  get  another  one;”  and  Dave  Mancovitz,  because  his  brother 
was  the  guilty  person,  said,  “I  will  give  you  S15  and  you  can  go  and 
buy  another  one.”  On  another  occasion  he  called  up  the  officer  at  head- 
quarters to  give  the  man  some  of  his  property  back.  There  is  no 
question  of  the  property  going  out  of  the  community^  or  an3rthing  of  that 
kind.  There  was  nothing  of  that  kind,  no  attempt  to  destroy  evi- 
dence. A man  by  the  name  of  Sobel  wrote  a letter  to  Mr.  Pelletier — in 
February,  1921,  about  his  property,  and  he  says  that  within  a few 
weeks  after  that  he  got  a telephone  call  from  Mr.  Pelletier’s  office  wherein 
Mr.  Pelletier  said,  “You  can  go  and  get  your  property.”  That  was 
after  evidence  came  to  Mr.  Pelletier  to  the  effect  that  the  man  had 
been  sent  to  the  penitentiary  from  New  York;  and  one  of  the  citizens 
here  had  property  which  was  tied  up  which  it  was  unnecessary  to  keep 
any  longer.  Those  are  the  facts. 

Those  are  the  four  cases — Nee,  Soracco,  Stone  and  Mancovitz — 
with  which  PeUeiter  never  had  the  slightest  connection  and  concern- 
ing which  there  was  never  complaint  made  until  this  complaint  here  is 
filed  as  to  the  conduct  of  his  deputies. 

I now  come  to  the  Shute  case,  and  I must  not  spend  so  much 
time  on  these  cases.  The  temptation  is  to  dwell  too  long,  and  I must 
be  brief,  because  my  voice  is  not  so  important  in  translating  these 
cases  as  that  of  Senator  Reed’s,  and  I must  hasten.  I come  to  the 
Shute  case.  Do  you  remember  the  Shute  case?  That  is  the  case 
where  a man  by  the  name  of  Shute  was  charged  with  having  despoiled 
an  old  lady  over  there  in  Bangor,  Maine. 

We  have  to  now  translate  ourselves  back  six  or  seven  years  to  1915, 
because  out  of  the  80,000  cases  that  have  passed  through  the  office  of 
this  man  since  he  has  been  in  this  position  for  over  twelve  years,  they 
have  been  able  to  dig  up  out  of  all  this  vast  multitude,  twenty-one  cases, 
and  one  of  these  is  the  Shute  case  1915. 

As  I have  said,  it  was  a case  involving  a money  transaction  between 
a man  who  was  buying  and  selling  stocks,  and  an  old  lady  who  lived 
in  Bangor.  Now,  what  are  the  facts  as  they  come  to  Mr.  Pelletier? 
You  are  not  here  concerned  in  passing  judgment  upon  Shute’s  guilt  or 
innocence.  You  are  concerned  here  with  the  question  as  to  why  did 
Pelletier  take  the  action  that  he  did,  and  was  he  actuated,  as  they  claim, 
by  improper  motives? 


9 


Now,  what  are  the  facts?  Patten,  a lawyer  who  theretofore  had 
lived  in  Maine,  now  practicing  law  in  Boston.  He  came  before  Mr. 
Pelletier  and  said  he  wanted  to  present  a certain  matter  to  the  Grand 
Jury.  As  soon  as  Mr.  Pelletier  discovered  what  it  was,  he  said,  “Why, 
that  must  be  the  matter  that  George  Thompson,  a lawyer  practising 
law  in  Bangor,  has  talked  to  me  about  and  said  that  he — Thompson — 
wanted  to  be  heard  if  the  matter  was  presented.  Evidently  Thompson 
had  told  Pelletier  something  about  this  being  a matter  wherein  they 
might  want  to  use  his  process  for  the  collection  of  a debt.  In  any 
event,  the  evidence  here  discloses — and  I beg  your  Honor  to  rivet  your 
attention  on  this  point — the  evidence  here  discloses,  from  Patten’s  lips, 
that  Mr.  Pelletier  said,  “Are  there  any  civil  suits  pending?”  Why  did 
ihe  say  that?  Because  George  Thompson  had  doubtless  talked  to  him 
about  the  case.  Is  there  anything  wrong  about  that?  Oh,  yes,  sinister, 
bad.  But,  you  are  not  going  to  say  so  without  proof.  Pelletier  said, 
“Are  there  civil  suits  pending?”  Now,  what  is  the  proof?  Patten  says 
to  you  on  the  witness  stand,  “I  told  him  there  was  a small  suit  pending 
down  here  in  Boston  where  I had  attached  some  money.”  “I  attached 
some  money  in  the  hands  of  some  brokers,  $400  or  $500.”  And,  on 
being  pressed  he  says,  “There  may  be  a little  suit  in  Maine  of  $500.” 
Patten  said  they  were  inconsequential  cases,  and  he  so  stated  to  Pelle- 
tier. Now,  that  is  the  testimony  that  it  is  admitted  went  before  Pelle- 
tier. Now,  get  this  point:  George  Thompson,  Pelletier’s  friend,  had 
come  down  here  and  said,  “I  want  to  be  heard.”  And  yet  Patten,  who 
was  practically  a stranger  to  Pelletier,  secured  an  indictment  because, 
although  he  told  Pelletier  there  were  certain  civil  suits  pending,  they 
were  inconsequential  and  of  no  moment.  Now,  where  do  you  find  at 
the  inception  of  this  case,  anything  abnormal  or  unnatural  in  the  con- 
duct of  Pelletier?  Nothing.  Now  afterwards  what  develops?  It 
develops  that  the  litigation  pending  in  Bangor  involved  not  $500  but 
$25,000.00.  Oh,  it  may  be  said,  the  equities  involved  in  the  properties 
covered  by  this  litigation  were  inconsequential,  but  I am  trying  to  visual- 
ize the  situation  from  the  standpoint  of  Pelletier.  When  he  discovered 
that  he  had  been  deceived,  that  he  had  not  been  told  the  truth,  and 
then  when  the  attorney  for  the  other  side  came  to  him,  and  made  his 
statement,  doubtless  to  the  effect  that  it  was  an  unfair  thing  for  the 
prosecuting  attorney’s  office  to  use  his  process  in  the  manner  that  it 
was  being  used — to  handicap  litigants  who  had  serious  litigation  in 
court,  under  these  circmnstances  the  case  was  nol  pressed. 

I say  to  your  Honors  this, — that  when  you  come  to  study  this  case, 
you  have  to  inject  something  based  on  suspicion  and  inneundo  and  not 
upon  facts,  because  there  is  no  basis  of  fact  in  this  case  of  improper 
conduct  and  the  worthy  Attorney  General  knew  that,  and  so  he  and  his 
assistants  discovered  a mare’s  nest;  they  discovered  the  changed  record. 
This  is  the  case  wherein  the  young  man  Kjellstrom  testified  and  where 
the  clerk  has  been  unfortunately  compelled  to  come  on  the  witness 
stand  twice  to  admit  an  error  upon  the  part  of  one  of  his  deputies. 
Remember,  this  is  the  case  that  was  before  the  Joint  Legislative  Com- 
mittee. It  was  stated  that  Pelletier  said  that  the  case  was  dismissed 
June  24th  rather  than  November  24th  and  they  went  over  and  found 

10 


it  was  November  24th,  and  they  came  back  afterwards  and  found  it 
was  changed  to  June.  Who  changed  it?  Did  your  office  change  it, 
Mr.  Attorney  General?  If  a change  was  made  it  is  just  as  fair  to 
assume  that  some  enemy  of  Mr.  Pelletier’s  manipulated  the  record, 
as  it  is  to  charge  that  Joe  Pelletier  did  it.  There  is  no  evidence  that 
even  squints  of  his  doing  it.  But,  witnesses  say  that  it  was  done. 
Ergo,  Pelletier  did  it.  If  it  was  done,  Mr.  Allen,  you  know,  as  much 
about  it  as  we  do. 

Why  was  that  ever  introduced  in  this  case?  A mistake  was  made, 
of  course,  by  the  clerk,  who  took  the  date  for  the  certified  copy  frorn  the 
back  of  the  indictment.  Why  was  this  injected?  Because  it  was  con- 
ceived in  the  mind  of  Patten  and  translated  to  the  realms  of  suspicion 
and  innuendo,  that  an  attempt  had  been  made  to  borrow  some  money 
about  November  24,  1916,  and  if  the  nol  pross  was  made  coincident  with 
the  borrowing  of  money  up  there  in  Maine,  ah,  then,  Pelletier  got  money. 
Therefore,  when  it  is  claimed  the  date  was  changed  back  to  June,  it  was 
to  conceal  his  tracks.  It  now  develops,  however,  that  the  nioney  trans- 
action occurred  in  November,  1915,  and  not  in  November,  1916,  long 
before  the  matter  ever  came  to  Pelletier  and  the  whole  matter  falls 
aborning.  But,  Mr.  Allen  must  stick  to  the  corruption  of  the  records, 
although  there  is  no  rhyme  or  reason  in  the  matter.  Something  was 
wrong,  and  Pelletier  must  have  done  it.  A lot  of  smoke  is  raised  about 
this  case.  When  you  come,  however,  to  the  naked  facts  there  is  nothing 
that  remotely  reflects  misconduct.  This  statement  is  reduced  to  a 
demonstration  in  the  light  of  Patten’s  testimony.  Such  was  the  verdict 
of  the  Joint  Legislative  Committee.  Such  has  been  the  verdict  of  the 
good  people  of  Suffolk  County  when  Joe  Pelletier’s  enemies  urged  this 
item  on  the  stump — and  your  Honors,  I confidently  rest  in  the  conviction 
tha't  your  verdict  will  be  in  harmony  with  the  action  of  the  legislature 
and  the  mass  judgment  of  the  people. 

Now,  we  come  to  the  Prendergast  case.  You  recall  that  in  1916 
a lady  by  the  name  of  Bennett  testified  she  was  assaulted  by  a young 
man  by  the  name  of  John  Prendergast,  and  according  to  her  story 
treated  in  an  outrageous  manner.  Let  us  analyze  just  briefly  this  case, 
because  it  is  from  her  lips  that  we  must  analyze  the  facts  that  wiU  be 
translated  into  your  minds  for  judgment.  This  witness  says  that  if 
John  Prendergast  had  come  to  her  at  any  time  within  four  weeks  after  the 
event  and  had  apologized,  she  would  have  forgiven  him,  and  the  case 
would  never  have  been  filed.  This  witness.  Miss  Bennett,  criticizes 
Joe  Pelletier  for  doing  that  which  after  three  or  four  years  have  passed, 
she  was  willing  to  do  within  ten  days  after  the  event.  Look  at  the 
evidence ! What  does  it  disclose  ? Volume  7 is  where  the  record  in  this 
case  is  found,  and  you  wiU  find  in  two  places  there  where  she  said, 
“If  he  had  come  to  me  as  a lady,  I would  not  have  pressed  the  case.’’ 
This  was  when  the  event  was  hot  upon  her.  This  was  when  all  the 
outrage  was  fresh  in  her  mind.  This  is  the  case,  mark  you,  that  in 
February,  1917  went  before  the  Joint  Legislative  Committee.  Some 
time  prior  to  that,  Miss  Bennett  fell  into  the  hands  of  this  same 
young  man,  Kjellstrom  who  testified  here  about  the  docket  entries,  and 
he  passed  her  on  to  Mr.  Perrin,  and  from  that  time  on  to  the  present, 

11 


you  find  Miss  Bennett  as  an  avenging  angel  after  Mr.  Pelletier.  She 
was  in  Mr.  Pelletier’s  office  in  November  of  1916.  She  said  to  him 
that  she  had  been  followed  and  pursued  by  Prendergast’s  brother. 
She  said  she  was  not  so  angry  at  the  event  as  she  was  at  what  fol- 
lowed the  event, — Prendergast’s  brother  pursuing  her  all  summer. 
Just  why  this  strange  story  of  pursuit  is  detailed  by  Miss  Bennet  is 
one  of  the  inscrutable  items  of  evidence  in  this  case.  The  statement  is 
so  extraordinary  that  it  of  necessity  arrests  attention. 

Let  us  analyze  this  fact,  because  you  have  to  get  Mr.  Pelletier’s 
position  when  this  woman  was  before  him,  and  why  he  took  the  action 
that  he  did.  She  said  that  John  Prendergast’s  brother  pursued  her  aU 
one  siunmer,  that,  like  a shadow,  every  night  throughout  the  summer 
months  he  followed  her,  annoyed  her,  pestered  her,  watched  her.  But, 
there  was  no  complaint  to  any  police  officer.  How  did  she  know  it  was 
John  Prendergast’s  brother?  Now,  this,  I think,  is  important,  because 
it  tests  the  woman’s  attitude.  She  says,  “Officer  McDonald,  my 
brother-in-law,  told  me  that  it  was  Prendergast’s  brother.’’  Do  you 
remember  that?  And  yet.  Officer  McDonald,  at  page  870  of  this 
record,  says  that  he  never  knew  that  Prendergast  had  a brother.  It 
is  in  volume  7,  page  870,  where  McDonald  testifies.  She  testified 
at  page  842.  Pelletier  is  to  be  criticised  because'  he  did  not  take  stock 
in  a story  that  your  Honors  on  this  record  must  discredit. 

I say,  if  your  Honors  please,  here  is  the  testimony  of  this  woman, 
erratic,  not  dependable.  Now,  what  is  the  height  of  Pelletier’s  offend- 
ing? What  is  the  height  of  it?  He  said  to  this  young  woman,  “Oh, 
be  merciful  to  him;  he  never  did  anything  VTong  before;  he  doubt- 
less was  drunk;  let  him  have  a chance;  he  never  did  any  wrong  before; 
he  has  not  done  any  wrong  since;  the  case  is  pending  over  him.  This 
is  his  first  offense.  Be  merciful.’’  Now%  after  three  years  and  after 
w'aiting  and  studying  this  young  man,  Pelletier  nol  pressed  that  case, 
and  he  is  charged  with  improper  conduct,  and  the  only  improper  con- 
duct in  God’s  w^orld  that  you  gentlemen  wdll  be  able  to  find,  when 
you  search  this  record,  was  not  money,  not  political  influence,  not 
favoritism,  but,  the  promptings  of  a kindly  heart  to  save  this  young 
man  as  a member  of  society.  , Ah,  you  say,  that  is  not  for  him  to  decide. 
It  is  for  him  to  press  the  law. 

Will  your  Honors  oust  a man  from  office  when  his  only  sinning  is 
on  the  side  of  kindness  and  reflects  as  pure  and  kindly  an  impulse  as 
ever  emanated  from  the  human  heart?  Oust  him  for  that?  No,  you 
will  not.  In  my  judgment,  you  will  not.  Criticise  him,  censure  him,  if 
you  please,  but  when  you  oust  Joe  Pelletier  for  doing  that  thing  you  oust 
him  not  because  of  immoral  or  venal  or  arbitrary  conduct,  but  because 
he  W'as  overly  generous.  If  the  man  has  a fault  that  is  it. 

Pausing  upon  this  lady’s. testimony  one  word  more.  Miss  Bennett 
stated,  “Nobody  ever  said  anything  to  me  about  this  man  Prender- 
gast being  a good  man  but  Mr.  Pelletier.’’  Pelletier  is  the  only  one 
that  ever  said  a good  word  for  him.  Yet  she  had  to  admit  that  Father 
McLeod  had  come  to  her  and  begged  her  to  be  merciful,  that  he  was  a 
good  boy.  She  had  to  admit  that  Mr.  Murphy,  the  commissioner,  had 
been  to  her  and  begged  of  her  to  be  merciful,  that  he  was  a good  boy. 

12 


She  went  down  to  Martin  Ryan’s  place  and  took  issue  with  him  because 
he  had  said  in  1917  that  she  was  being  influenced  by  those  people  who 
had  charge  of  the  legislative  committee  and  she  went  down  there  to 
upbraid  him  for  it.  You  saw  this  witness  on  the  witness  stand.  I am 
not  saying  anything  about  the  witness  that  is  luifair  or  unjust,  but  I 
am  talking  about  Joe  Pelletier’s  visuaHzation  of  the  witness  and  of  her 
story,  and  of  the  strange  story  that  she  told  of  this  man’s  brother  fol- 
lowing her.  And,  of  course,  it  was  not  his  brother, — if  anybody  fol- 
lowed her.  She  said,  “I  could  even  tell  the  color  of  his  fiair  and  that 
he  had  gray  running  through  it,”  and  he  followed  her  in  the  night  time. 

Study  the  Prendergast  case  from  aU  angles  and  nothing  can  be 
found  that  points  to  an  unworthy  purpose  on  the  part  of  Pelletier. 
For  three  and  a half  years  he  held  this  charge  over  this  young  man. 
The  young  man  had  never  been  arrested  before  and  during  three  and 
a half  years  went  straight.  He  was  of  hiunble  parentage.  There  is 
no  money  here;  no  poHtical  influence;  no  favoritism;  no  law>^er  with 
a puU.  Simply  a first  offender,  who  proved  by  his  conduct  that  he 
was  not  a bad  man.  Joe  PeUetier  sought  to  save  him  from  a prison  record. 
Miss  Bennett  herself  was  willing  to  save  him  imtil  she  fell  under  the 
sinister  influence  that  seeks  to  destroy  this  defendant. 

I come  now  to  a group  of  cases  where  we  find  Corcoran’s  name.  I 
have  spoken  of  one  where  Tuft’s  name  appears,  wherever  there  is  a 
case  that  Corcoran  or  Tuft  or  Coakley’s  name  appears,  there  is  offense, 
that  is  in  the  mind  poisoned  by  suspicion.  I rejoice,  although  a stranger 
to  this  city,  I rejoice  that  this  man  who  is  now  my  client  has  the  great 
good  fortune  to  be  tried  before  a bench  of  lawyers,  or  a jury  of  lawyers, 
who  have  skilled  understanding  and  will  not  translate  the  merest  shadow 
of  suspicion  into  facts.  The  case  in  which  we  are  here  concerned  is 
back  in  1916,  and  was  filed  against  Mary  Fuller.  I wonder  if  the 
Attorney  General  then  knew  Mary  Fuller  as  Brownie  Kennedy?  I 
w^onder  if  Mr.  Dodge  did.  I wonder  if  Mr.  McCarthy  did.  No ! But 
Joe  Pelletier  must  have!  Oh,  yes,  Pelletier  must  have.  They  say 
that  Mary  Fuller  was  Brownie  Kennedy,  and  that  is  all  there  is  to 
this  case.  What  are  the  facts?  Officer  Campbell  made  an  arrest  of  a 
woman  and  a man  in  a two-room  apartment  in  1916.  Corcoran  was 
her  lawyer.  He  fumi^ed  the  bond,  or  his  office  did.  Concerning 
which  Pelletier  knew  nothing.  An  officer  went  in  and  foimd  a man  in 
an  undressed  condition  in  this  woman’s  apartment.  They  were  seized, 
taken  to  the  lower  court,  fined,  appealed,  the  charge  being  keeping  a 
house  of  iU  fame.  No  evidence — and  you  remember  the  case,  no  evi- 
dence of  bargaining,  no  e\ddence  of  circumstances  that  should  be 
proved  in  cases  of  this  character.  And  now  Pelletier  upon  the  facts  as 
they  came  to  him  nol  prossed  that  case.  Any  money  ? Any  influence  ? 
Any  favor?  Nothing  in  God  Almighty’s  name,  gentlemen,  but  the 
simple  fact  that  Corcoran’s  name  is  connected  with  it  and  the  woman 
turns  out  afterwards  to  be  the  famous  or  the  infamous  Kennedy  woman. 
Concerning  which  Pelletier  had  as  much  knowledge  as  any  one  of  your 
Honors  as  far  as  this  record  goes,  and  your  Honors  are  guided  by  that. 
That  is  your  chart.  And  that  disposes  of  the  Mary  Fuller  case.  This 
case  would  not  be  here  at  aU  if  it  were  not  that  this  scarlet  name  appears 

13 


in  the  record.  This  fact  alone  is  offered  to  besmirch  Pelletier.  It  is 
not  proof. 

Now,  I come  to  these  cases  in  which  Mr.  Coakley’s  name  appears 
and  the  first  is  the  Szathmary  case, — no,  the  first  one  is  the  Tripp  case, 
1915.  You  remember  this  case.  Mr.  Tripp,  a citizen  of  Boston.  Mr. 
Stinson,  the  lawyer,  appeared  in  the  case  for  Tripp.  Now,  this  is  back  in 
1915.  Coakley  had  made  a couiplaint  to  Mr.  Pelletier  in  reference  to 
the  conduct  of  a man  by  the  name  of  Tripp,  connecting  him  with  a 
woman  by  the  name  of  Bowser.  It  is  said  in  the  testimony  of  Tripp 
and  Stinson  that  the  matter  involved  adultery  and  fornication.  When 
you  come  to  study  the  record  I think  you  will  find  that  a tort  was 
involved.  Coakley  had  made  a complaint  to  Pelletier — of  course  the 
fact  that  it  was  Coakley  implies  suspicion  at  once,  but  your  Honors 
will  not  so  decide — that  a man  by  the  name  of  Tripp  was  having  some 
illegal  relations  with  a girl  by  the  name  of  Bowser.  Mr.  Pelletier  sent 
for  Tripp.  I assume  that  there  are  at  the  Boston  Bar  a hundred  lawyers 
— I don’t  know  whether  Mr.  Dodge  ever  did  it,  I don’t  know  whether 
Mr.  McCarthy  ever  did  it,  but  a hundred  lawyers  have  talked  with  the 
prosecuting  attorney  and  had  him  do  exactly  the  thing  that  is  here  in- 
volved. He  called  this  man  in,  and  he  talked  to  Tripp,  and  Tripp  dis- 
closed that  he  was  a substantial  man,  that  this  really  was  a bad  girl, 
and  that  she  was  trying  to  blackmail  him,  that  she  was  trying  to  abuse 
Mr.  Pelletier’s  office.  What  did  Pelletier  do?  He  said  to  Mr.  Stinson 
that  he  would  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  matter,  but  he  said,  ‘T 
advise  you  to  go  to  Mr.  Coakley  and  explain  the  matter.”  Oh,  the 
fact  that  he  said,  “Go  to  Coakley”  although  he  had  told  them  that 
Coakley  was  the  man  that  brought  the  case  to  him,  that  circumstance 
itself  damns  Pelletier.  But  why  should  it?  Why  should  it?  Where 
can  you  find  the  error  and  the  misconduct?  I beg  your  Honors’  best 
thought,  and  I ask  you  when  you  go  to  your  council  chambers  to  think 
of  this  suggestion:  You  must  take  each  of  these  cases  and  view  them 
in  their  own  perspective.  There  is  no  possibility  of  a common  con- 
spiracy. There  is  no  possibility  of  that.  Mr.  Tripp  and  his  lawyers 
went  to  Mr.  Coakley’s  office,  and  there  they  discussed  the  matter  with 
Coakley.  The  case  before  Pelletier  was  not  further  pressed.  And  then 
what  follows?  An  action  for  tort  was  filed.  When  you  calmly  study 
the  record  all  that  appears  is  that  Coakley  complained  to  Pelletier  of 
Tripp.  Pelletier  conferred  with  Tripp.  After  hearing  Tripp’s  story  he 
stated  he  would  take  no  action.  That’s  your  story.  If  any  lawyer’s 
name  in  this  court  room  was  connected  with  the  case  but  the  name  of 
Coakley  the  matter  would  not  be  here.  Is  it  possible  that  a man’s 
character  can  be  touched,  his  reputation  ruined,  his  whole  life  blighted 
by  such  methods?  I beg  of  your  Honors  to  remember  that  that  is  the 
first  Coakley  case  that  the  record  discloses. 

The  next  is  the  Szathmary  case,  where  we  go  back  to  1920.  The 
Szathmary  case  was  a divorce  case.  That  is  found  in  volume  13.  You 
remember  the  young  Isreal  Szathmary,  not  a very  worthy  figure,  as  I 
thought  of  him  when  he  appeared  on  the  witness  stand.  Judge  Sulli- 
van, a fine  upstanding  gentleman,  as  I viewed  him,  came  and  testified 
to  your  Honors  in  reference  to  this  case.  The  case  is  still  pending. 

14 


Now,  what  follows?  In  November  of  1919  or  1920,  as  the  case  may  be, 
Mr.  SuUivan — Judge  SulHvan — ^went  to  see  Mr.  PeUetier  and  there 
complained  because  the  case  was  not  being  prosecuted.  He  said  to 
Air.  Pelletier — and  I think  this  significant,  if  you  will  read  Judge  Sulli- 
van’s testimony,  and  of  coiu*se  you  will — “I  was  not  satisfied  because 
this  man  had  not  paid  this  woman  sufficient  money  and  was  not  pay- 
ing her  sufficient  money,  and  the  case  ought  to  go  forward.  ’ ’ Then  PeUe- 
tier tinned  to  the  wife  of  this  young  man  and  said,  “Mrs.  Szathmary, 
what  do  you  want  us  to  do  with  this  case?’’  And  she  said,  “Please  do 
not  prosecute  it.  Leave  it  as  it  is.  We  are  living  together,  and  I wiU 
not  get  my  support  if  he  is  taken  away.’’  That  is  the  record  of  the 
case.  Now,  where  does  Coakley  figure  in  the  case?  Young  Fardy, 
the  attorney  for  these  people,  had  said  that  he  had  gone  to  Mr.  Coakley 
and  said,  “If  this  case  is  going  to  be  tried  I want  you  to  help  me  try  it. 
Judge  Sullivan  is  on  the  other  side,  and  I do  not  feel  myself  capable  of 
competing  with  him,  and  I want  your  assistance.  What  will  be  your 
fee,  Mr.  Coakley?’’  Fardy  said  Coakley  stated,  “Whatever  you  figure 
that  my  services  are  worth,  or  your  clients  can  afford  to  pay.  It  is 
all  right  with  me.  You  can  fix  that  up  yourself.’’ 

That  is  the  testimony.  He  want  back  to  his  client  and  charged  him 
a fee  of  S2000,  SIOOO  of  which  he  said  he  would  give  to  Mr.  Coakley  if  he 
ever  had  to  call  on  him.  And  here  is  the  paradoxical  situation  we  find : 
the  only  opportunity  Coakley  could  have  to  get  money  was  to  have 
the  case  tried,  and  Pelletier  was  the  man  that  continued  the  case  and  did 
not  put  the  case  to  trial!  Strange  conspiracy!  Extraordinary  be- 
tray^ of  public  trust!  Pelletier  is  damned  when  Coakley  makes  a fee. 
Also  he  must  suffer  when  he  keeps  Coakley  from  making  a fee.  How- 
ever, what  do  these  gentlemen  care  for  logic.  Put  Coakley  in  the  pic- 
ture and  every  gap  is  filled.  All  presumptions  disposed  of! 

The  Charlotte  Broad  case,  is  a case  if  your  Honors  please,  in  1916, 
wherein  this  young  woman  who  was  then  in  New  York  and  a man 
by  the  name  of  Waxman,  a citizen  of  this  town,  had  had  prior  relations. 
After  breaking  off  his  relations  with  the  Broad  woman  he  married  and 
was  living  happily  and  contentedly.  This  girl  was  pursuing  him. 
Now  Coakley  came  to  Pelletier’s  office  and  made  a complaint  that 
the  woman  was  trying  fo  blackmail  Waxman.  And  wasn’t  she?  Can 
there  be  any  doubt  about  it?  Can  there  be  any  question  about  it? 
Mr.  Pelletier  wrote  her  a letter.  This  is  the  case  where  this  lawyer 
Stebbins  appeared.  The  letter  from  Pelletier  to  the  Broad  woman  in 
New  York  shows  what  took  place.  Stebbins  went  to  New  York  and 
wrote  the  answer  to  the  letter  for  her  wherein  he  said  for  her,  that  if 
Mr.  Pelletier  would  indicate  to  her  wherein  she  had  done  wrong  in 
tiying  to  get  this  money  from  Waxman,  she  would  be  glad  to  talk  with 
him.  Shortly  after  that  she  wrote  PeUetier  another  letter  wherein 
she  acknowledged  that  this  man  had  never  promised  to  marry  her;  that 
she  was  trying  to  get  money  out  of  him  on  account  of  the  letters  he  wrote 
her,  admitting  the  blackmail  plan;  that  as  far  as  she  was  concerned  she 
would  abandon  it.  Now  that  is  all  the  contact  that  PeUetier  had 
with  this  case.  If  it  were  not  that  Coakley’s  name  was  connected  with 
it,  wherein  would  anybody  suspicion  error? 

15 


There  remains  but  one  case  to  which  I desire  to  call  to  your  Honor’s 
attention.  That  is  the  Piscopo  case  in  1917.  Mr.  Pelletier,  Mclsaac 
and  Webber  were  partners  in  a civil  law  business,  coincident  with  the 
time  that  Mr.  Pelletier  was  conducting  the  office  of  District  Attorney. 
Mr.  Piscopo  was  then  a citizen  of  Boston,  who  had  lived  here  and 
reared  a family  of  six  children  whom  he  abandoned  in  1911.  From 
that  time  on  litigation  developed  between  Piscopo  and  his  wife,  she 
fighting  for  herself  and  her  children.  He  was  evidently  a man  of  large 
means.  Some  time  in  1915,  or  1913  rather,  proceedings  were  filed  here 
in  the  Probate  Court  by  the  wife  for  separate  maintenance.  Along 
in  that  period  Mr.  Piscopo  who  knew  Mclsaac,  and  because  Mr. 
Mclsaac  had  done  business  for  him,  met  Mclsaac  on  the  street  and 
they  had  some  talk  about  Piscopo’s  affairs,  and  Piscopo  employed 
Mclsaac  to  go  forward  and  help  him  look  after  his  matters.  Mclsaac 
took  charge  of  the  matter  in  the  Probate  Court  and  defeated  the  wife’s 
claim  there.  Divorce  libels  were  filed  up  in  New  Hampshire — if  I am 
possibly  mistaken  about  where  the  divorce  was  granted  I want  it  cor- 
rected, but  in  any  event  a divorce  was  finally  granted  in  another  juris- 
diction. Coincident  with  the  divorce  being  granted  alimony  settle- 
ments were  adjusted,  four  hundred  thousand  dollars  passing,  two 
hundred  thousand  dollars  to  the  wife,  and  two  hundred  thousand  dollars 
in  trust  for  the  children.  Mclsaac  conducted  these  negotiations,  and 
finally  the  matter  is  settled,  long  prior  to  February  7,  1917.  Two  weeks 
or  two  months — the  evidence /is  not  clear  because  the  deposition  says 
in  one  place  several  months,  and  in  another  place  several  weeks — the 
man  was  in  Mclsaac’s  office  discussing  about  his  fee.  At  that  time 
he  says  Mr.  Pelletier  was  there.  He  says  that  Mclsaac  said  he  would 
charge  him  $35,000.  When  he  objected  to  the  amount — Pelletier, 
he  says,  suggested  that  he  was  running  a hotel  here  and  they  might 
have  the  hotel  watched.  That  is  the  siim  total  of  this  charge  of  the 
attempt  on  the  part  of  Pelletier  to  use  his  office  to  extort  money  in  civil 
proceedings.  Now  what  follows?  Here  we  must  analyze  and  pass 
judgment — your  Honors  will  have  to  pass  judgment  upon  the  testimony 
of  this  man  and  as  to  its  believable  nature.  Piscopo,  says  the  threat 
was  made  some  weeks  prior  to  February  3 or  7,  and  upon  that  date  this 
man  went  to  Mclsaac’s  office  and  paid  him  $5,000.  No  suggestion  at 
that  time  to  Mclsaac:  “This  money  is  paid  now  and  I hope  you  will 

let  my  hotel  alone.’’  No  suggestion  of  going  to  his  waiters  down  there 
and  telling  them  he  was  ateid  of  young  boys  and  girls  coming  in  and' 
his  license  taken  away  from  him.  No  evidence  of  warning  his  help 
touching  the  question  of  watching  against  a job  being  put  up  on  him. 
No  suggestions  of  reporting  to  the  licensing  board,  or  to  the  police, 
or  anything  of  that  kind.  No  statement  to  his  private  counsel  in 
the  other  jurisdiction.  No  statement  anywhere,  or  any  place  of  this 
question  of  his  fear  and  fright  over  Pelletier’s  threat.  In  February  he 
paid  $5,000.  In  May  he  comes  in  and  pays  $14,000  in  cash  and  $2,000 
in  a note,  making  a total  fee  of  $21,000.  I submit  your  Honors  in  view 
of  the  amount  of  business  involved,  and  in  view  of  the  responsibility 
of  going  over  these  trust  papers,  I say  to  your  Honors  in  my  judgment 
as  a lawyer  the  fee  involved  was  not  exorbitant,  as  none  of  these  gentle- 

16 


men  would  assert.  And  coincident  with  the  reasonableness  of  the  fee 
and  the  conduct  of  this  man  who  says  he  never  opened  his  mouth  to  a 
living  hiunan  being  aU  this  time  about  this  threat,  while  this  matter  was 
before  the  Bar  Association  and  when  this  matter  was  before  the  legis- 
lature committee,  and  when  it  was  in  the  campaigns,  and  in  no  place 
does  he  say  anything  excepting  two  months  before  the  time  his  deposi- 
tion was  taken  in  1921.  On  the  utterly  baseless  story  — a story  that 
would  not  support  proof  of  a promise  to  pay — you  are  asked  to  destroy 
all  that  this  man  hold  sacred — ^his  good  name — ^his  fair  reputation. 

Joe  Pelletier  may  have  had  faithless  friends — ^that  is,  assumed 
friends — ^men  who  sold  him  time  and  again  behind  his  back.  Why, 
sirs,  up  in  Washington  there  are  types  of  men  who  make  a business  of 
holding  themselves  out  as  “fixers”  of  people  within  the  various  De- 
partments of  Government.  The  last  man  to  learn  of  this  vile  practice 
is  the  man  most  concerned — ^the  man  who  is  being  mistreated.  It  is 
possible  that  there  are  lawyers  in  Boston  so  lost  to  all  sense  of  honor 
that  they  have  traded  upon  Joe  Pelletier’s  name.  However,  as  to  this 
I challenge  your  attention  to  the  basic  fact  that  there  is  no  evidence  in 
this  record  that  connects  Pelletier  with  any  such  lawyer.  I hold  no 
brief  for  Dan  Coakley.  If  he  has  abused  Joe  Pelletier’s  friendship 
then  indeed,  he  is  a vile  wretch.  However,  whatever  the  fact  may 
be  as  to  what  Dan  Coakley  may  have  done  there  is  no  evidence  in 
this  record  that  connects  Pelletier  with  Coakley,  and  this  directly  or 
indirectly. 

Your  Honors,  that  is  as  far  as  my  review  will  go  of  this  record. 
Senator  Reed  will  take  up  the  balance  of  these  cases.  In  closing  may 
I just  be  permitted  to  say  this  one  word:  I feel  it  has  been  a great 
privilege  as  a lawyer — one  who  has  led  a very^  active  and  full  life  as  a 
lawyer — to  have  had  the  privilege  and  opportimity  of  coming  before  this 
great  Court.  We  have  been  treated  with  rare  courtesy  and  kind- 
ness. This  is  an  important  case — ^many  angles  are  involved — ^many 
things  that  go  deep  into  the  soul  of  our  human  nature.  I have  an  abiding 
confidence  in  the  integrity  of  this  great  profession  of  ours.  I have  an 
abiding  confidence  in  the  fine  spirit  of  this  Court.  No  matter  w^hat 
suspicions  may  have  been  created  by  the  testimony;  no  matter  what 
false  atmosphere  may  have  been  engendered  by  malice  and  envy; 
I have  an  abiding  confidence  in  the  fact  that  this  great  Court  will 
be  guided  solely  by  the  facts  of  the  record  and  not  by  the  innuendo  of 
coimsel,  and  when  this  Court  finds  the  facts  as  I have  sought  to  show 
them  in  the  ten  cases  that  I have  reviewed,  and  as  Senator  Reed  will 
show  in  the  cases  that  he  is  to  review,  an  utter  lack  of  that  kind  of 
probative  evidence  that  is  essential  in  a court  of  justice,  I say,  when  you 
find  as  I believe  you  will,  an  utter  lack  of  evidence,  I know  that  the 
traditions  of  this  great  court  will  be  followed.  It  is  a court  revered  by 
lawyers  throughout  this  country.  I am  grateful  for  having  had  the 
opportmiity  of  being  before  it. 

MR.  REED:  I was  out  when  the  court  made  its  announcement 
as  to  time.  If  I had  been  here  I would  have  asked  General  Boyle  to 

17 


have  taken  up  the  time  imtil  recess.  If  I began  no\y  there  will  be  a 
recess  at  eleven  o’clock. 

RUGG,  C.  J.;  Quarter  past  eleven,  Mr.  Reed. 

MR.  REED : Then  I will  talk  a while  and  there  will  be  an  adjourn- 
ment for  dinner,  and  cut  my  remarks  in  two  twice.  I was  just  won- 
dering if  I might  further  impose  on  the  good  nature  of  the  court  and  if 
we  could  have  our  recess  a little  bit  early  now  and  then  I could  proceed 
until  one  o’clock. 

RUGG,  C.  J. : Very  well.  We  shall  be  very  glad  to  do  that. 
RUGG,  C.J.:  Mr.  Reed. 

CLOSING  ARGUMENT  BY  MR.  REED 

MR.  REED:  If  your  Honors  please,  I am  about  to  perform  my 
last  duty  in  this  case.  Lest  I forget  to  do  so  later  on,  I|now  thank  the 
Coiirt  for  most  courteous  treatment,  for  some  rather  unusual  courtesies 
extended  to  me,  I am  sure  because  I am  a stranger  in  this  part  of  the 
world  and  imfamiliar  with  the  practice  of  Massachusetts. 

For  the  closing  of  the  case  without  putting  on  even  a word  of 
evidence,  my  associate.  General  Boyle,  and  myself  take  the  full  re- 
sponsibility. We  acted  upon  our  judgment  that  no  case  had  been  made, 
and  that,  under  the  rules  of  law  and  under  a fair  construction  of  the 
evidence,  we  could  safely  repose  the  judgment  of  this  case  in  this  great 
tribunal  without  dignifying  the  prosecution  by  evidence  in  rebuttal. 

If  I had  been  trying  this  case  before  a jury  without  a judge  to  guide 
the  jury  in  the  law,  a different  conclusion  would  have  been  reached ; but 
in  this  tribunal,  where  the  Judges  know  the  law,  where  their  long 
experience  enables  them  to  analyze  evidence  and  to  determine  its 
weight,  I approach  the  case  with  the  utmost  confidence  that,  at  its  end, 
upon  the  evidence  adduced  by  the  State,  there  can  be  but  one  result, 
and  that  the  dismissal  of  these  charges. 

In  preliminary,  let  me  state  to  your  Honors  what  I conceive  to  be 
the  law  of  the  case.  It  is,  first,  that  each  of  these  charges  must  stand 
by  itself;  that  one  cannot  be  brought  in  aid  of  the  other;  that  there 
must  be  a separate  determination  of  each  charge;  and  that  you  cannot 
take  the  sum  total  of  twenty-one  failures  and  add  them  together  to  make 
a general  case.  You  cannot  accumulate  enough  zeros  in  a lifetime 
to  make  an  integer.  Every  case  that  has  been  cited  to  your  Honors 
during  this  long  trial  on  matters  arising  during  its  progress  has,  with- 
out exception,  indicated  that  the  character  of  this  case,  whether  it  be 
civil  in  form  or  otherwise,  is  nevertheless  criminal  in  its  nature  and 
must  be  determined  by  fixed  rules  of  law,  among  which  are  that  the 
charge  must  be  laid,  and  the  charge  must  be  proven  as  laid.  This  is 
not,  as  the  Court  has  already  said,  an  inquisition.  This  Court  does 
not,  in  my  judgment,  sit  as  a board  of  censors.  It  sits  here  to  determine 
whether,  under  the  law,  upon  the  specific  charge  made,  a case  has  been 
made  out,  and  whether  that  case  is  sufficient  to  warrant  a removal  from 
office. 


18 


In  this  latter  conclusion  I am  supported,  I think,  by  the  whole 
general  line  of  authorities,  but  I desire  to  call  attention  particularly  to 
one  case, — Andrews  v.  King,  77  Maine,  235.  I quote: 

“In  special  courts  established  for  the  trial  of  officers  alleged  to  be 
unfaithful,  such  as  courts  of  impeachment  and  courts  martial,  we 
believe  it  is  the  universal  practice  for  the  court  to  pass  first  upon 
the  truth  or  falsity  of  each  charge  before  passing  sentence.  This 
must  be  the  course,  otherwise  the  court  might  pronounce  sentence 
where  no  one  charge  was  believed  by  a majority  of  the  court. 
There  might  be  as  many  charges  as  there  were  members  of  the 
court  and  no  one  charge  received  the  assent  of  more  than  one  mem- 
ber, yet  that  member  vote  to  sentence  on  account  of  his  belief 
in  the  truth  of  that  one  charge  which  all  his  associates  believed 
to  be  false.  If  each  member  did  so  there  would  be  sentence  with- 
out conviction  and  without  guilt.  Such  a result  would  be  mon- 
strous, hence  the  practice  of  first  ascertaining  and  declaring  whether 
the  court  agrees  or  concurs  upon  any  one  charge  as  proved.  We 
think  it  may  be  assumed,  in  the  absence  of  specific  directions,  that 
the  Legislature  intended  that  a special  tribunal  should  follow  the 
course  so  long  and  generally  followed  by  the  common  law  courts 
and  special  courts  with  similar  duties.  The  same  reasons  for  such 
a course  certainly  exist.” 

If  that  authority  be  not  convincing,  and  if  that  reasoning  be  not 
conclusive,  nothing  I can  say  would  add  to  it,  and  I pass  from  that 
phase  of  the  argument. 


The  second  rule  to  which  I desire  to  caU  attention,  to  which  I 
shall  have  occasion  to  refer  in  the  course  of  my  remarks  later  on  and 
which  furnishes,  in  my  humble  judgment,  the  yardstick  by  which  is 
to  be  measured  the  greater  part  of  the  evidence  in  this  case,  is  the 
doctrine  of  circumstantial  evidence.  If  the  law  be  as  I contend,  then 
there  is  an  utter  failure  to  make  out  a case.  I shall  take  some  of 
my  limited  time  to  read  the  wisdom  of  the  court,  which  wiU  be 
superior  to  anything  I may  utter.  First,  I call  attention  to  Common- 
wealths. Webster,  5 Cush.,  .the  opinion  written  by  the  great  Chief  Justice 
Shaw,  whose  learning  I need  not  eulogize  and  upon  whose  greatness 
I need  pass  no  encomiums.  Speaking  of  circumstantial  evidence  he 
said: 

“The  first  is,  that  the  several  circumstances  upon  which  the 
conclusion  depends  must  be  fuUy  established  by  proof.  They 
are  facts  from  which  the  main  fact  is  to  be  inferred ; and  they  are 
to  be  proved  by  competent  evidence  and  by  the  same  weight  and 
force  of  evidence,  as  if  each  one  were  itself  the  main  fact  in  issue. 


Under  this  rule,  every  circumstance  relied  upon  as  material  is  to  be 
brought  to  the  test  of  strict  proof;” — 

19 


I interrupt  to  say  that,  as  I go  on,  I shall  demonstrate  that  the  majority 
of  this  evidence  rests  upon  imagination  and  conjecture,  the  connecting 
link  being  supplied  out  of  inflamed  imagination.  I quote  further: 

“The  next  rule  to  which  I ask  attention  is,  that  all  the  facts 
proved  must  be  consistent  with  each  other,  and  with  the  main  fact 
sought  to  be  proved.  . . . Therefore,  if  any  one  fact  necessary 
to  the  cone  usion  is  whoUy  inconsistent  with  the  hypothesis  of  the 
guilt  of  the  accused,  it  breaks  the  chain  of  circumstantial  evidence 
upon  which  the  inference  depends;  and,  however  plausible  or  ap- 
parently conclusive  the  other  circumstances  may  be,  the  charge 
must  fail.  . . . Another  rule  is,  that  the  circumstances  taken 
together  should  be  of  a conclusive  nature  and  tendency,  leading 
on  the  whole  to  a satisfactory  conclusion,  and  producing  in  effect 
a reasonable  and  moral  certainty,  that  the  accused,  and  no  one 
else,  committed  the  offence  charged. 

“It  is  not  sufficient  that  they  create  a probability,  though  a 
strong  one,  and  if,  therefore,  assuming  all  the  facts  to  be  true  which 
the  evidence  lends  to  establish,  they  may  yet  be  accounted  for 
upon  any  hypothesis  which  does  not  include  the  guilt  of  the  accused, 
the  proof  fails.  It  is  essential,  therefore,  that  the  circumstances 
taken  as  a whole,  and  giving  them  their  reasonable  and  just  weight 
and  no  more,  should,  to  a moral  certainty,  exclude  every  other 
hypothesis.” 

Apply  that  to  the  bank  account  evidence. 


I quote  from  Commonwealth  vs.  Jejffries,  7th  Allen,  548:  [Reading] 

“To  render  evidence  of  collateral  facts  competent,  there  must 
be  some  natural,  necessary  or  logical  connection  between  them  and 
the  inference  or  result  which  they  are  designed  to  establish.” 

In  Barrett  vs.  Bruffee,,  182  Mass.,  page  230,  citing  Commonwealth  vs. 
Jeffries,  the  same  rule  of  logical  inference  has  been  applied  to  civil 
cases:  [Reading] 

“The  question  in  this  class  of  cases  is  whether  the  collateral 
fact  sought  to  be  proved  is  so  closely  connected  with  the  question 
at  issue  that  an  inference  may  fairly  be  drawn  from  the  collateral 
fact  of  the  conclusion  sought  to  be  established.” 

In  Lydon  vs.  Edison  Electric  Illuminating  Company,  209  Mass.,  532, 
it  was  held : [Reading] 

“The  fact  that  he  exercised  care  n going  down  as  it  is  shown 
that  he  did  by  the  fact  that  he  had  got  safely  by  the  wire,  and  by 
the  fact  that  the  spur  on  his  right  foot  was  driven  into  the  limb, 
does  not  remove  the  manner  in  which  the  accident  occurred  from 
the. field  of  conjecture  or  warrant  an  inference  that  at  the  instant 
of  the  accident  he  was  in  the  exercise  of  due  care.” 

20 


In  Brennan  vs.  Keene,  237,  Mass.,  556:  [Readii^g] 

“In  the  field  of  pure  speculation  one  conjecture  may  be  as 

near  the  truth  as  any  other.” 

Apply  that  to  the  bank  deposit  evidence. 

I hope  my  manner  will  not  be  offensive  to  your  Honors.  It  is 
simply  a part  of  me,  and  I need  not  again  express  my  great  respect 
for  the  court.  My  apparent  dogmatism  of  manner  is  inseparable 
from  my  natiue.  And  yet,  like  many  other  bits  of  circumstantial 
evidence  the  conclusion  to  be  drawn  is  very  unsound. 

I could  file  long  briefs  upon  this  question,  but  I am  content. 


I now  pass  to  another  doctrine  which  I assert  lies  at  the  very 
foundation  of  the  law,  and  if  it  be  applied  in  this  case,  then  there  must 
be  a holding  that  all  that  the  District  Attorney  did  in  these  cases  was 
within  his  sound  discretion,  and  that  the  exercise  of  his  discretion 
cannot  be  inquired  into.  Unless  it  can  be  clearly  proven  that  he 
did  not  act  within  his  discretion,  but  that  he  went  outside  of  it  for  some 
evil  purpose,  then  no  case  exists.  I quote  from  Commonwealth  vs. 
Wheeler,  2d  Mass.,  172:  [Reading] 

“I  observe  in  the  bar,  the  nolle  prosequi  is  alleged  to  have 
been  entered  by  the  advice  of  the  Court  of  Common  Pleas.  Cer- 
tainly, the  court  is  not  legally  competent  to  give  any  advice  on  this 
subject.  The  power  of  entering  a nolle  prosequi  is  to  be  exercised 
at  the  discretion  of  the  attorney  who  prosecutes  for  the  government, 
and  for  its  exercise  he  alone  is  responsible.” 


I quote  very  briefly  from  Commonwealth  vs.  Tuck,  20  Pickering: 
[Reading] 

“It  is  perfectly  clear  that  a nolle  prosequi  may  be  entered  at 
the  pleasure  of  the  prosecuting  officer.  Such  is  the  constant 
practice.  It  mayjDe  that  the  indictment  is  defective  and  he  may 
wish  to  prociue  another.  He  may  discover  that  the  evidence  will 
turn  out  different  from  what  he  expected  and  he  may  wish  to  vary 
the  charge  to  make  it  conform  to  the  proof.  Or  he  may  have  good 
reasons  for  not  wishing  to  prosecute  at  all.  There  may  beinnu- 
, merable  causes  for  discontinuing  the  prosecution;  of  all  of  which 
he  must  judge,  upon  his  official  responsibility.  In  many  cases 
the  discontinuance  may  operate  to  the  prejudice  of  the  defendant, 
but  never  to  the  injury  of  his  legal  rights.  It  is  not  to  be  presumed 
that  this  officer  wiU  violate  his  duty  or  act  oppressively.”  . . . 

“The  power  to  enter  a nolle  prosequi  is  held  by  the  Attorney 
General  virtute  officii.  He  exerts  it  upon  his  official  responsibility. 
The  court  has  no  right  to  interfere  with  its  exercise.  They  can 
only  judge  of  the  effect  of  the  act  when  done,  and  of  the  legi  con- 

21 


sequences  which  may  follow  from  it.  They  will  take  care  that  it 
shall  not  operate  to  the  prejudice  of  the  defendant’s  rights.” 

In  Commonwealth  vs.  Smith,  98  Mass.,  page  10:  [Reading] 

‘Tt  is  perfectly  clear  that  a nolle  prosequi  may  be  entered 
at  the  pleasure  of  the  prosecuting  officer  before  a jury  is  impanelled. 
The  reasons  for  the  practice  are  there  stated,  and  they  are  numerous 
and  decisive.” — 

That  is  referring  to  Commonwealth  vs.  Tuck,  20  Pickering. 

“Nor  can  we  see  that  there  are  any  valid  objections  to  it.  Such 
a mode  of  disposing  of  an  indictment  can  in  no  way  inipair  or  affect 
the  rights  of  the  accused  party  in  any  future  prosecution  for  the 
same  offense.  That  it  will  not  be  resorted  to  capriciously  or  op- 
pressively, so  as  to  work  any  undue  hardship  on  defendants,  is 
sufficiently  guarded  against  by  intrusting  the  exercise  of  the  power 
to  the  sound  discretion  of  an  officer  of  the  government,  whose 
function  it  is  to  watch  over  and  direct  the  course  of  criminal  prose- 
cutions, and  who  can  have  no  motive  to  use  the  authority  vested 
in  him  in  a manner  inconsistent  with  a due  regard  to  the  rights 
and  interests  of  all  parties.” 

Again,  in  Lizotte  vs.  Dloska,  200  Mass.,  327:  [Reading] 

“The  District  Attorney  had  the  absolute  power  to  enter  a 
nolle  prosequi  upon  his  official  responsibihty,  without  the  approval 
or  intervention  of  the  court.  He  alone  is  answerable  for  the 
exercise  of  his  discretion  in  this  respect.  It  is  presumed  that  he 
will  act  under  such  a heavy  sense  of  obligation  for  enforcement  of 
the  law  and  sensitive  consciousness  of  important  public  duty  that 
no  wrongful  act  will  be  committed.” 

To  the  same  effect  see  Commonwealth  vs.  Wheeler,  2 Mass.  172,  and 
Commonwealth  vs.  Tuck,  20  Pickering,  356.  But,  let  me  read  a little 
further  from  that  case,  because  it  seems  to  touch  another  phase  of  this 
proposition:  [Reading] 

“Entry  of  a nolle  prosequi  is  final  so  far  as  the  particular  case 
is  concerned.  It  does  not  require  the  presence  nor  the  consent 
of  the  defendant.” 

We  had  a great  deal  of  evidence  introduced  here  that  defendants  had 
not  been  consulted. 

“Therefore,  the  agreement  of  the  prosecuting  officer,  that  the 
indictments  or  complaints  should  not  be  further  prosecuted  and 
that  an  entry  upon  the  records  of  the  court  should  be  made  to  that 
effect  at  an  early  sitting,  was  tantamount  to  the  completion  of  the 
service  which  the  plaintiff  contracted  to  render  in  defending  Farra 

22 


and  Goyeski  in  the  ciiminal  proceedings  pending  against  them. 
It  is  not  to  be  assumed  that  the  word  of  a prosecuting  officer  will 
be  broken  respecting  the  disposition  of  cases,  in  instances  'where 
the  whole  matter  lies  in  his  O'^m  hand.” 

It  seems  there  have  been  other  prosecuting  attorneys  who  have  said  to 
attorneys  having  cases  before  them,  that  they  would  dismiss  the  case. 


In  State  vs.  Smith,  49  New  Hampshire,  155,  going  outside  of  this 
state:  [Reading] 

“No  question  is  made  by  the  counsel  on  either  side,  as  to  the 
general  discretionary  power  of  the  prosecuting  officer,  in  this  state 
to  enter  a nolle  prosequi  in  ordinary  indictments,  instituted  in  the 
name  of  the  State.  This  power,  such  officer,  exercises  virtute 
officii,  frequently  before  a jury  is  impanelled,  and  sometimes,  while 
the  case  is  on  trial,  before  the  jury,  with  the  consent  of  the  re- 
spondent, and  sometimes,  after  a verdict  is  rendered  against  the 
prisoner. 

It  may  be  that  the  prosecuting  officer,  finds  his  indictment  de- 
fective in  form,  or  substance,  and,  that  he  may  wish  to  procure  a 
better  one,  or,  he  may  discover,  that  the  evidence  will  not  sustain 
the  charge  as  alleged,  and  a change  may  be  requisite  to  conform 
to  the  actual  proof.  There  may  be  various  reasons  for  discontinu- 
ing the  prosecution,  all  of  which  he  must  determine,  being  con- 
trolled by  w^ell  settled  principles  of  law  and  practice  and  a sound 
legal  discretion.  It  is  not  to  be  presumed  that  this  officer  will 
voluntarily  consent  to  any  discontinuance  which  will  materially 
injure  the  rights  of  the  prisoner,  or  that  he  will  violate  knowingly 
his  official  trust  or  in  any  way,  act  corruptly  or  oppressively.” 


Again  in  56  New  Hampshire,  137,  State  vs.  Tufts:  [Reading] 

“For  obvious  reasons  the  functions  of  the  court  and  prosecut- 
ing officer  are  entirdy  distinct.  The  court  cannot  usurp  the  duties 
of  his  office  and  say  what  cases  shall  and  shall  not  be  prosecuted. 
The  law  has  lodged  that  duty  wdth  officers  selected  for  that 
special  purpose,  and  who  are  responsible  for  the  manner  in  which 
they  perform  those  duties.  . . . He  is  not  required  to  prosecute 
an  indictment  if  there  is  no  proof  to  sustain  it,  or  so  little  evidence 
that  the  chance  of  convicting  is  not  such  as  to  justify  the  attempt. 
Nor  is  he  required  to  prosecute  cases  where  ‘they  are  pursued  in  a 
spirit  that  renders  them  injurious  to  the  public  morals.’  ” 

I call  special  attention  to  that  clause,  because  it  shows  that  this 
discretion  of  the  District  Attorney  extends  so  far  that  when  he  con- 
cludes it  is  better  for  the  public  morals,  better  for  the  public  welfare 
not  to  prosecute  a case,  in  the  exercise  of  his  discretion,  he  may  refuse 
to  proceed  with  the  case. 


23 


I read  from  30  Federal  Reporter,  page  21,  In  re  Eaves; 

“It  is  all  important  to  good  government,  and  the  public 
interests,  that  an  officer  who  exercises  important  judicial  functions 
should  be  free  in  thought  and  independent  in  judgment,  when  he 
acts  in  the  administration  of  justice  and  the  enforcement  of  the 
law.  The  course  of  justice  would  be  impeded,  and  the  efficiency 
of  the  commissioner  would  be  greatly  impaired,  if  his  freedom  of 
action  was  restrained  by  continual  apprehensions  of  removal  from 
office  on  account  of  honest  official  mistakes  and  errors  of  judgment, 
or  by  judicial  caprice  or  by  the  clamor  of  individuals  excited  by 
personal  prejudices  and  hostility. 

“In  this  civil  proceeding  which  so  seriously  affects  the  reputa- 
tion and  other  interest  of  the  respondent  he  is  entitled  to  all  the 
presumptions  of  law  as  to  innocence  which  are  allowed  on  criminal 
trials.” 

State  vs.  Hastings,  37  Nebraska:  ^ 

“As  to  whether  an  impeachment  is  to  be  regarded  as  a civil 
action  or  as  a criminal  prosecution  for  the  purpose  of  the  produc- 
tion and  the  quantum  of  proof  to  warrant  a conviction  it  may 
be  safely  asserted  that  the  decided  weight  of  authority  in  this 
country  and  England,  ij  indeed  there  exists  a diversity  of  opinion  on 
the  subject,  is  that  impeachment  in  that  respect  must  be  classed  as 
a criminal  prosecution  in  which  the  state  is  required  to  establish 
elements  of  the  charge  beyond  a reasonable  doubt.” 

In  the  Impeachment  of  President  Johnson  it  was  declared: 

“To  say  that  a high  public  officer  with  good  motives  and  with 
'an  honest  intent  to  obey  though  he  mistake  the  meaning  of  the 
statute  can  be  found  guilty  of  a high  crime  or  misdemeanor  which 
shall  subject  him  to  the  heaviest  punishment  which  can  fall  upon 
a public  man  in  high  office  is  to  assert  a doctrine  never  before 
heard  in  any  court  of  justice.” 


In  Mahen  vs.  Rosser,  24  Okla.  588  and  again  in  Phillips  vs.  State,  181 
Pac.  713,  this  doctrine  is  laid  down: 

“In  a case  to  remove  an  officer  the  jury  must  believe  from  the 
evidence  in  the  case  beyond  a reasonable  doubt  that  the  officer 
is  guilty  of  the  charge.  The  degree  of  proof  required  is  the  same 
as  required  in  the  trial  of  a misdemeanor.” 

State  vs.  Bush,  208  S.  W.  609 : 

'“Proceedings  under  the  ouster  should  never  be  brought  unless 
there  is  a clear  case  of  official  derehction.  This  is  a very  drastic 
statute  and  should  not  be  invoked  except  in  plain  cases  that  could 

24 


be  certainly  proved.  There  is  no  excuse  for  instituting  an  ouster 
suit  for  purposes  of  inquisition  and  as  a fishing  expedition.” 

Storey  on  the  Constitution,  s.  798,  after  quoting  from  decisions; 

‘‘The  foregoing  decision  also  held  that  ouster  proceedings  were 
civil.  Nevertheless,  it  indicated  that  the  degree  of  proof  should 
be  to  a high  degree  of  certainty,  greater  than  that  which  ordinarily 
prevails  in  civil  proceedings. 

‘‘It  is  the  boast' of  English  jurisprudence  and  without  it  the 
power  of  impeachment  would  be  an  intolerable  grievance;  that  in 
trials  by  impeachment  the  law  differs  not  in  essentials  from  criminal 
prosecutions  before  inferior  courts. 

‘‘The  same  rules  of  evidence,  the  same  legal  notions  of  crimes 
and  punishments  prevail.” 

A'tidrews  vs. 'King,  77  Me: 

‘‘The  proceeding  is  adversary  or  judicial  in  its  character,  and 
where  the  statute  is  silent,  the  substantial  principles  of  the  common 
law  must  be  observed.  . . . 

‘‘The  removal  cannot  be  made,  unless  the  alleged  cause  in 
fact  exists,  and  such  existence  should  be  ascertained  and  declared, 
as  the  legal  basis  for  the  sentence  of  removal.  Such  is  the  imme- 
morial practice  in  prosecutions  in  the  common  law  courts.” 

Com.  vs.  Kane,  108  Mass.  423.  Masonic  Trustvs.  Boston,  201  Mass, 
at  326: 

‘‘The  foundation  of  the  rule  of  evidence  that  a person  acting 
as  a public  officer  has  been  duly  appointed  to  the  office  which  he 
assumes  to  exercise,  is  that  all  acts  done  by  what  appears  to  be 
public  authority  are  presumed  to  be  rightly  done  unless  the  con- 
trary is  proved.” 

‘‘AH  acts  done  . . . are  presumed  to  be  rightly  done  unless  the 
contrary  is  proved.” 

Bank  of  the  U.  S.  vs.  Dandridge,  12  Wheat.  64,  69: 

‘‘The  law  itself  for  the  purpose  of  strengthening  the  infirmity 
of  evidence,  and  upholding  transactions  intimately  connected 
with  the  public  peace,  and  the  security  of  private  property,  in- 
dulges its  own  presumptions.  It  presumes  that  every  man,  in  his 
private  and  official  character,  does  his  duty,  until  the  contrary 
is  proved.” 

There  is  one  further  proposition  of  law  to  which  I call  attention. 
It  is  the  law  of  conspiracy.  I shall  not  pause  to  more  than  state  the 
point.  Conspiracy  consists  in  the  meeting  of  two  or  more  minds  to 
do  an  unlawful  act  or  to  do  a lawful  act  by  unlawful  means.  There 
must  be  a meeting  of  minds  as  to  the  common  purpose,  a guilty  knowl- 

25 


edge.  It  is  true  that,  a conspiracy  being  established,  the  meeting 
of  the  minds  in  the  common  cause  having  been  shown,  it  is  not  then 
necessary  that  each  individual  member  of  the  conspiracy  shall  be 
acquainted  with  each  of  the  acts  of  the  fellow  conspirators,  because  the 
conspiracy  having  been  shown  from  that  center  flows  out  the  responsi- 
bility for  the  individual  acts  of  the  several  conspirators.  But  there  can 
be  no  conspiracy  inferred  from  individual  acts  unless  the  conspiracy 
has  been  shown,  although  of  course  it  is  true  that  the  individual  acts 
may  in  themselves  constitute  such  a chain  of  circumstances  as  to  prove 
the  conspiracy;  but  there  must  be  evidence,  direct  or  circumstantial, 
to  establish  the  common  meeting  of  the  minds  to  accomplish  a common 
purpose.  All  these  principles  of  law,  I take  it,  your  Honors  have  long 
been  familiar  with,  yet  in  this  vast  field  of  legal  learning  it  is  always 
necessary  to  take  our  bearings  when  we  come  to  consider  any  particular 
journey  we  are  to  undertake. 

And  now,  iflyour  Honors  please,  I desire,  if  I can,  to  l^y  before  the 
Court  very  briefly  a picture  of  this  case.  My  associate,  Mr.  Boyle, 
has  well  said  that  if  your  Honors  are  to  hear  this  evidence  and  weigh 
it,  as  you  must,  it  is  almost  necessary  that  you  transport  yourselves  in 
your  mind  from  this  bench  to  the  District  Attorney’s  office.  I presume 
there  are  but  few  men,  who  have  not  themselves  filled  a position  of  that 
kind,  can  appreciate  its  difficulties.  Your  office  crowded  in  the  morn- 
ing with  complainants,  many  of  them  set  on  by  improper  motives,  many 
of  them  mistaken,  some  of  them  desiring  to  use  the  office  for  some 
sinister  purpose,  some  of  them  seeking  revenge,  sortie  of  them  seeking 
to  use  the  office  for  the  collection  of  money;  all  of  them  come  present- 
ing their  cases  and  holding  back  the  real  reason.  The  Court  in  the 
meantime  is  busy  trying  cases,  and  your  attention  is  divided  there. 
You  have  but  a few  minutes  to  examine  each  case  in  the  ordinary  course 
of  business.  In  a city  like  this,  with  the  vast  ebb  and  flow  of  business 
through  the  prosecuting  attorney’s  office  the  personal  attention  of  the 
District  Attorney  is  a physical  impossibility. 

Mr.  Pelletier  has  been  continuously  in  office  since  1909.  He 
has  disposed  of  over  80,000  cases  of  record,  and  probably  three  times 
that  number  which  never  passed  beyond  preliminary  inquiry.  The 
State  asserts  that  he  was  guilty  of  misconduct  in  20  instances  out  of  the 
80,000.  The  earliest  charge  is  1915;  the  latest  charge,  with  the  excep- 
tion of  five  cases  trivial  in  their  character  and  solely  in  charge  of  dep- 
uties, in  1918.  These  cases  handled  by  the  deputies  were  the  Stone, 
Mancovitz,  Soracco,  Nee  and  Szathmary  cases.  In  addition  to  this 
there  is  the  charge  about  political  speech.  Apparently  neither  in- 
dustry nor  mahce  was  able  to  discover  the  slightest  defect  in  Mr.  Pel- 
letier’s conduct  during  the  first  six  years  of  his  official  career  or,  w’ith  the 
inconsequential  exceptions  named,  during  the  last  three  years  thereof 
The  picture  present^  by  the  prosecution  is  therefore  of  a man  uncor- 
ruptible, efficient,  honest  for  six  years,  suddenly  becoming  and  remaining 
for  three  years  a bad,  wicked  and  vicious  man,  and  then  just  as  sud- 
denly, and  without  apparent  reason,  returning  to  his  original  state  of 
virtue.  This  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  Corcoran’s  activities 

26 


seemingly  have  reached  their  climax  during  the  last  three  years  and 
that  the  much  abused  Coakley  was  all  the  time  at  large. 

The  Attorney  General  brought  charges  upon  thirty-two  separate 
and  distinct  cases.  Many  of  these  cases  embraced  four  or  five  separate 
and  distinct  charges.  In  each  instance  he  declared  upon  oath  that  the 
matter  charged  was  an  act  of  wilful  malfeasance,  misfeasance  or  non- 
feasance in  office.  In  five  cases,  the  Emerson  Motors,  the  Daniels,  the 
Metropolitan  Motors,  the  Albert  T.  Smith  and  the  Emery,  he  asserts 
that  PeUetier  brought  or  threatened  to  bring  criminal  proceedings  and 
in  the  alternative 

t 

(1)  that  he  proceeded  without  sufficient  evidence,  or 

(2)  that  having  sufficient  evidence  he  failed  to  prosecute. 

• The  Attorney  General  further  charges  in  paragraph  30  that  Pel- 
letier, having  sufficient  evidence  to  prosecute,  has  failed  to  do  so; 
in  paragraph  33  that  Pelletier  has  nol  pressed  cases  which  should  have 
been  prosecuted;  in  paragraph  32,  that  having  sufficient  information  he 
has  failed  to  prosecute  cases.  Many  of  the  cases  specified  are  brought 
under  two  or  three  of  these  alternative  or  contradictory  charges.  In 
substance  the  charges  are  that  Pelletier  started  an  investigation,  or 
prosecution,  and  that  not  having  carried  the  prosecution  through  to  a 
final  judgment,  it  followed  that 

(a)  he  had  begim  an  investigation  or  prosecution  without  sufficient 
evidence,  and  is  therefore  guilty,  or  in  the  alternative 

(b)  that  he  had  sufficient  evidence  and  failed  to  prosecute,  and  is 
therefore  guilty. 

Tested  by  this  philosophy,  how  stands  the  learned  Attorney  Gen- 
eral? He,  within  ninety  days  brought  under  oath  in  the  most  solemn 
form  charges  in  32  specific  cases.  He  has  dismissed  II  of  these  charges, 
more  than  one  third  of  the  total.  He  has  offered  excuses  for  the  dis- 
missal of  but  two — ^the  Cobb  and  Smith  case.  His  excuse  in  one 
instance  being  the  sickness  of  a single  witness;  and  in  the  other  the 
refusal  of  the  alleged  injured  party  to  testify  imder  oath.  If,  there- 
fore, we  apply  to  the  Attorney  General  the  rule  he  seeks  to  apply  to 
Pelletier,  it  follows  that  the  Attorney  General  either  brought  at  least 
nine  complaints  without  sufficient  evidence,  or,  having  siifficient  evi- 
dence, faded  to  prosecute,  and  he  is  therefore  in  nine  instances  tarred 
with  the  same  stick  with  which  he  would  besmear  Pelletier  for  acts 
selected  from  80,000  cases  disposed  of  during  a period  of  twelve 
years.  Do  I charge  him  with  bad  faith?  No.  But  I use  his  act 
to  illustrate  the  defects  of  his  philosophy  in  this  solemn  proceeding 
before  this  great  court.  Nine  separate  times  he  has  done  acts  of 
exactly  the  same  character  which  he  alleges  against  Pelletier  as  a 
reason  for  his  removal.  Moreover,  in  the  instance  of  Pelletier,  he  had 
in  some  cases  proceeded  no  further  than  a preliminary  investigation, 
a thing  absolutely  necessary  if  a District  Attorney  is  to  gain  any  informa- 
tion whatever.  In  the  other  cases,  indictments  were  returned  by  grand 

27 


juries  who  often  act  improvidently.  In  this  case  the  Attorney  General 
himself  made  charges  and  solemnly  swore  to  their  truth.  The  Attorney 
General  seeks  to  draw  from  the  mere  fact  of  the  initiation  and  prose- 
cution and  its  subsequent  abandonment  an  inference  of  a guilty  motive. 
Shall  we  apply  that  doctrine  to  the  Attorney  General,  or  to  his  initia- 
tion and  dismissal  of  the  11  cases  referred  to.  To  do  so  would  be  mon- 
strous, but  to  apply  it  to  Pelletier  would  be  more  monstrous,  for  the  act 
of  the  Attorney  General  occurred  in  one  case.  The  dismissals  were 
within  90  days  after  bringing  the  charge,  while  the  act  of  Pelletier  ex- 
tended over  7 or  8 years  of  time  and  concerned  cases  selected  from 
80,000' cases  and  involves  all  cases  of  accidents  which  occur  in  the  ordi- 
nary course  of  justice  in  handling  the  vast  flood  of  business  flowing 
through  the  criminal  courts  of  the  land. 

Of  the  80,000  cases  pending  before  Pelletier  less  than  5,000  were 
actually  tried  before  juries,  or  by  any  possibility  could  have  been  so 
tried.  There  are  approximately  200  trial  days  in  the  year.  The 
disposition  of  400  or  500  cases  by  trial  crowds  a court  to  the  limit. 
The  inevitable  result  is  that  the  greater  number  of  cases  must  be  dis- 
posed of  by  pleas  of  guilty,  by  filing,  and  by  nol  pros.  Out  of  the 
80,000  cases  heard  during  the  seven  years,  and  which  embrace  all  the 
charges  against  Pelletier,  it  is  alleged  he  wrongfully  or  mistakenly 
dismissed,  or  failed  to  prosecute  in  some  thirteen  or  fourteen  instances. 
Let  me  call  attention,  although  the  court  will  take  judicial  notice  of 
these  records,  that  there  was  pending — I wiU  call  attention  to  but  one 
year,  but  I should  be  glad  to  leave  as  a part  of  my  argument  this  tab- 
ulation, there  were  pending  at  the  beginning  of  1921,  1548  cases. 
That  has  some  tendency  to  keep  a man  busy.  7,711  cases  were  begun 
in  the  year  1921.  592  cases  were  actually  tried.  1,724  cases  were  nol 
prossed.  439  cases  were  filed  before  trial.  There  were  pleas  of  guilty 
in  3,135  cases.  1,678  cases  were  placed  on  file  after  the  ca^es  were 
disposed  of.  There  were  789  cases  admitted  to  probation.  I am  quoting 
these  figures  on  the  assumption  that  the  court  will  take  judicial  notice 
of  the  court  records  themselves.  But  if  they  are  not  in  evidence,  and  if 
they  cannot  properly  be  presented  here,  then  I simply  call  your  Honors’ 
attention  to  these  figures  as  illustrative  of  the  business  of  the  District 
Attorney’s  office. 

The  disposition  of  practically  9,000  cases  in  a single  year  makes 
it  impossible  for  the  District  Attorney  either  to  be  personally  familiar 
with  all  these  cases  or  to  give  to  any  of  them,  except  the  most  import- 
ant, any  prolonged  personal  consideration. 

The  only  charges  brought  since  December,  1918  are,  the  Mancovitz 
case,  still  pending,  the  defendant  being  in  prison  in  New  York;  the 
Szathmary  case,  still  pending  at  the  solicitation  of  the  injured  wife,  the 
husband  in  the  meantime  furnishing  the  wife  and  children  with  sup- 
port; Stone  and  Nee,  handled  exclusively  by  Mr.  Sheenan;  and  the  Sorac- 
co  case  in  charge  exclusively  of  Mr.  Mancovitz.  In  addition  to  these 
there  is  the  political  speech  of  which  more  hereafter.  The  youngest  case, 
which  is  over  three  years  old,  and  the  earliest  case  which  is  over  seven 
years  during  this  period  of  three  and  one  half  years  stretching  from 
July,  1915  to  December,^  1918,  complaint  is  made  as  to  fourteen  cases, 

28 


four  of  them  seven  years  old ; six  of  them  six  years  old ; two  of  them  five 
years  old;  two  of  them  three  years  old. 

Since  the  date  of  these  twelve  charges  Pelletier  has  been  elected 
twice.  He  has  been  elected  once  since  the  date  of  the  last  four  charges 
I am  discussing.  All  the  graver  charges  have  been  thrashed  out  on 
the  hustings.  Many  of  these  charges  I do  not  know.  The  record 
does  not  disclose  them.  But  it  does  disclose  there  was  an  investi- 
gation by  a legislative  committee  in  the  1917  session.  Substan- 
tially all  of  these  charges  were  made  before  the  Bar  Association  nearly 
three  years  ago.  They  were  practically  abandoned.  They  were 
conducted  by  Pelletier’s  enemy,  who  was  afterwards  convicted  of 
receiving  stolen  papers  from  Coakley’s  office,  and  whose  case  rests 
in  this  court.  They  were  finally,  by  some  mysterious  influence,  sud- 
denly revived  to  form  the  basis  of  the  Attorney  General’s  information. 
The  record  furnishes  indubitable  proof  of  the  activities  of  Mr.  Cabot, 
who  originally  preferred  these  charges  before  the  Bar  Association, 
after  a first  attempt  to  bring  them  before  this  court  who  declined  to 
issue  an  order  of  notice.  Although  not  a lawyer  he  sat  at  the  Bar  Asso- 
ciation hearings  as  I recall  the  evidence.  He  employed  attorney  Cole- 
man to  procure  an  affidavit  from  Bond  the  stock  salesman  for  Metro- 
politan Motors,  and  it  is  this  same  Coleman  who  supervised  the  affi- 
davit, or  at  least  carried  the  affidavit  of  Matches  to  the  Bar  Association, 
and  accompanied  Matches  to  Boston  while  Matches  gave  his  testimony 
before  the  Bar  Association.  He  is  today  the  representative  of  Matches 
in  his  criminal  proceedings. 

It  may  be  frankly  confessed  that  it  is  not  fully  and  conclusively 
proven  that  Godfrey  Cabot  is  the  real  instigator  of  these  charges, 
but  the  evidence  as  to  his  participation  therein  is  a million  times  more 
direct  and  a million  times  stronger  than  any  evidence  produced  against 
Pelletier.  These  ancient  cases  are  dragged  forth  from  the  catacombs 
of  the  past.  Many  witnesses  have  disappeared,  papers  and  documents 
are  lost,  and  memory  of  the  occurrences  largely  obhterated  from  the 
minds  of  honest  men  and  only  preserved  and  kept  fresh  and  growing 
in  the  brains  of  witnesses  controlled  by  selfish  and  sinister  motives. 

Such,  sirs,  is  the  groundwork  upon  which  the  structure  of  this  case 
rests. 

And  by  what  kind  of  witnesses  is  it  sustained  ? In  thirty-six  years 
of  practice  I have  never  seen  such  an  array.  Let  me  call  the  roll. 
I will  not  call  it  the  rogues’  gallery,  although  it  would  not  be  a misnomer. 

The  convict  Matches — admittedly  testifying  to  mitigate  or  escape 
punishment  for  his  crimes. 

Perry — the  lawyer,  whose  association  with  automobile  thieves, 
it  is  alleged,  was  so  intimate  that  Pelletier  should  be  removed  froni  office 
for  not  sending  him  to  the  penitentiary.  Perry — now  resting  under 
indictment  and  disbarment  proceedings,  the  while  in  the  tender  care 
of  the  Attorney  General. 

Emery — ^who  debauched  and  stole  his  friend’s  wife,  wasted  his 
mother-in-law’s  fortune,  possesses  two  or  three  habitats,  engaged  in 
numerous  questionable  ventures,  and  who  is  now,  by  the  undisputed 
evidence,  resting  under  charges  made  to  the  Attorney  General. 

29' 


Peters — of  whom  it  is  said  Pelletier  should  be  removed  from  office 
for  failure  to  prosecute ; Peters,  who  attempted  rape  upon  the  wife  of 
his  friend,  who  stood  swaggering  in  the  witness  box  and  sneeringly  said 
that  the  husband  would  not  dare  to  strike  him. 

Dorothy  Cot4 — ^who  lured  a husband  from  his  wife  and  children, 
who  brought  him  to  verge  of  bankruptcy,  who  despoiled  him  of  his 
fortune,  and,  in  her  insatiate  greed,  took  the  ring  from  his  mother’s 
finger,  who  threatened  him  with  exposure  and  in  the  process  brought 
suit  to  compel  him  to  further  disgorge  his  property. 

McCallum — ^the  lawyer  who  lent  himself  to  Miss  Cote’s  plan, 
yielded  to  her  blandishments  so  that  he  became  a social  visitor  at 
her  flat  and  an  associate  of  her  female  companions;  who  forgot  his 
obligations  as  a lawyer  and  disclosed  the  confidences  of  his  client;  who, 
at  her  suggestion  and  because  of  her  siren  influence,  sent  a copy  of  the 
letter  of  demand  on  the  Locomobile  Company  to  Lawrence,  who  was 
to  be  the  victim  of  the  concerted  blackmail.  No  court  analyzing 
the  evidence,  it  seems  to  me,  could  escape  the  conclusion  that  the  letter 
was  sent  to  Lawrence  for  but  one  purpose,  and  that,  to  use  the  language 
of  the  street,  to  compel  him  to  “come  across.’’ 

Garland — McCallum ’s  chaperone  at  the  Cote  flat  but  who  came 
forth  so  unscathed  that  he  now  appears  at  once  as  the  accuser  of  the 
District  Attorney  and  as  the  counsel  and  proctor  of  Perry,  under  indict- 
ment and  under  disbarment  proceedings.  Garland — ^the  exaltation 
of  whose  character  is  further  manifested  by  his  eavesdropping  perform- 
ance as  a listener-in  on  a telephone  conversation. 

Stebbins — ^retired  lawyer  who  only  takes  cases  for  friends,  repre- 
sentative of  Charlotte  Broad,  the  working  girl,  who  divided  her  time 
between  gay  parties  at  elegant  hotels  in  Boston,  the  Hghts  of  Paris,  the 
moimtains  of  Switzerland,  and  the  society  of  Stebbins;  Charlotte — 
who  never  asked  for  money  but  accepted  loans  from  her  lawyer  friend. 
Stebbins,  who  can  remember  the  loan  and  the  parties  ni  Boston  but  has 
really,  forgotten  whether  he  met  his  charming  friend  while  he  was 
travelling  in  Europe.  Stebbins — ^who,  knowing  the  character  of  his 
client  and  his  friend,  institutes  a groimdless  suit  upon  a pretended 
promise  of  marriage  against  a man  who  has  been  married  for  three  years 
and  is  living  a decent  life.  Stebbins — ^who  contrives  a letter  to  be 
written  to  Pelletier  so  full  of  falsehood  as  to  shock  his  unscrupulous 
client,  who  within  three  days  time  repudiates  it  in  toto  and  substan- 
tially confesses  the  scheme  of  blackmail.  This  man  is  brought  forward 
to  accuse  Pelletier,  who,  clearly  and  plainly,  balked  him  in  as  bold 
a piece  of  attempted  blackmail  as  ever  disgraced  a lawyer  or  defaced 
the  records  of  a court.  Suppose  Charlotte  Broad — and  I throw  this 
in  by  way  of  illustration — ^had  not  recanted;  suppose  Pelletier  had 
lost  the  letter  of  confession:  this  case  would  now  be  pressed  against 
Pelletier  as  one  of  the  strongest  in  the  catalogue. 

Bond — agent  for  the  sale  of  the  Metropolitan  Motors  stock  who 
made  an  affidavit  at  the  instance  of  Coleman,  the  lawyer  for  Cabot,  who 
also  assisted  in  framing  the  testimony  of  Matches  in  the  Emerson  Motors 
case. 


30 


Buckley — who  confessedly  paid  the  blackmail  levied  upon  Acker- 
man & Brummel,  who  afterwards  asserted  an  unfoimded  and  ridiculous 
claim  for  $65,000  for  commissions  in  addition, to  a salary  although  his 
written  contract  specifying  the  salary  had  yet  a year  to  run.  Buckley 
— who  was  detected  in  conspiracy  with  one  of  the  former  blackmailing 
employees,  who  surrendered  his  pretended  claim  at  the  mere  hint 
that  his  conduct  was  under  surveillance  by  the  authorities,  although 
he  was  then  represented  by  so  good  a lawyer  and  so  gallant  a soldier 
as  Judge  Logan,  under  whose  advice  he  acted. 

Papineau — the  unspeakable,  who  lived  in  idleness  at  the  instance 
of  his  wife’s  mother,  who  tamely  submitted  to  the  seduction  and  theft 
of  his  wife,  who,  while  surrendering  the  custody  of  his  own  child, 
brought  suit  to  recover  the  illegitimate  offspring  of  his  wife  and  her 
paramour,  who  settled  his  claims  for  damages  for  $1,000,  and  who 
then,  concealing  the  facts,  represented  himself  to  Coakley  as  a wronged 
and  injured  man.  Papineau — ^whose  story  is  a mass  of  contradictions 
which  could  only  have  emanated  from  a brain  degenerated  by  the  vile 
habits  of  a debased  life. 

Bernstein — ^who  told  various  stories  upon  the  witness  stand  utterly 
at  variance  with  his  testimony  before  the  Bar  Association. 

Myer  Berman — whose  religious  zeal  restrained  him  from  riding  in 
any  wheeled  vehicle  on  Saturday  but  whose  avarice  permitted  him 
to  keep  a disorderly  house  not  only  on  Saturday  but  all  the  rest  of  the  week 
and,  on  every  day  save  the  sacred  Saturday,  to  introduce  the 
female  habitues  of  his  resort  to  lascivious  male  visitors. 

Sam  Berman — who,  inheriting  the  instincts  of  his  father,  became  a 
partner  in  his  disreputable  business,  who  falsified  his  ownership  interest 
to  the  Licensing  Board  and  repeated  his  falsehood  to  this  Court,  and  who 
was  finally  convicted  as*  a sharer  and  partner  in  the  lascivious  loot. 

Louis  Berman — who  spent  his  days  in  pursuit  of  higher  learning 
amidst  the  classic  halls  of  Harvard  College  and  his  nights  keeping  the 
books  of  this  hotel  brothel. 

Such  is  the  character  of  some  of  the  witnesses  of  the  State  who 
constitute  the  chief  props  to  the  rickety  structure  erected  by  the 
Attorney  General. 

Now  I present  you,  in  contrast,  the  attempted  besmirchment 
of  honorable  attorneys.  If  Pelletier  is  held  guilty,  then  Francis  M. 
Carroll  and  Amos  Stephens  of  the  New  York  Bar  are  equally  guilty  in 
the  Emerson  case.  If  Pelletier  is  held  guilty,  then  Charles  H.  Innes 
and  Henry  G.  Wells  are  equally  guilty  in  the  Perry  case.  If  Pelletier 
is  held  guilty,  then,  according  to  the  testimony,  Daniel  J.  Gallagher, 
named  as  a co-conspirator,  is  equally  guilty,  and  Major  Thomas  L. 
Walsh  is  seriously,  if  not  criminally,  involved  in  the  Emery  case.  If, 
in  the  Peters  case,  PeUetier  is  held  guilty,  then  Henry  F.  Hurlburt, 
who  arranged  the  settlement  and  paid  the  money,  is  particeps  criminis ; 
and  Charles  F.  Choate,  James  A.  Bailey,  Thomas  D.  Lavelle,  and 
another  attorney  too  exalted  to  have  his  name  even  mentioned,  advised 
the  exact  course  of  conduct  taken. 

There  is  also  the  general  charge  that  Pelletier  retained  in  his 
employ  incompetent  or  dishonest  deputies.  This  is  a reflection  upon 

31 


his  own  present  deputies, — Daniel  M.  Lyons,  Frederick  M.  Sheenan, 
William  S.  Kinney,  Henry  P.  Fielding,  David  Mancovitz,  and  Daniel 
W.  Casey.  It  is  likewise  a reflection  upon  all  of  their  predecessors 
in  office,  and  it  is  imsustained  by  a single  word  of  credible  evidence. 

The  lawyers  specifically  named  as  co-conspirators  are  Carroll, 
GaUagher,  Innes,  and  the  lawyers  necessarily  involved  are  Wells, 
Walsh,  Hurlburt,  Choate,  Bailey,  LaveUe,  and  the  unnamed  attorney. 
All  of  these  attorneys  have  hitherto  been  of  unimpeachable  reputation, 
some  of  them  being  numbered  not  only  among  the  greatest  lawyers  in 
Boston  but  the  greatest  in  the  United  States.  I stand  in  their  defense 
and  I hurl  back  every  insinuation  against  their  honor.  But  I repeat: 
if  in  these  cases  this  man  is  to  stand  convicted,  then  they  too  must  have 
upon  their  garments  the  smoke  of  the  fire. 

Moreover  the  veteran  clerk  of  the  Superior  Criminal  Court  and 
his  equally  veteran  deputy  find  the  integrity  of  their  records  challenged 
and  their  capacity,  if  not  their  integrity,  brought  into  question.  The 
stenographer  who  took  the  testimony  before  the  Grand  Jur>^  finds 
his  notes  questioned  and  an  insistence  that  is  remarkable  indulged  in, 
that  he  shall  write  in  the  name  of  Pelletier  instead  of  the  name  of 
Kinney. 

The  desperate  straits  in  which  the  Attorney  General  found  him- 
self is  manifested  in  these  acts  and  especially  by  his  conduct  in  placing 
Mr.  Carroll  upon  the  stand  as  his  own  witness,  thus  vouching  for  his 
integrity,  and  afterwards,  for  the  mere  purpose  of  securing  the  admis- 
sion. of  what  must  be,  I think,  regarded  as  the  perjured  testimony  of 
a convicted  felon,  naming  Mr.  Carroll  as  a co-conspirator,  and  this 
while  the  echo  of  Assistant  Attorney  General  McCarthy’s  words,  “I 
make  no  implication  against  Mr.  Carroll,”  were  still  reverberating  in 
this  chamber. 

Now,  if  your  Honors  please,  let  me  for  a moment  analyze,  the 
theory  upon  which  the  evidence  of  conspiracy  rests.  I assert,  in  my 
humble  judgment,  that  if  the  theory  followed  by  the  State  in  this  case 
as  to  proof  of  conspiracy,  is  allowed,  no  man  is  safe.  All  this  evidence 
was  admitted  by  your  Honors  upon  the  promise  of  the  State  that  it 
would  furnish  the  connecting  link.  Instead  of  first  furnishing  the 
evidence  of  the  meeting  of  minds  and  the  common  purpose  of  the 
concerted  action,  they  began  at  the  outskirts  and  proved  that  A said 
to  B something  about  C.  Their  method  then  was  to  follow  that  by 
showing  that  C did  the  thing,  and  then  whether  the  thing  he  did  was 
natural  or  just  and  right  or  not,  the  claim  was  made  that  that  established 
the  conspiracy. 

Let  me  state  that  concisely.  The  method  of  the  introduction  of 
evidence  and  evidently  the  theory  of  the  State,  was  this,  that  if  A,  in 
a private  conversation,  tells  B that  he  controls  C and  that  he  can,  by 
reason  of  his  control,  induce  C to  do  a particular  thing,  and  afterv'ards, 
C at  the  request  of  A does  the  act  that  A said  he  would  get  him  to  do, 
that  this  makes  C responsible  for  the  plots  and  acts  of  A and  aU  other 
persons  with  whom  they  may  associate  themselves.  That  has  been 
the  method  of  proof  in  every  one  of  these  cases,  if  your  Honors  please, 
in  every  one  of  them.  Where  does  it  lead  ? The  theory  is  at  war  with 

32 


the  law  and  with  common  sense.  If  it  were  adopted,  no  man  would 
be  safe  unless  he  secluded  himself  in  an  hermetically  sealed  room  and 
cut  the  telephone  communications. 

A simple  illustration  will  suffice:  Suppose  that  A is  a lawyer — 
let  us  say  Perry  is  a lawyer — and  B is  a litigant  in  the  court  of  some 
judge  and  a continuance  of  the  case  or  some  particular  order  is  desired. 
Perry,  in  disregard  of  the  truth,  boasts  that  he  secured  the  appoint- 
ment of  the  judge  from  his  friend  the  Governor,  that  he  can  seciire 
any  favor  he  desires,  well  knowing  that  the  thing  he  has  said  is  false, 
but  also  well  knowing  that  the  thing  he  is  about  to  ask  can  be  justly 
and  properly  granted,  well  knowing  that  any  judge  would,  in  the  ordi- 
nary course,  upon  proper  presentation  and  argument,  grant  the  order. 
Thereupon  he  telephones  the  judge,  speaks  even  in  a familiar  way, 
possibly  calls  him  by  his  first  name,  and  asks  for  an  appointment  in 
regard  to  the  case  in  question.  At  a proper  and  usual  time  he  appears 
before  the  judge,  presents  his  reasons  for  the  desired  order,  and  secures 
it.  The  judge  has  done  exactly  the  thing  that  A said  he  would  do,  but 
he  did  not  do  it  because  of  any  control  exercised  over  him  by  A,  of 
for  any  sinister  or  corrupt  motive,  but  upon  the  merits  and  in  the 
exercise  of  his  sotmd  discretion.  The  years  roll  by,  the  litigation  is 
disposed  of,  the  dust  of  time  has  settled  down  and  covered  the  records, 
the  whole  is  relegated  into  the  limbo  of  the  past.  Suddenly  it  is  dis- 
closed that  A charged  his  client  an  enormous  fee  and  obtained  it,  and 
the  client  asserts  that  he  paid  it  because  of  a supposed  influence  of  A 
over  the  judge.  It  even  appears, — ^which  is  not  the  case  here — that 
A was  engaged  in  a general  conspiracy  with  a number  of  other  people 
of  corrupt  nature,  connected  with  the  litigation  in  question.  There- 
upon the  judge  is  impleaded  as  a fellow  conspirator  and  held  responsible 
for  all  the  criminal  acts,  of  which  he  never  heard,  of  which  he  never 
dreamed,  and  mayhap,  the  connecting  Hnk  even  then  is  forged  by 
perjured  hands,  working  upon  the  anvil  of  hate,  driven  on  by  some 
suspicions  in  the  minds  of  those  who  have  an  interest  at  heart. 

Write  that  doctrine  into  the  law  of  Massachusetts,  that  a conspiracy 
can  be  established  in  that  way,  and  your  Honors  will  have  this  case, 
and  from  your  decision  here  rendered  there  wiU  flow  many  other  deci- 
sions. I do  not  pause  to  remind  you  of  your  duties  and  responsibilities. 
No  men  know  it  better:  And  its  mere  mention  might  also  be  taken  as 
an  offense.  But,  it  is  not  so  intended.  Write  into  the  law  of  Massachu- 
setts, this  great  old  Commonwealth  where  Webster  thundered  for  the 
Constitution  and  for  human  rights,  whose  hiUs  were  stained  with  the 
choicest  blood  that  ever  flowed  from  patriots’  veins,  patriots  who  fought 
, for  liberty,  that  upon  such  evidence  and  such  connection  as  this,  men’s 
rights  and  honors  may  be  destroyed,  that  they  may  be  impaled  and 
crucified,  the  structure  they  have  builded  through  the  years  of  their 
lives  be  made  to  crumble  into  dust,  their  mothers’  hearts  broken  and 
shame  be  put  upon  them ! It  is  not  the  law.  No  man’s  life  or  honor, 
more  precious  than  life  itself,  would  for  a moment  be  safe  with  such  a 
law. 

Conspiracy,  proven  in  that  way,  and  yet  that  is  the  method  pursued 
in  substantially  every  one  of  these  cases,  as  I shall  show  your  Honors 

33 


if  my  time  permits  and  your  patience  will  indulge  me.  Conspiracy  is 
the  meeting  of  two  minds,  I repeat,  to  do  an  illegal  thing  or  to  do  a 
legal  thing  by  illegal  means.  It  implies  the  wilful  entering  into  a 
corrupt  scheme.  The  scheme  must  be  known  to  a man  before  he  can 
be  a party  to  it,  of  course,  must  be  known  to  both  parties  or  there  is 
no  conspiracy.  While  it  can  be  proven  by  circumstantial  evidence,  the 
circumstantial  evidence  must  exclude  every  reasonable  theory  of  inno- 
cence. Nor  can  this  defect  of  the  evidence  in  particular  cases,  an  utter 
failure  of  proof  in  each  specific  instance,  be  pieced  out  by  adding  together 
evidence  in  other  cases,  first,  because  there  is  no  charge  of  a general  con- 
spiracy between  Pelletier  and  Coakley.  In  the  absence  of  such  a charge 
that  kind  of  case  cannot  be  presented  or  that  kind  of  judgment  justly  ren- 
dered. Second,  the  cases  in  which  Coakley  was  concerned  when  sub- 
jected to  analysis  show  that  they  were  not  and  could  not  be  part  of  any 
general  plan.  They  are  isolated  instances,  the  inherent  nature  of 
which  forbids  the  conclusion  of  any  general  scheme  or  plan.  All  of  this 
I hope  to  make  more  plain  as  I proceed. 

f And  here  I intend  to  pause,  with  the  Court’s  permission,  to  say  a 
word  in  regard  to  Mr.  Coakley.  I do  not  criticise,  far  be  that  from 
me,  but  I have  been  somewhat  struck  as  we  went  through  this  case 
that  it  seemed  that  if  an  act  were  attributed  to  Coakley,  even  from 
the  first,  somehow  that  act  always  was  permitted  to  come  into  the 
case.  And  yet,  if  your  Honors  please,  so  far  as  this  record  stands, 
and  on  this  record  the  case  must  of  course  be  tried,  there  is  no  more  of 
a presumption  against  Daniel  H.  Coakley  than  any  other  man.  He 
has  not  been  convicted  of  any  felonies.  There  may  have  been  much 
said  about  him  in  rumor,  I do  not  know,  but  when  we  come  to  measure 
his  acts  in  this  case  is  it  not  true  that  we  must  test  him  as  we  would 
any  other  member  of  the  bar,  and  more  than  that,  may  we  not  remember 
that  during  these  occurrences  he,  if  common  rumor  is  to  be  credited, 

stood  high  and  did  an  enormous  business,  just  as  Mr. I wiU  not 

name  other  lawyers,  many  other  lawyers  stand  high  now  doing  a large 
business.  So,  approaching  the  case  from  that  standpoint, — and  here 
I call  attention  now  to  the  utter  failure  of  proof  in  regard  to  certain 
matters, — it  is  intimated  that  Coakley  exercised  a general  influence  over 
Pelletier.  The  proof  offered  is  that  in  some  eight  or  ten  instances 
what  Coakley  sought  to  have  done  was  done.  It  is  also  in  proof  that 
in  at  least  two  of  the  cases  in  which  evidence  was  adduced  Coakley 
failed  to  get  what  he  wanted. 

In  the  Tripp  case  Pelletier,  after  listening  to  Tripp’s  statement, 
told  him  he  would  not  prosecute,  and  sent  him  to  Coakley  to  tell  Coakley 
his  decision.  The  case  was  never  prosecuted.  The  Metropolitan 
Motors  case,  in  which  Pelletier  after  his  investigation  told  Coakley, 
Bernstein  and  Fox,  that  he  would  deal  with  no  lawyers  in  that  case 
and  give  them  no  hearing,  but  would  proceed  with  his  investigation  on 
his  own  lines  and  in  accordance  with  his  judgment,  was  not  brought 
before  the  Grand  Jury.  The  record  furnishes  additional  evidence  that 
the  Gordon  case,  in  which  the  Attorney  General  knows  Coakley  was 
counsel,  was  dismissed,  presumably  because  there  was  no  case.  It 
also  shows  that  the  A.  T.  Smith  case,  in  which  Coakley  was  charged  with 

34 


being  the  chief  conspirator,  was  dismissed  because  Mrs.  Smith,  the 
principal  witness,  refused  to  testify  to  facts  which  would  enable  the 
State  to  proceed. 

There  is  no  evidence  as  to  the  number — and  this  I call  attention  to — 
there  is  no  evidence  in  this  case  as  to  the  mtmber  of  times  Coakley 
applied  to  the  District  Attorney’s  office.  He  may,  as  far  as  the  record 
is  concerned,  have  applied  a hundred  times  and  been  a hundred  times 
turned  down.  The  State  utterly  failed  to  fill  that  gap  or  to  furnish 
that  proof.  All  that  stands  here  now  is  that  in  some  ten  or  twelve 
instances,  scattered  over  seven  6r  eight  years,  Coakley  got  what  he 
wanted,  and,  as  I think  we  can  show,  got  nothing  more  than  was  proper 
to  have  given  to  any  lawyer.  But  mark  you,  I repeat,  the  State  cannot 
take  the  position  that  Coakley  got  what  he  wanted  in  a majority  of 
instances,  or  that  he  exercised  any  kind  of  control,  for  the  State  utterly 
failed  to  prove  that  these  were  the  only  cases  he  had  there,  or  sub- 
stantially all  of  them,  and  so  far  as  the  record  is  concerned  he  may  have 
had  a hundred  or  a thousand  cases  and  been  rejected  in  his  application 
on  all  but  these.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  State  to  prove  its  case  by  evi- 
dence, and  no  inference  is  to  be  indulged  in  a case  like  this. 

Another  inference  sought  to  be  drawn  is  that  the  failure  to  prosecute 
an  indictment  is  in  itself  evidence  of  a corrupt  mind  or  heart,  or  that 
it  is  an  act  of  non-feasance  warranting  removal  from  office.  Two  or 
three  of  these  cases  rest  upon  that  bald  assumption.  And  also  it  is 
further  intimated,  at  least  I get  such  an  intimation  from  the  conduct 
of  counsel  in  the  course  of  their  evidence,  that  there  is  something  sin- 
ister in  an  attorney  visiting  a prosecutor’s  office  and  asking  that 
criminal  proceedings  be  delayed  or  discontinued.  Apply  this  rule, 
and  under  the  evidence  'adduced  in  this  case,  already  adduced,  a 
large  number  of  attorneys  would  have  been  guilty  of  bad  practice,  for 
it  is  in  evidence,  it  seems  indeed  to  be  the  custom  here,  when  an  indict- 
ment is  about  to  be  brought  or  when  an  investigation  is  on  for  the 
attorney  of  the  party  who  may  be  accused  to  ask  for  a hearing  and  to 
get  it, — and  it  is  a good  practice  too.  It  would  save,  and  has  saved, 
the  wrecking  of  thousands  of  reputations,  of  course,  of  heartaches  in- 
numerable and  of  injury  incalculable.  But  let  us  apply  the  rule  of 
failure  to  execute  an  indictment,  and  where  stand  we  then? 

According  to  the  evidence  in  this  case  District  Attorney  Saltonstall 
would  be  culpable,  and  Attorney  Gailand,  who  appears  here  both  as  a 
prosecutor  and  purifier,  in  the  most  lamentable  situation.  The  evidence 
discloses  that  there  was  pending  when  Saltonstall  took  office  an  indict- 
ment against  Perry,  that  this  was  called  to  the  direct  attention  of 
Saltonstall  by  Perry  and  Garland,  who  visited  him  for  the  purpose 
of  procuring  a discontinuance  of  the  prosecution,  yet  the  strange  fact 
remains  that  the  indictment  has  neither  been  dismissed  nor  has  the 
defendant  in  the  intervening  months  been  arraigned.  He  continues 
at  large  under  the  protection  of  Garland,  who,  if  we  are  to  exercise 
common  sense  and  draw  the  natural  inferences  visited  Mr.  Saltonstall 
to  prevent  the  arrest  of  his  client  or  to  obtain  the  dismissal  of  the  in- 
dictment, in  order  to  aid  him,  among  other  things,  to  retain  his  place 
as  a lawyer  at  the  bar.  Consider,  if  you  please,  the  spectacle  of  Pelle- 

35 


tier  being  tried  for  merely  permitting  Perry  to  make  a statement  before 
the  Grand  Jury,  and  the  performance  here  described.  With  an  indict- 
ment pending  against  him  Perry  is  able  to  forestall  arrest  and  arraign- 
ment, and  is  brought  into  this  court  to  give  testimony  to  sustain  a 
charge  for  the  removal  of  Pelletier,  while  the  Attorney  General  permits 
him  to  be  at  large  and  the  processes  of  the  law  to  be  unexecuted.  The 
theory  of  the  Attorney  General  seems  to  be  that  he  is  permitted  to  dc 
these  things,  but  that  Pelletier  is  to  be  condemned  for  doing  the  very 
things  the  Attorney  General  himself  practices.  And  I do  not  say  that 
now  to  criticise  the  Attorney  General.  The  trouble  with  this  case  is 
that  the  Attorney  General  assumes  that  whatever  Pelletier  does  is 
wrong,  and  brings  charges  here  against  him,  massing  them,  painting 
them  as  irregularities,  yet  they  are  the  common  practices  of  the  courts 
and  must  be  the  common  practice  if  business  is  to  be  dispatched  in  any 
sensible  way. 

Now,  if  your  Honors  please,  in  the  light  of  what  I have  said,  or  in 
line  with  it,  I come  to  c^  attention  very  briefly  to  this  question  of 
bank  accounts,  and  there  again  the  evidence  utterly  fails  to  connect 
an}rthing.  I say  it  boldly,  and  I say  it  with  all  possible  emphasis. 
It  fails  because,  first,  there  is  no  relation  shown  between  the  acts. 
It  is  not  shovm  in  this  case  that  Coakley  ever  made  a check  payable 
to  PeUetier,  or  that  he  made  a check  payable  to  anybody  else  and  that 
person  transferred  the  money  to  Pelletier.  No  scrap  of  paper  exists 
of  that  character.  No  human  being  has  come  forward  to  testify  that 
a penny  of  money  ever  passed  from  one  of  these  men  to  the  other. 
Though  malice  with  a microscope  has  searched  to  find  a little  speck 
somewhere  to  indicate  that  fact,  it  was  not  successful. 

What  is  introduced  in  evidence?  Two  bank  accounts.  The  one 
of  Coakley  and  the  other,  of  Pelletier,  showing  certain  deposits  and 
withdrawals  by  each.  So  far  as  the  bank  accounts  were  introduced 
they  showed  substantially  the  same  general  course  of  business  through- 
out the  years.  Whenever  the  State  was  able  in  this  long  course  of 
the  books  to  find  items  in  each  of  the  accoimts  that  bore  some  resemb- 
lance in  amounts,  they  spring  to  the  conclusion — purely  imaginative 
— that  the  money  passed  from  one  to  the  other.  I repeat  in  part  what 
I said  the  other  day.  Apply  that  rule,  and  I can  convict  any  two 
men  of  crime  who  put  into  banks  any  considerable  sums  of  money, 
or  who  transact  any  considerable  business,  because  there  will  come 
inevitably  days  when  similar,  or  somewhat  similar  sums  will  be  de- 
posited or  withdrawn.  And  in  this  case  frequently  the  State  for  its 
innuendo  has  to  wait  some  two  weeks  or  more  to  find  a corresponding 
item.  But  what  shall  we  do  with  this  rule  of  circumstantial  evidence 
which  I adduce,  that  everything  is  presumed  to  be  innocent  until  the 
connection  is  shown  by  a change  of  circumstances,  which  excludes 
every  other  reasonable  hypothesis.  Apply  that  to  the  bank  account. 
What  are  the  reasonable  hypotheses  ? That  a man  might  have 
gotten  money  from  ten  thousand  sources,  all  of  it  honest,  that  he  may 
have  paid  out  money  in  ten  thousand  places,  all  of  it  honest,  all  of 
it  without  taint;  until  the  State  shows  that  it  was  not  so  paid  out, 

36 


the  evidence  is  zero,  and  worse  than  that  it  is  an  insult.  Apph^  I 
repeat,  these  rules  to  any  act  of  his. 

Now  there  is  a way  that  bank  accounts  can  be  proven.  There  is 
a way  that  they  can  be  introduced,  and  they  can  be  introduced  without 
proving  the  actual  passage  of  the  money,  when  you  have  proven  a 
crime  has  been  committed  and  a bribe  has  been  passed — when  the 
corpus  delicti  has  been  established — in  order  to  sustain  it  and  not  to 
prove  it,  but  to  sustain  it  after  proof.  You  can  prove  the  possession 
of  the  particular  thing  alleged  to  have  been  stolen,  or  the  particular 
bribe  passed.  Nay  more,  you  can  prove  the  possession  of  money  by  a 
man  alleged  to  have  been  bribed,  or  the  possession  of  money  by  a man 
alleged  to  have  committee  a theft  or  a robbery  without  actually  identi- 
fying the  money.  But  before  that — before  you  can  do  that  you  must 
introduce  evidence  excluding  every  other  reasonable  hypotheses  as  to 
the  source  of  the  money.  The  law  was  never  better  stated  than  in 
the  instruction  of  the  court  in  the  case  of  Commonwealth  vs.  Coyne,  228 
Mass.  269.  The  opinion  in  the  case  is  by  his  Honor  the  Chief  Justice, 
who  does  not  say,  it  is  true,  that  everything  in  this  instruction,  is 
necessar}s  but  who  does  approve  the  instruction  and  says  that  the 
instruction  protected  properly  the  defendant’s  rights.  I have  no  hesi- 
tation in  saying  that  nothing  less  than  this  instruction  would  protect 
the  defendant’s  rights  and  that  the  learned  Judge  who  tried  the  case 
at  nisi  gave  the  law  as  it  stands  as  the  law  is.  “It  was  not  equivalent” 
said  His  honor  the  Chief  Justice,  “to  the  admission  of  evidence  of 
another  crime.  That  was  not  the  ground  on  which  it  was  received. 
The  jury  were  not  permitted  to  consider  it  in  that  connection.  But 
the  jur}^  were  instructed  carefully  to  disregard  this  evidence  upon  the 
question  of  breaking  and  entering  and  to  consider  it  only  if  the  breaking 
and  entering  was  found  to  be  proved  by  independent  evidence,  . . . ” 
That  is  the  language  of  the  Chief  Justice.  “And  even  then  only  if 
it  was  found  that  the  defendants  ‘had  no  other  source  of  income  to 
account  for  the  possession  of  the  property  found  in  their  possession, 
and  if  they  also  found  that  the  money  and  jewelry  were  the  proceeds, 
or  a part  of  the  proceeds,  of  the  property  stolen  from  the  Wallace 
residence,  they  might*  consider  this  evidence  insofar  as  this  property 
accoimts  for  the  defendants  not  having  the  specific  articles  stolen 
in  their  possession  when  arrested;  that  otherwise  they  were  to  dis- 
regard the  evidence  entirely.’  ” Now  that  rule  protects  a man.  That 
rule  is,  first,  that  evidence  of  the  possession  of  money  is  not  evidence 
of  the  primary  commission  of  a crime,  until  the  crime  has  been  first 
estabhshed;  and  second  there  must  be  a finding  from  the  evidence 
that  the  defendant  did  not  have  any  sources  of  income  which  would 
account  for  the  possession  of  the  property.  Apply  that  to  this  case. 

There  is  no  evidence  that  Daniel  H.  Coakley  might  not  have  been  do- 
ing business  bottomed  upon  a fortune  of  one  million,  or  tw'o  milHon  or  ten 
million  dollars.  There  is  evidence  that  he  had  two  or  three  bank 
accoimts ; that  he  did  a very  large  business  from  which  one  w^ould  infer 
the  possession  of  a large  fortune.  There  is  no  evidence  as  to  Joseph 
Pelletier’s  fortune,  or  money.  The  State  utterly  failed  to  connect 
this  evidence  and  make  it  competent,  although  they  told  this  court  time 

37 


and  again  they  would.  There  is  no  e\-idence  that  he  is  dependent  upon 
his  salaiy.  He  is  not.  There  is  no  evidence  as  to  how  large  a salaiy' 
he  draws  from  other  institutions,  or  what  they  are.  There  is  no  evi- 
dence as  to  the  amount  of  money  he  made  from  his  private  practice. 
There  is  no  evidence  as  to  whether  he  had  a private  fortune  of  his  own. 
There  is  no  evidence  that  the  money  he  put  into  his  safety  deposit  box 
might  not  have  come  from  any  one  of  ten  thousand  sources.  There  is 
no  evidence  that  the  money  he  put  into  his  bank  might  not  have  been 
trust  funds,  clients’  funds,  his  own  funds.  The  State  is  left  suspended 
in  the  air.  The  evidence  is  unconnected.  You  have  failed  to  prove 
}-our  case,  and  without  proof  the  evidence  should  go  out  of  this  case, 
and  never  should  have  been  admitted  except  upon  the  promise  to  connect 
it  up,  and  that  promi.se  has  not  been  kept. 

RUGG.  C.  J. : The  court  will  take  its  usual  noon  recess. 
AFTERXOOX  SESSIOX 

RUGG,  C.  J.  You  may  resume  your  argument,  Mr.  Reed,  it 
you  please. 

MR.  REED.  May  it  please  the  Court,  if  I am  unable  to  conclude 
within  the  allotted  time,  the  Attorney  General  has  said  to  me,  very' 
generously,  that  he  is  quite  willing  my  time  should  be  extended  it  it  is 
agreeable  to  the  Court, — of  course,  a similar  privilege  being  granted  to 
the  other  side  if  they  desire  it,  and  I shall  try  not  to  wear\*  your  Honors 
a moment  longer  than  seems  to  me  to  be  absolutely  necessaiy. 

I do  not  iatend,  after  what  I have  said,  to  discuss  these  bank 
deposits  in  detail  because,  as  I have  asserted,  they  prove  nothing, 
in  the  absence  of  the  limiting  evidence  whidi  the  State  was  in  dun*  bound 
to  produce;  but  I cannot  refrain  from  calling  attention  to  one  item,  as 
shown  upon  the  face  of  these  accounts. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  one  of  the  first  item_s  introduced  was, 
presumptively,  in  connection  with  the  Beiman,  case.  It  seems  that 
the  transaction,  on  its  face  as  it  originally  appeared,  took  place  about 
November  6;  and  so,  with  great  glee,  the  State  introduced  in  e^fidence 
the  deposit  of  Mr.  Coakley  on  that  day  of  $32,593.  But  subsequent 
evidence  showed  that,  at  that  time,  the  money  had  not  been  paid  by 
the  Bermans  at  ah,  and  that  Coakley  went  to  the  bank  and  borrowed 
that  money,  and  a deposit  sHp  of  $67,000  was  introduced  by  the  State 
and,  on  examination,  it  wras  found  that  the  deposit  shp  was  made  up 
of  two  items,  one  a loan  of  $32,500,  with  a note  given,  and  the  other 
a loan  of  an  amount  on  a different  note  which  made  up  the  sum  of 
$67,000.  And  it  was  further  shown  that  Coakley,  on  that  same  day, 
made  his  check  for  the  $32,593.43,  which  was  the  amount  of  the  loan 
made  at  the  bank,  with  the  accumiulated  interest  figured  up  to  the  time 
when  the  Bermans  afterwards  paid  the  money.  I am  in  error  in  my 
statement  that  Mr.  Coakley  on  that  day  made  that  loan.  The  loan 
was  made  on  October  10,  at  the  time  the  transaction  with  the  Bermans 
was  dosed  up.  But  those  are  the  facts  disdosed  in  the  records,  with 

3S 


the  correction  I have  made.  Accordinzh 


at  if.  on  XoT 


her  7,  he  had  tvithdrawn  $-3,000  and  gave  iz  to  Pelletier  as  the  mrre 
insinuation  is,  he  would  have  c^een  caving  money  out  oc  cc-cket  while 
he  was  already  borrowing  $32,000  for  the  Bermans. 

And  30  I might  go  through  this  record.  But  I come  haih  to  the 
rule  of  law  that  there  must  be  a connection  shown,  and  the  mere  mnnec- 
tion  cannot  be  deduced  rom  the  facts  of  decc*sits  ant  wtthfrawnls. 


oecause.  u: 


Le  or  law,  mmocence  to 


nrst  place,  and,  in  the  secc'nd  place,  the  evidence  must  he  of  sm 
acter  as  to  exclude  every  other  reas.:nahle  hypoth; 
world  of  btisiness  lies  there,  to  account  for  evemr  one  of  these 
actions. 

use  a document  merely  as  an  illustration  of  what  might  havr 
place  Simply  in  my  argument  let  me 

tion  with  the  Buckley  case — let  me  assume  that  that  is  th 
let  me  assume  that  it  was  endorsed  by  one  J.  B.  Miram 
assume  that  J.  B.  Moran  borrowed  the  money,  and  let  m 

lot  for  a m‘Dm 


id  as  e“.ddent£anr.  but  I refer  to 


how  easy  it  is.  by  pursuing  the  wild  course  of  imaginatiom  to  imagine 

case,  where  the  terrdme  fact  is  Pelletier  put  $-5.CiOO  in  the 

properly  refer  to  it.  It  showrs  that  the  money  drawn  cut  by  Coakley 
was  drawn  to  Daniel  H.  Sugrue.  who  sat  here  in  this  mom  whom 
the  State  declined  to  put  upon  the  stand — -cne  of  the  couns*h  vcluntarly 
casting  aspersions  upon  the  man's  character.  W ss  that  the  reason  they 
would  not  put  Mr.  Sugme  on  the  stand:  Have  they  been  sc*  choice  in 

has  not  been  so  debased  thev  wouln  not  nut  it  here  unon  the  stand 


if  it  would 


:e  camta.  anamst  r 


on  the  stand.  And  so  they  trace  the  money  into  the  hants  of  E^arhel 
H.  Sugrue,  and  there  ft  rests.  But  let  me  new  supp*ose.  hy  wny  of 
illustration  only,  that  Sugrue  took  the  m^oney  and  paid  it  out  in  settle- 
ment of  a case  to  an  attorney  of  this  town  and  took  his  receipt,  and 

that  is  argument : I oner  it  only  as  argument  I 

And  what  more  do  vou  get.  as  I nass  through  ani  nnaZv 
these  banks  accounts?  It  is  said,  why.  here  is  a check  which  w3s 
cashed  across  the  bank  for  several  th*?usand  dollars  and  that  is  evinence 
of  some  sinister  purpose.  I have  recently  had  cocasion  :o  go  to  a rmtain 
bank  account,  not  in  this  case,  and  found  where  checks  for  four,  nve 
and  six  thousand  dollars  had  been  cashed  across  a counter — nay.  m*?re 
It  is  the  ordinarr  course  of  checks  that  they  do  not  go  through  the  bank 

39 


upon  the  day  they  are  drawn;  and  these  accounts  which  have  been 
introduced  here,  let  me  challenge  your  attention,  your  Honors,  to  the 
fact,  do  not  show  the  date  when  a check  was  made:  they  show  the  date 
a check  was  paid.  And  I could  show  you  checks  for  thousands  of 
dollars  which  have  been  carried  for  months  and  never  cashed,  but 
in  the  ordinary  course  examine,  if  you  please,  your  own  accoimts  and 
see  how  many  checks  came  in  from  two  to  ten  and  twelve  days  after- 
wards. And  so  the  evidence  that  a check  was  passed  through  a bank 
upon  a certain  day  is  no  evidence  at  all  that  the  transaction  took  place 
upon  that  day. 

Thus,  this  evidence  that  has  been  produced  ceases  to  be  evidence, 
for  it  is  in  no  manner  connected  up  as  the  law  requires.  I take  it  out 
and  break  the  chain  of  these  conspiracies,  as  I believe  they  must  be 
broken,  by  the  hammer  of  the  law,  and  there  is  nothing  in  this  case 
on  which  to  rest  even  the  vague  suspicion  which  malice  may  conjure 
up  or  envy  may  promote. 

Now,  if  your  Honors  please,  very  briefly  let  me  take  up  these  various 
cases. 

The  Berman  case.  When  is  the  scheme  laid  ? October,  1916.  Seven 
years  have  come  and  gone,  and  Mr.  Berman  says  his  suspicions  were 
not  even  aroused  until  he  read  something  in  the  newspaper,  and  then, 
if  I recall  the  testimony  rightly,  be  began  discussing  the  case  with  some 
conception  of  getting  money  back. 

Now  what  is  the  case  ? It  is  that  Corcoran,  then  the  District  At- 
torney of  an  adjoining  coimty — ^however  much  debased  he  is  today, 
to  what  vile  estate  he  may  have  sunk — was  then,  seven  years  ago, 
regarded  as  an  honorable  citizen  and  was  the  prosecuting  attorney 
of  an  adjoining  county,  clothed  with  all  that  elevation  to  a high  office 
can  confer.  He  telephones  to  Pelletier,  a brother  district  attorney, 
and  says,  “Please  get  the  register  of  this  second-class  hotel.”  Was 
that  unusual?  Why,  I have  been  prosecuting  attorney,  and  a mere 
telegram  from  a prosecuting  officer  whom  you  had  never  seen,  a telegram 
to  Missouri,  even  to  the  State  “west  of  the  Mississippi,”  from  Massa- 
chusetts, asking  me  to  obtain  the  register  of  such  a hotel,  would  have 
received  instant  attention;  and  if  I had  wired  back  here  to  any  prose- 
cuting attorney  I would  have  expected  the  same  courtesy.  The  chiefs 
of  police  of  all  the  cities  do  that  kind  of  service  for  each  other.  It  is 
of  the  very  essential  of  the  detection  of  crime.  Are  you  to  draw  from 
it  an  evil  purpose?  Not  tmless  the  evil  purpose  is  present.  The  act 
itself  is  as  innocent  as  the  course  pursued  by  all  the  officers  of  this 
coimtry,  as  any  act  is  ever  done.  It  may  be  arbitrary.  If  these 
people  had  refused  to  give  up  their  register,  the  policeman  would  have 
had  to  turn  around  and  left.  But  people  ordinarily  do  not.  I say  it 
is  the  gommon  and  the  usual  thing.  The  Attorney  General  of  this 
Commonwealth  would  wire  the  Attorney  General  of  New  York  to- 
night, to  please  hold  John  Smith  until  tomorrow  morning,  and  he 
would  be  held  as  certain  as  the  message  was  delivered.  Now,  that  much 
Pelletier  did.  What  followed?  The  register  was  delivered  to  Pelletier 
and  soon  thereafter  there  appeared  in  his  office,  Meyer  Berman  and 
Isaac  Gordan.  It  does  not  make  any  difference  for  the  purposes  of 

40 


this  case  whether  they  first  visited  Mr.  Coakley  or  not.  Their  testi- 
mony is  that  they  went  directly  to  Coakley,  who  had  been  their  advisor 
before.  Is  Pelletier  responsible  for  that  act?  What  a strange  coin- 
cidence, to  be  sure,  if  this  were  a conspiracy,  that  these  men  went 
immediately  to  their  own  attorney,  if  this  was  the  man  who  was  to 
consummate  the  conspiracy  against  them.  Such  a conclusion  does  not 
jump  with  common  sense.  It  is  a strain  upon  credulity. 

They  came  to  him — and  this  is  all  that  happened — ^they  asked  him 
why  he  had  sent  for  the  register.  He  told  them  that  he  had  sent  for 
it  at  the  request  of  District  Attorney  Corcoran  of  Middlesex  County, 
and  that  that  was  all  he  knew  about  it.  Whether  it  occurred  there  or 
whether  they  had  first  been  to  Coakley,  we  do  not  know,  for  there  their 
own  story  disagrees  with  itself,  if  I recall  the  evidence  aright.  One 
of  these  men  said,  “We  will  have  to  go  and  see  our  lawyer,  Coakley, 
about  it.”  But  Pelletier  did  not  suggest  it.  Even  Meyer  Berman 
does  not  say  that.  And  it  is  one  of  the  marvels  of  this  case  that  he 
did  not  say  it,  for  who  is  there  in  all  the  world  will  think  he  would  not 
have  said  it  had  he  thought  it  would  suit  the  purpose  of  the  hour. 
That  is  Pelletier’s  sole  connection  with  this  case,  and  not  one  word  more 
-to  it.  I am  not  concerned  in  such  a state  of  facts  as  that,  for  what 
transpired  between  Coakley  and  Corcoran,  the  State  does  not  make 
Pelletier  privy  to  it  by  any  act,  by  any  thought,  by  any  single  link  of 
evidence.  Nay,  they  have  not  by  so  much  as  the  weight  of  one  poor 
farthing,  furnished  evidence  of  connection.  But,  if  we  were  to  take  the 
evidence  as  it  stands  here,  these  three  or  four  or  five  men  met  with 
their  lawyer,  Coakley.  He  told  them — and  there  is  not  a word  of  coim- 
tervailing  evidence — ^that  the  charge  was  that  Meyer  Berman  had 
introduced  in  his  resort,  the  wife  of  a man  who  had  there  been  de- 
bauched, that  this  man  claimed  heavy  damages,  and,  under  the  advice 
of  their  counsel,  they  settled.  Why  did  they  settle?  Men  like  Berman 
do  not  pay  out  $35,000  unless  there  is  guilt.  They  do  not  leave  their 
money  behind  and  run,  unless  the  law  is  hot  in  their  pursuit.  Now, 
Corcoran  then  may  have  been  a wolf;  Corcoran  then  may  have  been 
a blackmailer,  but  there  is  no  evidence.  And  Coakley  then  may  have 
been  as  bad  as  his  worst  enemy  would  paint  him.  I do  not  say  so. 
I know  nothing  against  this  man.  He  may  be  the  most  abused  man  in 
Boston  for  aught  I know.  But,  If  these  two  lawyers  and  these  three 
or  four  or  five  Hebrew^  gentlemen  transacted  that  business  there,  how 
is  it  connected  with  Pelletier,  whose  single  act  is  an  honest  act,  an 
ordinary  act  ? 

I say  there  was  guilt.  They  settled  a civil  claim,  and  they  paid 
heavily.  Now,  let  us  foUow  the  story  on.  Some  three  or  four  months 
elapsed.  They  did  not  pay  the  money  that  day,  you  will  remember. 
There  was  no  great  haste.  There  was  only  $2,500  paid  that  day,  and 
they  had  some  three  or  four  weeks  in  which  to  pay  the  rest.  They 
had  all  of  that  time  to  learn  that  their  own  lawyer  had  tricked  them 
if  he  did  trick  them,  and  then  they  came  in  and  paid  the  money.  There 
was  no  fee  exacted.  The  money  was  borrowed  in  the  bank  by  Coakley 
to  make  good  for  them.  I think  that  is  in  the  record.  If  I have  in- 
advertently said  something  outside  the  record,  I wiU  withdraw  it.  I 

41 


think  that  is  in  the  record.  It  is  hard  for  me  to  keep  what  I hear  in 
this  room  and  outside  of  it  separated,  but  I do  not  mean  to  trespass 
on  the  rules. 

Then  a year  passes,  and  Sam  Berman  says,  “Coakley  sent  for  me 
and  said,  T want  $15,000  more.’”  “What  for?”  “They  are  after 
you  again.”  This  is  a year  after  the  conversation  with  Pelletier. 
“They  are  after  you  again.”  Now,  don’t  you  know,  your  Honors,  that 
that  was  a fee,  that  Coakley  was  charging  them  for  the  work  that  he 
had  done  for  them,  that  the  claim  that  it  was  blackmail  and  that  these 
Jews  gave  it  up  without  a protest,  is  a falsehood  so  monstrous  that  if 
it  had  been  uttered  by  Ananias  and  Sapphira,  it  would  have  fully  justi- 
fied their  fate.  You  do  not  need  evidence  to  refute  a story  of  that  kind. 

I have  said  these  Jews.  For  myself  I condemn  no  race,  and  from 
my  tongue  has  never  fallen  an  aspersion  upon  a man  because  of  his  blood. 
Since  I have  had  to  make  this  reference,  permit  me  just  to  say  that  in 
every  race  there  is  good  and  bad.  The  Jewish  race  has  produced  some  of 
the  greatest  characters  of  the  past  and  some  of  the  greatest  of  the 
present.  The  Jew  is  as  good  a man  as  lives,  but  a bad  Jew  is  as  bad 
a man  as  lives,  and  these  two  things,  because  of  the  very  strength  of 
the  Jewish  character,  which,  turned  to  good  account  marks  the  high-, 
way  where  blazes  the  pure  sim,  or,  seeing  fit  to  take  the  other  course, 
brings  the  very  genius  of  his  race  to  bad  accoimt.  As  to  the  Bermans 
you  may  make  a choice.  You  saw  them  on  the  stand. 

I have  heard  much  of  Daniel  H.  Coakley  and  I have  met  him.  He  is 
a very  ordinary  looking  man.  It  seems  he  prospered  here  at  your  bar  for 
many  years,  and  no  one  discovered  anything  remarkable  about  him.  He 
is  even  now  a member  of  your  bar,  a quiet,  modest  and  beseeming 
gentleman.  But,  he  must  be  possessed,  if  you  accept  this  story,  of 
hypnotic  power,  the  like  of  which  Svengali  never  had.  Svengali  could 
not  make  poor  Trilby  sing  with  half  the  readiness  that  by  the  mere 
waving  of  his  hand,  Coakley  made  Berman  give  up  $15,000,  that 
gentleman  who  loved  the  touch  of  gold  so  well  he  would  coin  it  in  a 
brothel  and  take  it  for  the  hire  of  a lewd  woman. 

And  he  gave  up  $15,000.  All  Coakley  said  was,  “Give  me  $15,000, 
they  are  after  you,”  and  he  dove  into  his  pockets  and  shoveled  it  out. 
Is  there  anybody  here  believes  that?  The  Attorney  General  doesn’t 
believe  that.  He  can’t.  He  has  too  much  intellect.  That  is  that 
case,  and  that  is  all  there  is  to  such  a case. 

Now  let  us  take  the  Emerson  Motors  case.  What  was  the  State’s 
theory  here,  as  plainly  reflected  in  the  questions  of  the  State  and  in 
the  manner  of  its  marshalling  evidence  as  though  it  had  been  painted 
broad  upon  the  wall  or  stated  in  the  open  court  ? It  was  that  PeUetier 
himself  conceived  and  set  in  motion  an  investigation  of  this  concern, 
that  he  advised  himself  with  reference  to  its  infirmities  and  weaknesses, 
that  then  he  caused  its  agents  to  become  alarmed,  that  they  were 
brought  here  to  this  town  through  some  sort  of  connivance  by  somebody 
not  named,  perhaps  by  Carroll,  afterwards  named  as  co-conspirator, 
that  Carroll  carried  them  to  Coakley  and  that  Coakley  alarmed  them 
to  the  point  where  they  would  disgorge,  that  they  repaired  to  Pelletier’s 
office,  and  that  Pelletier  then,  having  no  knowledge  through  the  police 

42 


of  what  had  been  discovered,  evinced  a complete  knowledge  of  the  case, 
and  that  therefore  the  scheme  must  have  been  his.  And,  oh,  with  what 
care  the  State  had  the  witness  who  was  sent  to  New  York,  Mr.  Waite  tes- 
tify that  until  the  morning  of  the  5th  of  October,  he  had  not  reported 
the  facts  that  he  had  discovered  in  New  York,  yet  that  Pelletier  knew 
these  facts,  hence  some  mysterious  source  and  hence,  again,  the  con- 
clusion that  he,  Pelletier,  had  devised  this  scheme.  But  as  we  pro- 
ceeded on  in  the  case  a little  way,  and  after  the  State  had  carefully 
proven  by  one  of  its  officers  that  he  did  not  report  imtil  the  morning 
of  the  5th  it  happened  that  Chief  Inspector  McGarr  was  put  upon  the 
stand.  I never  saw  an  officer  of  the  police  who  impressed  me  more 
as  an  upstanding  man  than  Inspector  McGarr, — clear  headed,  careful, 
straightforward . 

And  now  what  is  the  story  as  we  receive  the  facts  ? Not  the  distorted 
picture  reflected  from  the  distorted  mirror  of  an  imagination  inflamed, 
but  facts?  Plain  they  come  forth  and  clear  as  the  running  brook. 
Inspector  McGarr  started  the  investigation  himself.  He  read  the 
advertisement  in  the  newspaper.  He  brought  it  to  Mr.  Pelletier’s 
office  and  said,  “What  do  you  think  of  that?”  and  Pelletier  said,  “I 
have  just  been  looking  at  it  as  I came  up  on  the  boat.  What  do  you 
think  of  it?’’  “I  think  it  looks  bad.  I have  a notion  to  investigate.’’ 
And  Pelletier  said,  “Go  to  it.’’  I think  those  were  the  words  in  the 
evidence.  And  so  Inspector  McGarr  started  it,  and  Inspector  McGarr 
went  to  it. 

And  then  Inspector  McGarr  put  on  the  case  Mr.  Farrell.  Farrell 
was  the  man  by  whom  the  State  sought  to  prove  that  Pelletier  had  this 
knowledge  he  should  not  have. 

And  let  me  now  conclude  that  phase,  so  that  I may  not  pass  it 
by  in  the  end.  Inspector  McGarr  not  only  swore  that  he  started  this 
investigation,  but  he  swore  that  from  day  to  day  he  had  reported  the 
facts  to  Pelletier,  the  facts  found  here,  the  facts  foimd  in  New  York, 
so  that  the  mystery  of  Mr.  Pelletier’s  knowledge  was  cleared  up  by 
their  own  witnesses.  He  got  it  from  McGarr.  And  all  your  house 
of  cobwebs  blew  away  by  the  breath  of  truth  from  one  of  your  own 
witnesses. 

Now,  briefly.  Carroll  went  to  Matches.  Let  us  get  this  picture 
as  it  is.  Here  is  an  institution  advertising  in  a newspaper.  Nobody 
knows  that  it  is  not  a perfectly  straight  institution.  No  District 
Attorney  wants  to  ruin  or  destroy  a legitimate  enterprise.  AU  under- 
stand how  serious  it  is  to  let  the  breath  of  suspicion  go  out  against  a 
business  house,  and  so  they  proceed  with  some  care.  But,  on  the  other 
hand,  people  of  Boston  and  the  vicinity  have  been,  I presume,  as  they 
have  in  other  cities,  jobbed  and  jobbed  and  jobbed  again  by  stock 
salesmen,  and  here  is  a thing  that  on  its  face  does  not  look  just  right. 
The  District  Attorney  could  have  sat  back,  but  being  a man  who  wanted 
to  protect  his  people  he  said  to  the  police,  who  started  it,  “Yes,  go 
ahead.  If  you  need  to  send  a man  to  New  York,  here  is  your  warrant 
to  send  him  on.’’  There  were  people  who  knew  that  the  stock  sales 
of  this  scheme  of  sales  was  a bad  and  rotten  thing.  My  own  opinion 
is  the  Emerson  Motors  Company  plan  of  building  a cheap  car  was 

43 


entirely  a practicable  thing.  If  inexpensive  automobiles  can  be  built 
by  Henry  Ford  they  can  be  built  by  others.  The  whole  question  was, 
as  far  as  the  factory  is  concerned,  whether  the  scheme  was  sound, 
and  evidence  has  been  brought  forward  that  the  best  automobile  men 
in  the  country  were  engaged  in  it;  but  the  stock  sales  scheme  was 
probably  unsound.  They  were  making  misrepresentations  in  their 
advertisements  to  seU  their  stock.  And  while  the  stock  sales  scheme 
was  unsound,  it  is  nevertheless  true  that  many  an  institution  has 
been  floated  to  success  and  the  stock  sold  at  enormous  discounts  to 
begin  with.  It  is  not  worth  while  to  argue  that.  The  simple  thing 
that  Pelletier  had  before  him  was  this  advertisement,  to  begin  with. 

The  investigation  proceeded,  but  Matches  knew.  He  knew  he 
had  been  sending  out  letters  that  PeUetier  never  saw,  one  of  which 
was  introduced  here  in  this  court,  grossly  misrepresenting.  He  knew 
that  the  statements  that  were  being  made  daily  by  his  men  in  sell- 
ing stock  were  grossly  false.  But  other  people  did  not  possess  the 
same  knowledge.  All  that  Pelletier  knew  what  what  the  police  found 
out,  but  Matches  knew.  How  do  I know  he  knew?  First,  he  knew 
his  own  acts,  and  his  men  who  were  with  him  knew.  Behold,  Officer 
Farrell  goes  to  the  office  and  asks  to  see  the  books  and  makes  inquiries. 
They  are  answered.  He  goes  over  to  look  at  the  automobile,  and  in- 
stantly the  four  salesmen  from  the  salesroom  leave  the  salesroom,  fly 
to  the  ball  park  and  call  Matches  form  the  box  in  which  he  sits  in  almost 
as  lordly  fashion  as  he  sat  in  this  room,  beholding  the  World’s  Series, 
and  he  comes  out.  Is  that  ever  done  by  men  who  are  not  alarmed? 
They  knew.  Pelletier  did  not  know  that.  The  police  did  not  know 
that.  They  telephone  to  New  York.  They  get  in  touch  with  Mr. 
Wilson.  And  here  at  home  they  rush  on  a Monday  morning  succeeding 
these  events  of  Thursday,  or  Friday,  or  Saturday,  to  see  Mr.  Carroll. 
Carroll  says,  “Why,  I think  there  is  no  trouble.  The  fact  that  the 
police  are  up  there  does  not  mean  anything.  You  are  an  honest  con- 
cern. What  difference  does  it  make?”  Wasn’t  that  the  attitude  of  an 
honest  lawyer,  who  believed  he  was  representing  an  honest  thing? 
Would  it  not  have  been  the  attitude  of  any  of  your  Honors  if  you  were 
yourselves  practising  at  the  bar?  ' I think  so. 

But  Matches  is  not  satisfied.  He  is  telephoning  back  and  forth 
to  New  York,  I know  not  how  many  times,  “I  know  there  is  trouble.” 
“I  know  there  is  trouble.”  How  did  they  know  it?  A police  officer 
had  been  down  looking  through  that  plant,  and  they  feared  an  investi- 
gation, as  all  crooks  fear  investigation.  It  needs  only  a shadow  to 
frighten  the  criminal.  And  so  they  hurried  Mr.  Stephens,  then  the 
attorney  of  one  of  the  great  insurance  companies  of  New  York,  as 
shown  by  Matches’s  testimony,  over  here,  and  Matches  takes  him  and 
Carroll  in  a room  and  tells  them  there  is  trouble.  “You  must  find 
out.”  I don’t  know  whether  it  was  that  day  or  the  day  before  that 
Mr.  Carroll  had  said — no,  it  was  that  day — “This  is  going  to  be  a serious 
matter.”  He  had  found  out.  He  had  gone  and  seen  Mr.  Coakley  in 
a perfectly  natural  way,  and  asked  Mr.  Coakley  to  find  out  if  there 
was  an  investigation,  and  said,  “Coakley  can  find  out,  if  it  is  proper 
for  the  District  Attorney  to  let  him  know.”  Well,  now,  undoubtedly 

44 


Carroll  thought  that  Coakley  was  in  some  way  better  fitted  to  get  that 
information  than  himself.  But  is  Pelletier  to  be  held  responsible  in 
this  case  because  that  was  the  estimate  Carroll  put  upon  Coakley? 
He  might  as  well  have  gone,  perhaps,  to  any  one  of  fifty  other  law>"ers; 
he  might  as  well,  in  fact,  have  gone  himself.  But  Coakley  had,  I think, 
some  reputation  here  of  being  a lawyer  of  very  great  skill.  “Yes. 
There  is  an  investigation  going  on,”  that  is  all  they  got.  All  that 
Matches  needed  was  to  be  sure  there  was  an  investigation  going  on, 
and  then  he  knew  the  facts  that  Matches  might  confront.  Then  what? 
Stephens  says,  when  Carroll  tells  him  “if  there  is  to  be  a real  case  you 
will  have  to  get  another  law^^er,  a man  who  can  handle  that  sort  of 
business.”  You  saw  Francis  M.  Carroll  on  the  stand.  I don’t  know 
him,  save  as  I saw  him  here.  He  may  be  a man  of  superb  ability;  I 
cannot  tell.  I wouldn’t  say  from  his  appearance  one  would  pick  him 
exactly  as  a champion  in  some  great  contest  in  a criminal  court.  Un- 
doubtedly these  people  knew'  that  if  information  was  filed  it  would 
destroy  their  business.  Undoubtedly  Stephens  knew  it  because  it  was 
a fact.  Undoubtedly  Matches  knew  in  the  guilty  heart  of  himself  that 
it  might  mean  the  penitentiary,  as  it  afterward  did  mean  to  him  in 
this  very  case,  only  it  was  tried  in  New  York.  But  Pelletier  didn’t 
know  it.  Now  what  happened?  Stephens  went  over  to  Coakley’s 
office  with  Matches  and  laid  down  the  arguments  in  this  case.  What 
were  they?  “Yes.  The  advertisement  does  misstate  a fact  or  two 
here.  It  says  we  have  a plant,  which  we  are  not  able  to  get,  but  we  are 
going  to  get  a plant.  We  are  going  to  do  everything  we  said  we  would 
do  everything  we  said  we  were  going  to  do  in  as  good  or  a better  way. 
We  have  the  money  to  do  it.  And  we  haven’t  wasted  our  money. 
We  have  no  big  salaried  officials.  We  are  an  honest  institution.  Here 
are  these  great  automobile  men  whose  names  appear  upon  the  directory. 
For  God’s  sake  don’t  destroy  this  great  enterprise  and  bring  injur}^ 
upon  a lot  of  innocent  people  who  have  bought  stock.  Can’t  we  get 
this  thing  before  the  District  Attorney?”  No  trouble  about  that. 
“I’U  take  you  over  and  introduce  you  to  the  District  Attorney  and  you 
may  make  your  own  statement  and  I will  back  you  up.  But  let’s  know 
what  the  facts  are.”  And  Coakley  pinned  them  down  as  a smart 
lawyer  does  with  every  client  that  comes  to  him,  just  as  I would  do  to- 
morrow. I would  insist  on  knowing  what  there  was  in  my  client’s 
case.  Undoubtedly  there  was  a serious  statement.  They  went  over, 
however,  to  Pelletier  and  they  fotmd  Pelletier  in  a very  inquiring  mood. 
He  was  taking  nobody’s  word  for  it.  He  had  had  reports  from  McGarr. 
“Where  is  this  factory?  You  have  made  that  representation.”  And 
Mr.  Stephens  made  the  explanation.  “How  many  machines  have  you 
made?”  I think  was  asked.  And  so  he  went  through  the  four  or 
five  points  and  finally,  it  being  stated  to  him  that  they  had  this  money, 
“I  wiU  not  accept  yom-  word  for  it,  gentlemen.  I want  an  auditor’s 
report.” — Then  the  appeal  is  made  “Do  not  destroy  the  business; 
give  us  a chance;  everything  is  straight.”  And  finally  he  says  “I’ll 
consider  it,  but  if  I do  consider  it  you  must  quit  selling  stock  in  Massa- 
chusetts and  you  must  agree  to  pay  back  to  my  people  every  dollar 
they  ever  paid  for  this  stock  if  they  demand  it.”  I know  of  no  picture 

45 


of  an  officer  in  the  public  service  more  commendable  or  brighter  than  is 
that  picture.  Here  he  sat  on  guard  for  his  own  people.  He  was  unwill- 
ing to  take  the  responsibility  of  destroying  a great  institution,  upon  the 
one  hand;  he  was  unwilling,  on  the  other,  to  permit  any  man  to  sell 
stock  of  that  institution  here  in  Boston,  lest  in  the  one  instance  he  might 
destroy  valuable  property  rights,  and  a great  scheme;  lest  in  the  other 
instance  his  own  people  might  have  their  pockets  picked  by  some  stock- 
broking-adventurer, and  in  his  uncertainty  he  said  to  them  that  day 
“I  will  take  it  under  consideration.  I want  this  report  of  the  expert 
or  auditor.  I want  to  know  they  have  got  this  money,  that,  they 
are  not  a mere  fly-by-night  concern.”  Now  that  is  the  evidence  from 
their  side.  From  the  State’s  side.  And  then  what  happens?  Not  a 
word  has  been  said  in  this  office  even  to  Matches,  in  whose  evil  heart 
you  could  rear  weeds  of  perjury  upon  the  instant,  if  he  could  but  profit 
thereby.  He  says  they  went  away  without  a word  and  that  caused  him 
therefore  to  have  suspicion.  It  is  true,  he  says,  that  Pelletier  said  to 
Coakley  “Well,  Dan,  have  you  got  your  fees  yet?”  It  might  have  been 
a mere  jest,  if  ever  said.  But  if  it  was  said  and  said  in  any  sinister  way, 
then  Matches  did  not  teU  the  truth  when  he  said  he  left  them  without 
any  intimation  of  wrong.  But  what  about  Francis  Carroll?  Who  are 
you  going  to  believe  now,  Carroll  the  lawyer,  or  Matches?  Carroll 
gives  that  account.  He  gives  it  at  the  instance  of  the  State.  He  did 
not  testify  to  such  a phrase.  And  if  the  State  could  have  obtained 
it — could  have  had  that  witness  testify — not  as  a co-conspirator,  but  as 
an  honorable  citizen — how  greedily  it  would  have  been  wrested  from 
him.  And  then  these  gentlemen  came  over  to  settle  their  own  affairs; 
Coakley  demanding  what  may  be  regarded  by  this  coiut  as  an  exorbi- 
tant fee.  The  District  Attorney — the  decision  of  the  District  At- 
torney has  already  been  foreshadowed,  and  that  it  wiU  be  favorable, 
but  they  haven’t  yet  produced  the  evidence  which  is  to  come  along,  of 
the  deposit  of  the  $300,000  in  the  banks.  And  Coakley  bargains  not 
for  a $20,000  fee,  but  according  to  his  practice  and  usage  a contingent 
fee  of  $500  and  $20,000  if  he  succeeds.  And  if  he  did  succeed  how  well 
it  would  be  worth  $20,000  for  this  institution  would  have  been  pro- 
tected from  persecution  that  might  have  wrecked  it — would  have 
wrecked  it.  It  would  have  been  protected  by  a legitimate  argument 
largely  made  by  Stephens.  Matches  knew  how  much  he  was  being 
protected.  Wilson,  the  head  stockbroker,  undoubtedly  knew  how 
dear  it  was  to  him.  And  so  they  brought  the  money  over  here  and 
Coakley  said  he  wanted  it  in  cash — a very  natural  thing  for  him,  at 
least,  to  do.  But  when  the  money  came  Carroll  put  it  in  the  bank  where 
the  plain  record  was  laid  down,  and  checked  it  out  to  Coakley.  And 
now  the  whole  deal  is  closed.  And  then  the  next  day  Matches  puts  into 
this  case  the  only  thing  that  could  cast  an  aspersion  upon  Pelletier. 
And  what  was  that?  The  conversation  between  himself  and  CarroU 
in  which  he  says  that  Carroll  said  to  him  that  the  money  had  to  be 
divided  with  Pelletier,  or  intimated  it.  He  didn’t  say  it  directly.  He 
drew  that  inference.  And  then  this  wretch  states  that  he  continued 
on  friendly  terms  with  Carroll  and  the  evidence  is  that  CarroU  con- 
tinued to  represent  him  as  an  attorney.  Now  let  us  take  the  measure 

46 


of  that  thing.  What  in  the  name  of  Heaven  did  Pelletier  have  to  do 
with  it?  How  could  that  conversation  bind  Pelletier?  Where  is  the 
conspiracy  that  is  shown  to  do  aught  that  is  wrong?  Where  are  the 
things  that  transpired  up  to  this  moment  that  any  honest  man  might 
not  have  done — would  not  have  done?  Where  is  the  evidence  that 
Pelletier  knew  a cent  had  been  brought  over  from  New  York  and  that 
Coakley  was  to  receive  a fee;  that  Carroll  was  to  have  a part  of  the 
fee,  or  did  receive  part  of  the  fee?  Where  is  the  evidence?  There  is 
no  such  evidence.  Then  we  look  at  the  story  of  this  man  Matches 
testifying  here  imder  oath,  testifying  before  the  Bar  Association,  ad- 
mittedly hoping  it  will  help  him  in  his  criminal  case.  His  criminal  case 
that  was  no  sooner  closed  than  he  changed  attorneys  and  got  Mr.  Cole- 
man as  his  representative.  The  same  Coleman  who  went  out  to  Ohio 
and  got  the  affidavit  of  Bond  to  be  used  in  these  proceedings  against 
Pelletier  and  Coakley.  This  same  Coleman  who  came  over  to  Boston 
with  Matches  when  Matches  was  to  testify  before  the  Bar  Association. 
The  same  Coleman  who  was  in  connivance — ^who  had  met  Perrin,  and 
who  like  Perrin  had  talked  the  matter  of  the  written  statement  before 
it  was  delivered  to  the  Bar  Association;  this  statement  that  was  refused 
three  or  four  times.  What  were  these  men  doing — ^this  man  Coleman 
whom  Bond  says  he  learned  represented  Cabot?  What  wbre  they 
to  do  in  gathering  up  this  evidence,  getting  these  affidavits,  but  framing 
a story  to  get  Mr.  Pelletier  for  the  purpose  of  aiding  in  some  mysterious 
way  the  man  Matches  then  under  sentence  and  now  under  final  con- 
viction? The  same  Matches  who,  for  some  mysterious  reason  and  by 
some  mysterious  influence,  is  kept  out  of  the  penitentiary  imtilhecan 
testify  here,  although  the  writ  of  certiorari,  the  last  step  that  could 
be  taken  in  legal  proceeding,  was  overruled  on  the  21st  day  qf  October 
last,  and  evidence  is  delivered  by  that  man  of  an  alleged  conversation 
he  had  with  Mr.  Carroll,  out  of  the  presence  of  Mr.  Pelletier  and  no 
human  being  claiming  it  was  ever  communicated  to  Pelletier.  He 
hears  of  it  first  in  these  proceedings  -when  the  scream  of  perjury  and 
malice,  poirring  from  the  lips  of  these  creatures,  gushes  as  a flood  about 
him. 

Now,  first,  as  to  its  competency,  in  the  absence  of  any  proof  to 
connect.  And,  second,  wiU  this  Court  beheve  Matches  as  against  the 
testimony  of  Mr.  Carroll?  They  were  both  witnesses  for  the  State. 
WiU  the  Court  choose  the  evil  witness,  the  convicted  witness,  the 
criminal  witness,  produced  as  against  the  reputable  law^^er  produced  on 
the  same  side — ^not  by  our  side  but  by  their  side.  Which  is  to  be 
chosen?  Aye,  the  testimony  of  a man  who  himself  admits  or  charges 
himself  with  being  a criminal,  who  comes  in  then  to  take  away  the  char- 
acter of  an  honest  man — on  such  testimony  are  human  reputations  to 
be  wrecked?  Why,  sirs,  if  I had  a common,  yeUow  dog,  I would  not 
convict  him  of  sheepkiUing  upon  the  testimony  of  a mangy  cur  with 
his  mouth  fuU  of  wool.  I would  not  convict  an  honorable  citizen  upon 
the  testimony  of  an  admittedly  dishonorable  man.  If  it  is  ever  done, 
then  the  heavens  of  justice  may  coUapse,  and  these  tribunals  which  are 
the  paUadium  of  our  liberty  become  the  instruments  of  VTong. 

So  much  for  the  Emerson  case. 

47 


Now,  I shall  not  spend  so  much  time  on  other  cases.  My  col- 
league warns  me  that  I am  taking  too  much  time. 

Let  us  take  the  Warren  C.  Daniel-Metropolitan  Motors  case  and 
in  the  cold  Hght  of  reason,  as  far  as  possible  analyse  it.  There  was  an 
investigation — and  this  comes  right  after  the  Emerson  Motors,  which 
had  excited  suspicion — and  another  concern  is  here  selling  stock,  and 
this  investigation  is  started.  Assistant  District  Attorney  Webber 
comes  in  to  Pelletier  one  day  and  says  that  a lawyer  named  Fox  had 
said  to  him  that  Coakley  had  said  to  a lawyer  from  New  York  repre- 
senting the  Metropolitan  Motors  that  he  could  fix  the  District  Attorney 
for  $10,000,  or  words  to  that  effect. 

What  happened?  Now,  let  us  get  this  picture.  Here  sits  a prose- 
cuting attorney,  and  one  of  his  deputies  comes  and  tells  him  of  the 
astounding  tale.  Thereupon  the  District  Attorney  immediately 
telephones  to  Fox  to  come  to  his  office  and  bring  this  lawyer,  Bernstein, 
and  Mr.  Bond.  They  came  to  the  office  and  started  to  tell  their  story. 
The  District  Attorney  said  that  he  thought  the  lawyers,  Coakley  and 
Lavehe,  ought  to  be  present  as  they  were  under  accusation,  and  he 
called  them  to  his  office  to  answer  the  charge.  LaveUe  had  been  first 
employed  by  this  Metropolitan  Motors  Company,  you  will  remember; 
he  had  been  their  attorney,  and,  after  he  had  concluded  that  there 
was  something  serious  the  matter,  he  had  consulted  Coakley.  I hope 
that  is  not  a criminal  act.  Many  times  lawyers  are  consulted  by  other 
lawyers.  I regarded  it  with  a great  deal  of  pride  when  the  day  came  in 
my  life  when  I found  younger  members  of  the  Bar  coming  around  and 
asking  me  to  help  them  in  cases.  If  that  is  a criminal  offence,  then 
about  half  the  lawyers  in  my  city  are  guilty,  and  I am  particeps  criminis, 
because  I.  think  about  half  of  the  number  have  come  to  me  and  I have 
regarded  it  as  the  greatest  compliment  that  could  ever  be  paid  me. 
Perhaps  I have  been  complimenting  myself  too  much,  and  I beg  to  say 
that  it  is  through  inadvertence. 

So,  Lavelle  came  to  Coakley  for  some  help — and,  by  the  way,  the 
evidence  is,  I think,  in  accordance  with  the  fact,  that  LaveUe  at  that  time 
was  at  outs  with  his  former  chief,  the  District  Attorney,  they  were  not 
freinds;  but  now  the  District  Attorney,  indignant  at  this  report,  sum- 
mons these  people  in.  Before  Coakley  arrived,  Webber,  the  assistant, 
and  Fox  were  brought  into  court — 

MR.  BOYLE.  Not  into  court. 

MR.  REED.  Yes — into  PeUetier’s  court,  this  court  which  he 
had  set  up  to  try  these  gentlemen  and  to  find  the  facts.  It  is  tm- 
doubtedly  true,  as  shown  by  the  Bar  Association  evidence  which  was 
introduced  to  contradict  Bernstein,  that  Bernstein  had,  before  the 
Bar  Association,  testified  to  the  fact  that  these  two  men.  Fox  and  Webber, 
were  having  a hot  dispute,  they  were  up  to  the  point  now  where  the 
thing  was  to  be  sifted  out.  Had  Mr.  Fox  made  the  charge  to  Mr. 
Webber  which  Mr.  Webber  reported  to  Mr.  PeUetier?  Fox  imme- 
diately began  to  recede  from  it.  Webber  insisted  upon  it.  And  in 
that  state  of  affairs,  Coakley  having  come  in,  what  transpired? 

48 


Coakley  said — and  the  Bar  Association  evidence  shows  it  now — 
“I  have  talked  to  three  men  in  this  case.  I don’t  care  anything  about 
the  disputes  between  these  gentlemen.  I never  talked  to  them.” 
Coakley  knows — ^he  is  there  on  trial — that  he  has  got  to  purge  himself 
of  that  charge  or  that  he  will  have  to  settle  with  Mr.  Pelletier  in  some 
way.  I know  how  he  would  have  to  settle  out  in  my  country.  So 
Coakley  says,  and  wisely  says,  “I  had  no  talk  with  these  two  gentle- 
men. They  are  talking  at  second  hand.  I have  talked  with  three 
men.  I have  talked  with  Mr.  Bond,  I have  talked  with  Mr.  Bern- 
stein, and  I have  talked  with  Lavelle.  Let  them  tell  their  story.” 
And,  as  they  told  their  stories,  Coakley  said,  “Yes,  I said  that” — ^for 
there  was  nothing  in  the  story  for  him  to  deny,  and  it  did  not  bear  out 
this  foul  aspersion  which  had  been  cast  upon  Pelletier.  And  so  they 
went  through,  each  repeating  his  story,  and  at  the  end  Coakley  said, 
“Now,  everything,  even  that  you  have  said,  Bernstein,  is  true,  except 
I did  not  teU  you  I was  the  ‘Charhe’  Murphy  of  New  York.” 

The  resiilt  of  that  investigation  was  that  Fox’s  charge  was  not 
sustained,  and  there  was  no  evidence  he  had  made  it  except  his  state- 
ment to  Webber,  and  it  did  not  involve  Mr.  Coakley  b'ecause  Coakley  had 
not  talked  to  Fox. 

Then  the  District  Attorney,  having  threshed  this  out,  said,  “There 
appears  to  be  nothing  in  this  case  or  back  of  this  except  some  jealousy 
between  lawyers.”  And  then,  to  show  how  that  Bernstein  had  re- 
tracted every  charge,  or  had,  in  other  words,  denied  each  charge  which 
he  had  made,  he  turned  to  Pelletier  and  said,  “I  would  like  to  have  a 
hearing.”  If  he  had  declared  that  he  had  said  the  thing  Fox  had 
charged,  he  could  not  have  had  a hearing.  He  could  not  have  had 
the  impudence,  with  all  the  impudence  of  his  bold  face — which,  is  after 
all,  the  thing  God  chisels  character  upon — he  would  not  have  dared 
to  make  that  request.  And  Pelletier  walks  from  the  office  and  says, 
“There  will  be  no  hearing  in  this  case.” 

How  like  an  indignant  man?  I do  not  want  to  use  your  Honors 
as  illustration,  but  suppose  some  other  judge,  and  suppose  such  a 
thing  as  this  had  transpired,  and  then  one  of  the  parties  had  said, 
“Well,  I would  like  to  be  heard,  it  being  a matter  where  you  are  not 
obliged  to  give  a hearing”: — I can  imagine  that  judge  walking  indig- 
nantly away  and  saying,  “There  will  be  no  further  hearings  in  this 
case,  on  this  matter.”  ^How  natural! 

That  is  the  Daniels  case.  That  is  the  wicked  thing  that  was 
done  there.  Distorted — twisted — why,  the  most  innocent  act  in  the 
world  can  be  distorted  and  twisted  into  anything. 

Now  we  come  to  the  Peters  case.  The  charge  was  assault  with 
intent  to  commit  rape.  What  are  the  facts?  Peters  lived  in  con- 
cubinage with  his  mistress — ^had  done  so  for  seventeen  years.  He  would 
not  admit  that  he  had  introduced  her  as  his  wife,  but  he  took  her  up 
to  Mr.  and  Mrs.  Robbins’  house,  and  they  played  cards,  and  then  he  came 
up  the  next  morning.  No  matter  what  his  excuse  is — ^his  admissions 
are  here  revealed  so  that  this  Court  and  every  sensible  man  knows 
his  purpose.  I shall  not  discuss  this  case  in  detail,  there  are  too  many 
ladies  here — but  he  grabbed  her,  and  he  pushed  her,  and  he  ran  around 

49 


one  room,  and  finally  admitted  he  ran  her  into  another  room;  and 
now,  that  evening  when  he  came  back,  the  woman’s  outraged  husband 
said,  “I  ought  to  knock  your  block  off,  or  your  head  off,”  and  the  woman 
in  the  house  said,  it  being  in  another  apartment,  “Don’t  have  this  dis- 
turbance in  my  room.”  Then  Mr.  Peters  stands  up  and  says,  “Why, 
he  would  not  have  touched  me.  I am  too” — ^he  meant  to  say — “too 
formidable  a creature  for  even  an  outraged  husband  to  strike.” 

It  seems  according  to  the  code  prevailing  here  they  do  not  resort  to 
more  than  hands  or  feet.  I do  not  know.  I am  not  criticizing  the 
code.  But,  there  are  places  where  size  does  not  coimt  in  affairs  of 
this  kind,  but  weapons  settle  questions  of  that  sort. 

Robbins  went  to  the  courts.  He  had  this  man  arrested.  What  the 
testimony  was  before  the  Grand  Jury  I believe  is  not  here,  but  there  was 
enough  testimony  before  the  Grand  Jury  to  get  an  indictment,  and  in- 
dictment was  returned,  and  that  is  the  end  of  the  matter.  I affirm  it  to 
be  the  law  that  an  indictment  is  conclusive  evidence  in  any  court  of 
law  that  there  was  sufficient  reason  for  the  indictment,  when  the  in- 
dictment is  a collateral  matter  brought  into  the  case.  There  was 
evidence.  On  the  other  hand,  if  Peters  told  the  truth,  then  there  was 
only  a common  assault.  Now,  what  happens?  This  man  Peters  refers 
this  to  five  lawyers,  and  they  all  throw  up  their  hands,  and  finally,  after 
having  Mr.  Lavelle  and  also  calling  in  the  President  of  the  Bar  Associa- 
tion at  this  time, — Mr.  Hurlburt,  they  agree  to  do  what?  They  settle 
the  civil  injuries  with  the  understanding  that  the  case  will  be  dropped. 
If  that  was  wrong  and  wicked,  then  all  were  parties  to  the  wickedness. 
It  is  the  ordinary  way  of  disposing  of  a certain  class  of  injuries.  I 
pass  from  that. 

I intend  to  hurriedly  run  through  the  Buckley  case.  Here  is 
an  interesting  story.  All  of  it  comes  from  the  lips  of  one  man,  and  he 
returns  from  Chicago  to  teU  his  tale.  Upon  what  pressure,  deponent 
sayeth  not,  because  he  has  no  information  sufficient  to  affirm  a belief. 
But  he  came  back.  What  was  developed  ? Little  by  little  it  came  out 
on  cross-examination  that  Ackerman  & Brummel  were  leather  mer- 
chants, that  Buckley  and  four  other  people  at  least,  worked  at  this 
place,  that  Ackerman  & Brummel  had  been  engaged  in  a fraudulent 
scheme  to  impose  inferior  leather  upon  their  customers,  that  they  had 
carried  this  man  along  to  a state  of  perfection  where  they  were  em- 
ploying or  feeing  the  foremen  in  the  factories  of  their  customers,  so 
that  the  foremen  would  pass  the  second-class  leather  as  first-class 
leather,  that  three  of  the  employees  had  discovered  that  fact  and  had 
purloined  from  the  papers  of  the  concern  the  checks  and  documents  to 
prove  that  Ackerman  & Brummel  had  been  engaged  in  these  frauds. 
Of  course  the  possession  of  those  instruments  enabled  them  to  put 
a tremendous  pressure  upon  Ackerman  & Brummel,  in  short  to  black- 
mail Ackerman  & Brummel,  and  Ackerman  & Brummel  gave  up, 
S25,000  to  these  parties  to  buy  their  silence,  and  the  negotiation  for 
that  settlement  was  carried  on  by  Mr.  Buckley.  One  of  these  black- 
mailers had  undertaken  to  camouflage  his  blackmail  imder  a pre- 
tended claim  for  a violation  of  a salary  contract.  Some  time  went  by 
and  Mr.  Buckley,  beyond  any  question,  concluded  that  as  the  other 

50 


scheme  had  been  so  successful,  he  would  practice  it  himself.  Accord- 
ingly he  put  up  a pretended  claim  of  $55,000,  which  I believe,  although 
I am  not  sure,  was  the  exact  amount  of  the  aggregate  blackmail  levied 
in  the  other  case,  including  the  damages  that  had  been  paid  by  Acker- 
man & Brummel  to  one  of  their  wronged  customers.  Buckley  says 
he  had  a contract  in  writing  which  had  not  yet  expired  and  woiild  not 
expire  for  a year.  He  says  he  was  performing  his  duty  and  was  going 
on  with  his  work.  There  was,  therefore,  no  reason  for  a firm  like 
Ackerman  & Brummel  to  offer  him  anything  extra.  And  then  he 
says  that  they  had  agreed  orally  to  pay  him  10  per  cent  in  addition  on 
the  sales,  and  it  figured  just  about  the  amount  of  the  aggregate  black- 
mail levied  before,  including  the  settlement  of  damages.  He  is  de- 
tected down  at  the  hotel  in  conversation  with  one  of  these  former 
clerks  and  blackmailers,  and  the  conversation  is  of  such  a character — 
and  we  get  it  all  from  Mr.  Buckley’s  lips — that,  taken,  as  he  says, 
over  the  dictaphone,  it  contained  some  things  that  he  did  not  agree 
with,  and  when  Mr.  Pelletier  read  it  to  him  the  charge  was  brought 
home.  Here  is  another  man  trying  to  hold  this  firm  up.  He  was 
represented.  He  was  called  there,  talked  to,  as  thousands  of  others 
were,  and  then,  what  happened?  Almost  the  next  day  he  got  together 
with  Ackerman  & Brummel,  the  claim  was  waived  and  the  whole  thing 
settled  up. 

By  whom  was  he  represented?  He  was  represented  by  no  less 
a person  than  Judge  Logan,  who,  I understand  is  a most  excellent 
lawyer  and  whose  record  upon  the  bloody  fields  of  France  shows  that 
he  would  never  lie  down  before  a blackmailing  scheme  any  more  than 
he  would  turn  his  back  upon  a rain  of  German  bullets.  What  was 
done  here  was  to  halt  a blackmailing  scheme,  for,  of  course,  Buckley,  who 
knew  of  these  papers  and  transactions,  could  have  gone  out  and  done 
infinite  injiuy,  and  in  the  settlement,  as  Buckley  declares,  the  papers 
were  surrendered  and  the  evidence  of  the  wrongful  acts  of  Ackerman 
& Brummel  were  taken  up. 

So  that,  we  are  being  tried  here  upon  the  testimony  of  an  attempted 
blackmailer,  for  the'  awful  crime  of  halting  him  and  his  blackmailing 
expedition.  This  sort  of  man  is  put  on  the  stand.  I ask  the  court 
humbly,  to  read  and  analyze  that  stor}^  There  was  only  one  witness, 
their  witness. 

Now,  as  to  the  Cote  case,  here  is  a tale  that  might  evoke  the  laughter 
of  the  gods.  I am  not  going  to  argue  it  at  length.  Your  Honors  will 
remember.  Here  is  the  man  with  the  wife  and  children,  and  a small 
fortime,  the  Cote  girl,  the  abandonment  of  wife  and  children,  the 
turning  over  of  large  sums  of  money  to  the  girl,  the  ring  of  the  mother. 
Oh,  God,  how  could  a man  give  his  mother’s  ring  under  such  circum- 
stances? Then  you  have  the  letter  written  by  the  girl,-  dictated  by 
her,  written  by  her,  pretending  to  turn  over  an  automobile.  And  yet, 
it  was  not  a bill  of  sale  or  a will.  Then  the  storm  between  these  two 
people  over  the  fact  that  the  erring  husband,  the  man  who  had  erred 
against  wife,  was  now  erring  against  the  mistress,  and  another  woman 
had  come  into  the  case.  And  then  they  rage.  I think  this  woman 
says — she  might  have  said  most  anything — there  was  a separation,  and 

51 


then — this  must  have  been  true, — she  must  have  made  some  dire 
threats  against  Lawrence,  or  else,  in  his  impecunious  condition,  he 
would  not  have  hurried  off  to  employ’  a lawyer  before  she  had  ever  said 
anything  at  all  about  the  automobile.  Lawrence  had  appealed  to  his 
brother  who  had  sent  him  $1,000  to  hire  a lawryer.  Why?  Do  I need 
to  tell  this  court  or  suggest  to  this  court  that  Lawrence  was  alarmed 
and  frightened  most  seriously,  that  in  aU  human  probability — just 
what  Coakley  said  wotdd  transpire — she  had  threatened  the  Mann 
Act,  that  she  had  threatened  aU  sorts  of  dire  consequences,  that  she 
had  threatened  expostue  and  ruin,  and  aU  of  that.  And  so,  the  $1,000 
was  paid.  And  then  came  the  consultations  with  McCallum,  and 
then  came  this  suit.  But,  notice,  the  suit  was  for  an  automobile. 
The  title  was  not  given  on  this  piece  of  paper,  but  if  it  had  been,  why 
did  they  send  a copy  of  the  notice  to  Lawrence?  It  was  sent  to  Law- 
rence because  they  wanted  Lawrence  to  know  that  the  processes  of 
the  law  were  going  to  work  out,  that  in  the  public  forum  they  were 
going  to  drag  forth  the  ugly  skeleton  of  his  life,  that  they  were  going 
to  expose  him,  and  if  what  Coakley  told  the  District  Attorney  was 
true,  it  was  but  the  first  step  in  carrying  out  the  threats  to  ruin  and 
destroy  this  man,  and  hence  the  notice.  More  than  that,  when  that 
notice  was  sent,  this  girl  was  already  trying  to  get  back  her  lover. 
She  had  been  trying  to  telephone  him.  And  the  notice  comes.  Two 
conflicting  tides  of  emotion  meet  there,  of  course, — the  desire  to  get  him 
back  if  possible,  the  desire  to  get  revenge,  if  he  cannot  be  gotten  back, 
and  a combination  of  the  two  where  they  meet,  the  desire  to  put  the 
pressure  on  and  force  him  back. 

Just  the  natural  thing  in  life.  And  now  there  was  an  indictment, 
and  as  a result  of  that  indictment  this  blackmailing  scheme  was  stopped. 
That’s  all. 

MR.  BOYLE.  There  was  no  indictment. 

MR.  REED.  No  indictment.  Well,  there  was  a threatened 
indictment,  the  mere  statement,  calling  upon  the  District  Attorney’s 
office  and  asking  “What  is  to  be  done?”  and  McCallum  was  called 
in  there,  undoubtedly  with  a kindly  notion  that  McCallum  was  making 
a mistake  and  that  he  needed  some  suggestions  of  guidance  to  let  him 
know  where  he  was  going.  And  from  what  I saw  of  Mr.  McCallum 
on  the  witness  stand  he  did  need  guidance  about  as  bad  as  any  man  I 
ever  beheld  in  the  court  room.  Now,  that  is  the  case,  if  I talked  upon 
it  for  a week.  It  was  a successful  arrestment  and  stoppage  of  black- 
mail. And  years  go  by.  Lawrence  has  been  finally  alienated  from 
his  wife,  and  then  this  girl  comes  here  to  tell  her  story,  with  the  husband 
sitting  beside  her,  and  a doctor  here  to  feel  her  pulse,  and  an  attorney, 
I think,  sitting  in  the  back  benches  to  represent  her,  and  all  for  what 
purpose?  Because  she  was  not  permitted  to  collect  the  harlot’s  tribute, 
— the  last  stick  the  man  had,  the  last  vestige  of  property  he  possessed. 

The  Emery  case.  What  is  the  State’s  theory.  The  State’s  theory 
is  that  Coakley,  Pelletier,  Corcoran  entered  into  a conspiracy  to  bring 
baseless  criminal  charges  against  Emery  and  wife  and  civil  actions 
against  Emery  and  Mrs.  Chase,  and  thereby  to  extort  money,  that 

52 


in  this  conspiracy  Daniel  J.  Gallagher  got  himself  employed  by  Emery 
and  Mrs.  Chase  for  the  purpose  of  aiding  in  the  blackmail  scheme  by 
advising  them  to  settle  on  Coakley’s  terms,  that  Thomas  L.  Walsh  was 
also  employed  and  gave  the  same  advice  as  Gallagher  and  acted  in 
concert  with  him,  and  regardless  of  any  failure  of  the  State  to  make 
a specific  charge  must  have  been  as  guilty  as  Gallagher.  Now,  what 
are  the  facts? 

Papineau,  whom  you  beheld  upon  the  stand, — there  are  but  few  of 
his  type,  but  you  may  have  seen  some  specimens  before,  somewhat  sim- 
ilar,— came  to  Coakley  and  told  him  that  his  wife  had  been  debauched 
and  stolen  from  him  by  Emery,  that  they  had  been  living  in  adultery 
in  Middlesex  County,  that  he  had  brought  civil  actions  for  damages 
against  Emery  and  Mrs.  Chase,  that  these  actions  were  still  pending, 
that  he  had  been  badly  used  by  his  lawyers,  and  he  wanted  Coakley  to 
punish  these  people  criminally  and  recover  damages  from  them  civilly. 
Coakley  went  with  Papineau  to  Corcoran,  then  the  District  Attorney 
of  Middlesex  County  and  a man  of  good  record  and  presumably  of 
good  character.  The  facts  were  laid  before  him  and  were  presented  to 
the  Grand  Jury,  and  an  indictment  followed.  Was  that  the  proper 
place  to  bring  this  indictment  ? Did  I not  succeed  in  bringing  from  the 
lips  of  Mr.  Emery  himself  admissions  from  which  any  jiuy  in  the 
land  would  have  been  warranted  in  finding  a verdict  that  the  charge 
^ be  made  was  properly  laid  in  Middlesex  County  ? Do  you  remember 
how  like  a fox  he  turned  and  turned  again  upon  his  track  ? Whatever 
way  he  turned  or  ran  he  had  to  nm  through  Middlesex  County.  There 
his  wife’s  babe  was  bom,  in  his  own  father’s  house,  and  there  he  had 
met  her  numerous  times,  and  there  they  had  visited.  The  question  of 
the  treatment  of  Mrs.  Chase  or  of  Emery  or  his  wife  is  utterly  imma- 
terial so  far  as  Pelletier  is  concerned.  The  indictment  of  the  Grand 
Jury  in  Middlesex  County  conclusively  establishes  the  fact  that  there 
was  sufficient  evidence  produced  to  warrant  the  indictment. 

Now,  Emery  employed  detectives.  And  here  is  a somewhat 
comp]icated  tale,  but  I think  I can  make  it  very  simple.  Emery 
employed  detectives  to  watch  Papineau  and  get  him  into  trouble 
with  women.  This  cannot  be  doubted,  in  view  of  the  detective’s  report, 
in  view  of  the  admissions  of  Mr.  Emery,  in  view  of  the  statement  of 
Mr.  Papineau.  Their  idea  was  that  Papineau  was  proceeding  against 
them  criminally,  and  that  if  they  could  get  Papineau  in  the  clutches 
of  the  criminal  law  then  they  could  make  him  let  go  in  their  case, 
and  so  they  employed  these  detectives.  The  purpose  of  the  detectives 
is  too  plain  for  debate  or  argument.  It  is  clearly  shown  that  they 
were  trying  to  get  him  mixed  up  with  women,  and  to  find  some  criminal 
charge  against  him,  and  this  conspiracy  to  get  him  mixed  up  with  women 
was  concocted  in  this  county.  How  was  it  discovered?  Of  course 
we  are  dealing  with  detectives.  They  are  curious  animals.  I say  it 
without  hesitation,  a decent  man  is  never  a detective.  Before  you 
can  be  a detective  you  have  got  to  get  yourself  in  the  frame  of  mind 
where  you  wiU  peep  through  keyholes,  gain  the  confidences  of  men 
and  then  betray  them,  lift  up  the  curtains  of  windows  and  put  your 
sneaking  eye  to  the  crack,  and  whenever  a man  does  that  he  has  laid 

53 


honor  aside  before  he  does  it,  and  when  a man  lays  his  sense  of  honor 
aside  then  there  is  no  limit  to  what  he  will  do  except  fear  of  the  law. 
Now,  they  concocted  that  scheme  over  here  of  the  detective  talking 
to  Papineau.  The  story  would  seem  almost  unbelievable,  but  their 
own  witness  tells  it,  and  surely  they  will  not  repudiate  aught  that 
Papineau  said:  that  the  detective  asked  him  who  represented  him.  He 
learned  that  he  had  a lawyer  in  a casual  conversation.  He  said  Coakley. 
The  detective  said  at  the  time  he  did  not  know  him,  but  the  next  day 
said  he  did  know  him,  that  Coakley  had  once  done  him  a great  favor, — 
I am  not  sure  but  he  said  he  saved  his  life. 

MR.  BOYLE.  Saved  him  from  prison. 

MR.  REED.  Saved  him  from  prison.  He  said,  ‘T  am  going  to 
tell  you  the  truth.  I am  hired  to  watch  you.”  ' He  told  Papineau. 
Papineau  then  goes  to  Coakley  and  tells  him  of  this  conspiracy  to  have 
him  commit  a crime,  to  catch  him  in  an  act,  to  induce  him  to  do  the  act. 
It  was  a crime.  So  stands  the  evidence,  and  on  that  evidence  an  indict- 
ment was  found  against  this  detective  and  against  Emery  and  against 
Robb.  It  was  properly  found.  And  why  should  not  the  District 
Attorney  in  view  of  that  evidence  do  exactly  what  he  did  when  he 
called  this  detective  in,  a man  licensed  under  the  laws  of  Massachusetts 
to  hold  himself  out  to  the  public  as  a detective,  an  officer  of  the  law, 
and  say  to  him,  “I  want  to  know  about  this  thing,”  and  this  detective 
says,  “Although  an  officer  of  the  law  I will  tell  you  nothing.”  And  so 
he  sent  it  to  the  Grand  Jury,  and  they  were  indicted.  They  ought  to 
have  been  indicted.  They  ought  to  have  been  indicted  here. 

The  question  comes  then,  “Why  were  they  not  prosecuted?” 
Well,  we  put  in  no  evidence,  and  so  I am  left  in  this  case,  too  trifling  a 
thing  to  in  itself  have  caused  us  to  go  through  the  long  labor  of  a trial 
unnecessary,  without  any  other  explanation  except  what  we  get  natur- 
ally from  the  evidence.  Why  were  they  not  prosecuted?  WeU,  you 
heard  Papineau’s  story.  You  find  some  other  evidence  in  this  case, 
and  you  discover  from  that  evidence  that  Papineau  had  not  told  Coakley 
the  truth  about  scarcely  anything  when  he  came  there  on  the  6th  of 
October.  He  told  Coakley  that  he  had  his  civil  cases  pending.  They 
had  been  settled  only  a few  months  before  for  the  pittance  of  $1,000. 

He  had  told  Coakley  that  he  had  been  greatly  wronged  and  outraged, 
and  yet  it  transpired  that  this  man  had  yielded  the  custody  of  his  own 
child,  and  volimtarily  agreed  to  a divorce  to  be  granted  to  this  woman, 
consented  to  it,  instead  of  as  he  had  told  Coakley,  the  divorce  being 
granted  without  proper  notice  to  him.  It  transpired  that  while  he 
yielded  the  custody  of  his  own  child,  the  child  of  his  own  loins,  he  brought 
a suit  for  the  custody  of  the  child  of  his  wife’s  paramour  and  his  wife. 
And  so  the  cases  drifted,  that  is  all,  until,  grown  old  and  stale,  whether 
because  of  the  absence  of  witnesses,  whether  because  of  the  discovered 
unreliability  of  Mr.  Papineau,  for  what  reason,  the  long  list  of  which  has 
been  given  in  these  cases  I have  read,  the  District  Attorney  dismissed 
the  case. 

Now,  that  is  the  story,  except  this:  that  Emery,  their  witness,  drags 
in  Daniel  J.  Gallagher,  drags  in  Walsh,  tells  a story  that  needs  no 

54 


refutation  in  this  court,  I am  very  sure,  for  against  the  word  of  such 
a man  as  Emery  shows  himself  to  be  in  this  case  I would  put  the  charac- 
ter of  any  honorable  man  certain  that  it  would  stand  there  like  a granite 
shaft  though  all  the  foul  birds  of  the  air  had  desecrated  it. 

The  Corcoran  case.  I think  I shall  spend  but  a moment  on  that 
case.  What  is  there  to  it  ? In  that  case  it  was  claimed  that  a man,  the 
general  agent  of  a wood  company,  had  defrauded  the  company. 

But  there  was  a civil  side  to  the  case  and  there  was  an  answer  to 
these  charges,  ih  part  at  least.  Now  let  us  take  the  steps.  It  is  brought 
to  Mr.  Pelletier  by  a reputable  lawyer.  He  tells  the  reputable  lawyer 
after  he  hears  it,  “Why,  this  is  a civil  controversy  more  than  criminal; 
it  does  not  belong  here,  and  if  I bring  it  your  institution  will  try  to 
collect  that  money  and  that  will  be  the  end  of  my  case.  We  don’t 
put  that  sort  of  a case  in  here.”  The  lawyer  protests.  He  finally  says 
to  him,  “WeU,  now  that  is  my  opinion.  But  go  and  see  Mr.  Lavelle, 
my  Deputy,  an  experienced  man;  if  you  can  convince  Lavelle  that 
there  is  a case  here  well  and  good,  you  can  take  it  to  the  grand  jury.” 
He  does  take  the  case  to  Lavelle,  a man  of  many  years’  experience,  who 
knows  how  these  cases  come  and  go  and  how  often  the  processes  of 
the  criminal  law  are  abused,-  especially  where  they  concern  foreign 
credits,  and  LaveUe  gives  the  same  answer.  They  go  down  to  the 
lower  court  then  and  they  get  a complaint  there.  Then  the  lawyer  on 
each  side  started  to  do  exactly  what' Pelletier  anticipated,  dickering 
for  the  money.  And  they  continue  that  course  nine  or  ten  times. 
It  was  read  in  the  record  here,  I think,  that  Pelletier  had  wickedly 
caused  the  continuances,  but  behold  it  appeared  that  Pelletier  did  not 
even  go  into  that  court,  and  that  the  continuances  were  arranged 
by  the  lawyers  that  were  interested  in  the  financial  business.  Finally, 
having  used  these  criminal  processes  to  the  extent  they  had,  they 
undertook  to  go  a step  further  and  demand  that  this  man’s  sister 
should  give  up  her  fortune.  And  then  one  of  Pelletier’s  deputies  said, 
“Oh,  no.  You  cannot  do  that.”  Then  the  man  was  released  on  bond 
by  agreement  of  the  attorneys  on  both  sides — released  on  nominal 
bail — in  order  that  he  might  get  out  and  help  salvage  this  property 
and  help  to  settle  up  these  matters.  Pelletier  wrote  it  on  a slip  of 
paper  and  put  it  in  the  papers  and  then  at  last  after  this  man  had  been 
out  and  been  trying  to  help  salvage  the  matter,  and  civil  suits  having 
been  brought,  the  whole  matter  being  in  controversy  in  the  civil  courts, 
he  dismissed  the  case  as  he  ought  to  have  dismissed  the  case.  That 
is  that  case. 

Now  I have  one  more  case — the  Perry  case.  Perry — you  will 
remember  the  little  lawyer  who  came  on  the  stand — ^Am  I inconvenienc- 
ing your  Honors?  I have  carried  you  by  the  hour — 

RUGG,  C.  J.  We  haven’t  asked  you  to  pause,  Mr.  Reed. 

MR.  REED.  I know  I am  wearying  myself  and  I have  no  doubt 
I may  be  wearying  the  court,  bu^;  I will  be  through  now  very  briefly. 

RUGG,  C.  J.  I hope  we  have  manifested  no  impatience.  We  cer- 
tainly have  felt  none. 


55 


MR.  REED.  I know  what  a burden  it  is  to  listen  to  any  man, 
especially  myself,  make  a speech  for  two  hours. 

Now  let’s  take  this  case.  The  State’s  theory  is  that  Perry,  Barry, 
Pembroke,  Seratt,  Bouve,  Collamore  and  Rice  were  all  engaged  in  a 
conspiracy  to  steal  automobiles.  That  their  enterprise  extended 
over  three  or  four  counties,  complaints  existing  against  them  in  Middle- 
sex County,  Tufts  being  the  then  District  Attorney;  that  Corcoran 
collected  a $5,000.  fee,  and  afterwards  he  learned  that  there  were  com- 
plaints in  Essex  County,  and  likely  to  be  complaints  in  Suffolk  County, 
and  other  counties  and  he  demanded  $10,000  more;  that  he  told  these 
parties  he  could  prevent  indictments  in  any  of  these  counties.  I 
haven’t  any  doubt  he  told  them  so.  I haven’t  any  doubt  from  what 
has  developed  that  he- would  have-  unhesitatingly  told  any  client  he 
could  have  controlled  this  court;  that  Corcoran  told  him  he  could  pre- 
vent indictments  in  Suffolk  and  had  arranged  for  a hearing  before  the 
cases  would  be  presented  in  Suffolk;  that  the  fee  was  deposited  in  the 
bank;  that  Charles  H.  Innes  was  a party  to  the  scheme;  that  Wells  and 
Tufts  were  both  implicated;  and  that  Corcoran  pretended  to  telephone 
to  Pelletier,  but  the  conversation  was  not  heard.  Now  there  is  this 
long  story,  all  told  in  great  detail.  I wouldn’t,  your  Honors,  believe 
one  word  of  it  coming  from  the  lips  that  it  did,  after  the  charge  had 
been  made  against  Mr.  Wells  and  Mr.  Innis,  after  they  had  been  drawn 
in.  Whenever  I find  a man  himself  fleeing  from  the  law  begin  to  cast 
aspersions  not  on  one,  but  two  or  three,  that  story  ceases  to  have 
weight  with  me.  Now  what  were  the  facts  ? Where  does  Pelletier  come 
in?  The  case  was  in  these  other  two  counties.  It  seems  indictments 
were  returned,  all  of  them  still  pending — at  least  one  of  them  still 
pending  where  Mr.  Perry  should  have  been  to  plead  the  day  he  stood 
here  testifying.  There  was  an  end  to  this  case  here,  however,  a Suffolk 
County  end.  The  case  was  presented  by  the  police  to  the  Municipal 
Court.  Perry  and  Barry  were  bound  over.  The  case  went  to  the 
Grand  Jury  in  the  usual  course  along  with  the  regular  grist  and  indict- 
ments were  returned.  The  evidence  was  fully  heard.  Every  fact  in 
the  possession  of  the  District ' Attorney  was  submitted  to  the  Grand 
Jury,  and  the  Grand  Jury  notes  have  been  introduced  in  evidence. 

MR.  BOYLE:  You  are  in  error.  Senator,  about  indictments 
being  returned.  That  was  the  case  where  Perry  went  before  the  Grand 
Jury. 

MR.  REED:  Indictments  were  voted  and  not  returned.  The 
evidence  was  fully  heard,  and  as  I understand  the  Grand  Jury  notes 
are  in  evidence  here.  Every  fact  in  the  possession  of  the  District 
Attorney’s  office  was  submitted  in  conversation  with  the  officer.  It 
had  undoubtedly  been  said  by  the  officer  that  charges  were  being  made 
in  Middlesex  County  and  Essex  County  and  that  the  cases  were  under 
investigation  there,  if  not  under  indictment.  Pelletier  had  said  “Let 
Middlesex  County  wash  its  own  dirty  linen.’’  Let  me  say  to  your 
Honors  I understand  it  to  be  the  practice  where  a crime  is  laid  in  three 
or  four  cormties  that  the  county  first  taking  jurisdiction,  the  other 
counties  yield  jurisdiction:  that  if  these  facts  be  known,  unless  there 

56 


be  some  peculiar  circumstances  that  would  be  the  practice.  There  is 
no  evidence  as  to  just  what  follows.  When  he  got  his  information 
through  the  police  or  through  the  deputies  is  undoubtedly  reflected 
through  the  evidence — that  is,  Perry  got  it  a day  or  two  after  the 
indictments  had  been  voted,  while  it  appeared  that  he,  Pelletier,  knew 
nothing.  Perry  and  Barry  appeared  and  requested  to  be  heard  before 
the  grand  jury.  Now  here  was  Perry  a lawyer  who,  up  to  this  time, 
had  not  been  criminally  involved.  Barry,  I think  the  evidence  shows, 
keeping  one  of  the  largest  automobile  garages  in  this  city.  They  asked 
to  be  heard.  Grand  Juror  Cutler  testifies  that  Pelletier  went  before 
the  grand  jury  and  said  that  Perry  and  Barry  had  called  at  his  office 
and  made  a request  that  they  be  allowed  to  go  before  the  grand  jury. 
He  said  it  was  unusual,  but  that  the  grand  jury  had  a right  to  grant  the 
request  if  they  wanted  to  do  so.  Grand  Juror  Russell  tells  substan- 
tially the  same  story.  These  men  made  their  statement  and  there  is 
not  the  slightest  evidence  that  there  was  any  interfering  with  or  tam- 
pering with  the  grand  jury.  The  grand  jury  in  the  exercise  of  its  dis- 
cretion, with  all  the  evidence  before  it  in  the  possession  of  the  District 
Attorney  or  his  deputies,  voted  no  bills;  and  undoubtedly  the  grand 
jury,  in  my  opinion,  became  convinced  that  there  was  a doubt  about 
the  case;  were  impressed  by  the  fact  that  a lawyer,  hitherto  of  unsullied 
reputation,  and  a prominent  business  man  were  wrongfully  accused. 
Undoubtedly  they  were  impressed  with  the  fact  that  the  evidence — 
the  chief  evidence  in  the  case,  as  I think  the  grand  jury  notes  will 
shoWj  was  that  of  a confessed  thief  who  was  turning  State’s  evidence. 
Undoubtedly  the  experienced  grand  jury  under  these  conditions,  con- 
cluded to  let  these  cases  be  tried  elsewhere,  and  at  least  not  to  indict 
these  two  men.  Now  what  happened?  They  then  voted  “no  bill.” 
How  is  Pelletier  connected?  Not  a word  of  testimony  to  show  that 
Pelletier  knew  anything  about  Corcoran’s  fees,  or  Corcoran’s  schemes, 
or  Corcoran’s  plans.  No  evidence  that  he  did  an  overt  act  in  this  case, 
except  to  make  the  statement  of  fact  to  the  grand  jury  that  these  men 
wanted  a hearing,  a thing  which  was  usual  and  proper.  Conspiracy 
cannot  be  established — Pelletier  cannot  be  made  a party  to  Corcoran’s 
scheme  by  the  mere  fact  that  Corcoran  told  his  clients  he  could  get 
them  a hearing,  a thing  which  is  ordinarily  granted  to  every  decent 
lawyer.  And  whatever  Corcoran  may  be  today,  at  that  time  he  was 
a lawyer  in  good  standing 

Now  I have  gone  through  I fear,  to  the  great  weariness  of  the 
court,  this  list  of  cases  which,  together  with  the  cases  discussed  by  my 
colleague.  Attorney  General  Boyle,  complete  the  entire  catalogue.  I 
have  just  a few  words,  if  your  Honors  please,  to  say  in  conclusion. 

What  is  back  of  this  case?  A search  has  been  going  for  three 
long  years,  according  to  the  evidence.  A dictaphone  put  in  his  office. 
Papers  purloined  from  Mr.  Coakley’s  office  and  the  man  who  was  en- 
gaged in  the  prosecution  of  these  investigations  convicted  of  receiving 
them  criminally.  The  underground  proceeds,  nevertheless.  Matches 
being  convicted  in  New  York,  we  find  an  attorney  connected  with  Mr. 
Cabot  going  over  to  get  Bond  and  to  bring  him  here  as  a witness — no, 
let  me  correct  that — to  get  Bond’s  affidavit;  the  same  man  getting  the 

57 


proceedings  R attorney  bnngmg  Matches  here;  these 

^1^0®  1 <^rned  to  the  Bar  Association,  for  three  years  books 
ransacked  and  papers  overhauled  and  bank  accounted  inspected  and 
out  of  80,000  cases  at  last  these  twenty  are  brought  to  trilh  ’ 

of  conspiracy  shgM  under  Se  cirStlnS'lt  is  betto  t^anTny 
a remark  whth^?M^r^°“®”‘  ^ “ade 

thecOv^^t,’^  ^ propaganda  going  throughout 

wron?^  \f 1'®**.*^®  “an  who  tells  you  that  he  is 

a thin?  ?i  WW  T ^^®  and  tumble  of  the  hustings, 

ahM^nl  * la^said  I have  said  it  myself,  and  I think  I am  a law- 

abiding  citizen.  I said  it  to  tickle  the  crowd.  And  these  reporters 

h^ed^^P  'r”  °“®i  representing  the  only  paper  that  pub- 

a^ft  Pelletier-even  he  had  to 

^ f provoked  laughter,  and  the  last  witness  completely 
showed  how  farcical  it  was.  pf  course,  if  men  hate  another  man  they 
can  spze  on  things  of  that  kind,  and  trifles  light  as  air  become’  huge 
mountains  bellowing  with  Are  and  smoke.  But,  to  the  normal  mind 

tr^higTSlirtoT"  i^^°  thought  that  PeUetier  was 

trying  really  to  have  people  go  out  on  the  street  and  beat  other  people 

Ts  to°S’?ip^W%^“"^  1°  that  race.  To  treat  it  sertously 

IS  to  make  a jest  of  him  who  so  treats  it. 

But  what  is  back  of  this  case?  I do  not  know.  Out  of  his  twelve 

years  work  there  is  no  charge  for  the  last  three  except  these  charges 

fte^is  no  XS  concerned,  and  out  of  the  first  six  yeL 

sprinI^of’hk®pff^!f-  ^f®w"  ’^®‘‘®  ^®  find  the  main- 

the  Kd?Ms  of  rA?*”K'  because  during  the  war  he  headed 

thp  t-  ^ Columbus  and  was  the  executive  officer  charged  with 
the  collection  and  expenditure  of  forty  millions  of  dollars?  Was  it 
because  that  money  went  to  France’s  stricken  fields?  Was  it  because 
Islt^lfepau’^  Church  coifierred  upon  him  a badge  of  distinction? 
fitrl  wl^o  ®'’®”  tfi“ngh  that  society  to  which  he  belongs,  sol- 
diers who  were  coughing  up  their  lungs,  soldiers  who  are  groping  their 

TnH  blindness,  soldiers  who  are  halting^ crippled 

Honi^of^^  fi  ^'"®  fiy  numerous  organiza- 

tions of  which  he  IS  the  head?  Does  this  diabolic  prosecution  spring 

hi^rew  PT  ri!-  “®Pne«  Cabot  and 

thp  p3^  that  makes  them  gather  witnesses  from  the  four  quarters  of 

thft  protection  to  the  cruninal  and  near  criminal?  Is 

that  the  sinister  shadow  which  rises  back  of  the  scene  ? I do  not  know. 

pin?  I boldly  say,  that  I have  never  seen  in  all  my  life  such  dig- 

ging in  the  catacombs  of  the  past,  such  raking  of  the  dust  of  time,  such 

58 


malicious  ingenuity,  such  fixed  determination  and,  as  I have  witnessed 
the  scene,  I have  thought  of  a story  I once  read  of  a gallant  steed, 
high-headed,  flashing-eyed,  proud  of  soul,  and  a lizard  fastened  his 
crooked  teeth  into  his  flank  and  there  hung  on  until,  at  last,  the  glorious 
steed,  whose  feet  had  spumed  the  desert  sands,  whose  nostrils  had 
drunk  in  the  breath  of  morning,  was  dragged  down  to  death. 

I thank  the  Court. 

RUGG,  C.  J.  Mr.  Attorney  General,  it  is  so  near  the  end  of 
the  day  we  offer  you  the  choice  and  let  you  determine  whether  you 
begin  your  argument  tonight  or  wait  until  half  past  nine  tomorrow 
morning. 

MR.  ALLEN.  I think,  may  it  please  the  Court,  that,  in  view 
of  the  nearness  of  the  closing  hour,  I will  wait  until  tomorrow  morning. 

(Adjourned  9.30  A.M.,  Tuesday,  January  24,  1922.) 


59 


